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Introduction
Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar 
Two things have inspired us to edit a volume on migration, Turkey and the 
European Union (EU).
Firstly, the year 2011 is  the 50th anniversary of the bi-lateral agreement 
between Turkey and Germany on labor recruitment in 1961. In half a century, 
enormous political  and economic changes took place both in Germany and 
Turkey. Thanks to the so-called “Guest-Workers” Programs, the labor shortage 
of Germany during the reconstruction and recovery period after World War II 
has been met by a migrant labor force. On the other hand, it suited very well 
the excess labor problem of Turkey. For Turkey, there were two main premises 
behind the bilateral agreements. First, migrants were expected to return with 
new skills, which would have had positive externalities on the labor market. 
Second, remittances of workers were expected to generate productive invest-
ment- and employment-creating activities. The history of Turkish emigration, 
which started more than half a century ago, has disappointed these expecta-
tions from the Turkish point of view in two ways. On the one hand, remit-
tances of Turkish migrants did not render the hope for the economic impulse. 
They remained a tool for financing the balance of payments deficits but they 
did not turn into employment-creating investments. On the other hand, the 
transfer of the return of the migrants’ skills did not take place. On Germany’s 
side, from an economic point of view, labor market shortages were relaxed and 
the migrant labor force contributed to the economic boom tremendously. Yet, 
Germany ended up with an unintended permanent migration and no coherent 
integration  policy.  Initially,  the  agreement  between  Germany  and  Turkey 
meant a temporary migration, yet many migrants ended up being permanent 
residents. The agreement with Turkey came to an end in 1973 with an expecta-
tion that the guest-workers would return. However, after the 1970s, migration 
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trends to Germany and other European countries continued and took different 
forms such as family unification, asylum seeking, refugee movements and ir-
regular migration. 
Secondly, in order to increase the consistency of the individual contribu-
tions to the book, we organized an international workshop on “Migration Po-
tentials from and to Turkey” at the Hamburg Institute of International Econom-
ics (HWWI) on January 12, 2010. This workshop was supported by the EU Marie 
Curie  Research  Training  Networks  on  the  “Transnationality  of  Migrants” 
(TOM).1 The idea of the workshop was to bring scholars from research centers, 
mainly  specialized in  migration research, to  exchange ideas  and share per-
spectives. Experts from various disciplines were invited to discuss the question 
of  potential  effects  of Turkey’s  accession  to  the EU on migration potentials 
from their specific point of view. During the workshop, we addressed the his-
torical dimension and possible scenarios as well as challenges and opportu-
nities arising from migration. Throughout the workshop, we sought to gener-
ate some more knowledge on the topic of “migration potentials” from several 
angles. To this end, we included issues such as labor market aspects, push and 
pull factors, volume/profile/regional distribution/pattern of migration poten-
tial,  current  migration  panorama,  future  trends,  demographic  factors  and 
policy aspects in the context of EU accession. The workshop was designed as a 
small conference with around 20 participants and there were four key presen-
tations, which triggered extensive and lively discussions.2
Editing a volume on the entire migration experience of Turkey over the 
last half century and covering all the aspects of future potential migration in 
the context of EU-Turkey relations is probably an over-ambitious target. Never-
theless, this book touches upon at least some important aspects of the ongoing 
debate about the effects of Turkey’s accession to the EU upon the migration 
flows and sheds light on various dimensions of current panorama, addressing 
policy implications as well as future challenges and opportunities.
1 The TOM Research Training Network was started in 2007 and continued until the end of 2010. It had 15 teams all across 
Europe investigating the contribution that foreign migrants make to the social and economic linkages between countries. 
In particular, the TOM project assessed how migration contributed to increasing trade, creating larger capital flows, increas-
ing foreign direct investment and encouraging further migration.
2 A majority of these presentations can be downloaded from http://www.hwwi.org/themenfelder/demografie-migration-
und-integration/projekte/migration-und-integration/tuerkei-und-migration.html.  A conference program is  available at 
http://www.hwwi.org/fileadmin/hwwi/Veranstaltungen/Workshops/2010/2010-01-12_Workshop-Agenda.pdf and at the 
end of this volume, as well.
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The “gradual realization of the free flow of workers” from Turkey into the 
European Economic Community was regarded as a significant and positive as-
pect of the 1963 Ankara Agreement, which was signed two years after the be-
ginning of an intense migratory movement from Turkey into Europe. The An-
kara Agreement had made Turkey an associate member of  the Community. 
However, 42 years after this Agreement, in the Negotiating Framework of Oc-
tober 3, 2005, in the context of Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership pro-
cess, it was stated that long transition periods and derogations, specific arrange-
ments, or provisions of permanent protection might be effective to limit the 
free movement of people from Turkey. Although these new perspectives sig-
naled a renewed emphasis on the migration between Turkey and the EU, they 
reframed the issue in a negative context. It is only natural that new perspectives 
on migration will emerge under changing circumstances. Undoubtedly, a domin-
ant trend to emerge in recent years has been the politicization of migration in 
the EU climate. In the political arena, migration has essentially become an issue 
of “governance” requiring the participation of actors on national, international, 
transnational and civil-society levels. Ahmet İçduygu and Ayşem Biriz Karaçay, 
in Chapter 1, emphasize the demographic aspects of migration issues within 
the scope of EU-Turkey relations. They make general inferences on the quali-
tative and quantitative status of migration on the basis of current debates over 
Turkey’s EU membership. Throughout the chapter, they interpret migration as 
an issue of governance and policymaking. Within this framework, they outline 
three main issues in EU discussions on the issue of international migration in 
relation to Turkey, including: (a) whether an intense migratory wave towards 
the EU in case of a free movement will  create serious economic, social  and 
political adjustment problems; (b) whether Turkey’s demography and, as a con-
sequence of this demography, the migration waves of Turkish origin, will have 
a complementary role in the demographic shrinkage process in the EU and (c) 
whether Turkey, in its position as a “receiving country” and “migration transit 
zone”, will  be successful, and, if so, to what extent, in producing and imple-
menting policies in compliance with the EU-centric international  migration 
and asylum regimes. The chapter concludes with the tasks of the EU, Turkey 
and migrants in handling the issue of migration as a “political phenomenon 
that requires governance”.  İçduygu and Karaçay argue that changing demo-
graphic processes will  affect migratory movements that Turkey, Europe and 
other neighboring geographies might encounter, and the future status of inter-
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national  migration in the Euro-Turkish space should be considered together 
with its economic, social, political and demographic dimensions.
Throughout most of the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey has been hit hard 
by the EU’s claim that most of Turkey’s policies were substandard and insuffi-
cient to be accepted as a member to the EU. In the realm of asylum and migra-
tion, the story was similar with Turkey being accused of violating the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers, as well  as being unable to control its borders. 
However, since 2002, the Turkish government and bureaucracy have engaged 
in a fascinating process of reforming their immigration policies. In Chapter 2, 
Juliette Tolay examines the role played by the EU in triggering these reforms, 
and how these reforms matched with Turkey’s qualification as a “European 
country”. Tolay argues that the rationale behind Turkey’s reforms in the realm 
of  immigration  goes  beyond  a  traditional  process  of  “Europeanization”, but 
rather is the result of what she calls “critical Europeanization” or the activation 
of Turkish pride and willingness to do “better than the Europeans”, or be “more 
European than the Europeans”.
Turkey has a long tradition of accepting refugees – a fact that is little 
known in the West. The Cold War years were characterized by asylum seekers 
from the Soviet world. Those recognized as refugees by North America were 
mainly resettled in North America. The composition and volume of  asylum 
seekers into Turkey have changed considerably since the end of the Cold War 
as well as the policies of the government. Kemal Kirişçi, in Chapter 3, brings a 
critical approach to the evolution of Turkish asylum policy in the last two de-
cades and assesses the role of “Europeanization” in the transformation of Tur-
key’s policies. Kirişçi argues that the impact of the “EU” has been a mixed and 
contested one and that other factors such as the UNHCR (United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees)’s long-standing engagement of Turkey, the rise of 
an effective civil society, the rulings of the ECHR (European Court of Human 
Rights) and the “logic of appropriateness” have also played an important role in 
this transformation.
Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to irregular migration. Turkey was known 
as a “sending” country for a long time. However, it has started witnessing an 
ever-increasing migration flow of an irregular nature into the country since 
the 1990s due to political unrest and economic transformation in the region. 
The integration of the Turkish economy to the global markets with increasing 
informal  employment  opportunities  attracted  people  from  former  socialist 
countries as migrant workers. In spite of this phenomenon, studies delineating 
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the position of irregular migrants participating clandestinely in the labor mar-
kets and tackling their employment conditions are rather few. Studies on do-
mestic and care workers that make the main body of the existing research and 
the other few surveys on migrants employed in various branches of economic 
activity demonstrate that irregular immigrants live and work under very pre-
carious conditions. In Chapter 4,  Gülay Toksöz and Çağla Ünlütürk Ulutaş re-
view and evaluate the existing labor migration literature from  a gender per-
spective to highlight different levels of precarity that male and female migrant 
workers are confronted with to answer the question of feminization of migra-
tion in Turkey.  Sema Erder and Selmin Kaşka, in Chapter 5, focus on the relative 
position of the foreigners in the Turkish labor market with special reference to 
the new immigration flows generating from the region. For this sake, the inter-
action of the informal labor market and irregular migration are examined. The 
current terminology on irregularity is critically analyzed in Erder’s and Kaşka’s 
article, which calls for the necessity of reconsidering/redefining the concept.
Giulia Bettin, Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar analyze the rea-
sons behind the sharp decrease after the year 1998 in the volume and the trend 
of the aggregate flows of remittances as well as its consequences for the Turk-
ish economy in an historical context in Chapter 6. Remittance literature with 
respect to Turkey focuses on the determinants of remittances, both from a mi-
croeconomic and macroeconomic perspective, and their (anti)cyclical behavior. 
However, there is  a gap in the literature for a study looking in depth at the 
causes  and  consequences  of  the  fall  in  the  post-1998  remittances  trend. 
Against this background, this chapter also considers how remitting behavior 
is affected by economic downturns and specifically the focus here is on what 
happened to remittance flows to Turkey during and after the financial crises 
of 1994, 2000/1 and 2008. The findings show that the decline in remittances 
might be the consequence of several coexisting reasons. New generations of 
migrants  have weaker  ties  with  Turkey and they  are  progressively  moving 
from the return idea to the willingness of settling permanently in the host 
country and investing in their own businesses there. At the same time, the 
contraction in remittance flows after the last two financial crises that hit Tur-
key in the 2000s shows that even if the investment motives could still play a 
role in determining remittance behavior, the instability of  the Turkish  eco-
nomy and the consequent loss of trustworthiness probably played a key role in 
influencing migrants’ attitude towards remittances negatively.
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The geographical and political location is fundamental to Turkey’s migra-
tion reality. Istanbul as a global city is a hotspot for various migration move-
ments and one of the very few economic centers and global cities at the frontier 
of the EU. This location of Istanbul illustrates its high significance in the region 
as center of the global modern economy and its attraction for various migrant 
groups as it provides various spaces for transnational identities, life-styles and 
formal and informal organizations. In Chapter 7, Barbara Pusch analyses vari-
ous forms of transnational migration to Istanbul. After a short overview on re-
cent migration movements to Turkey and the clarification of the theoretical 
concepts used in the article, she focuses on Istanbul’s attractiveness for regular 
migrants,  irregular  labor  migrants,  irregular  transit  migrants  and  asylum 
seekers  and  refugees  as  well  as  migrants  with  a  Turkish  background.  She 
presents micro-level examples from her empirical work, which represent the 
experiences of migrants within the context of transnationality. In this context, 
she elaborates the relation of transnational migration and global cities using 
the example of Istanbul. 
The potential for migration to Turkey of highly skilled migrants educated 
in Germany with a Turkish background is and will be significant, as well. In 
Chapter 8, Yaşar Aydın examines the migration of highly qualified Turks from 
Germany to Turkey, ones who went through the German education system 
(from primary school to the college degree). Aydın discusses on the ground of a 
transnationality  framework  whether  this  migration  movement  is  a  brain-
drain process. Aydın postulates the reasons that motivate the highly qualified 
Turks for their migration decision. Among these reasons, the three most im-
portant ones are as follows. First, due to the recent developments in the Ger-
man economy, such as privatization, unemployment and the shrinkage of so-
cial benefits, highly skilled migrants are under the risk of unemployment or 
underemployment. These  economic  determinants  play  the  most  important 
role among the pushing factors, yet they influence the confidence of highly 
skilled migrants with regards to the future of the German economy. Second, 
highly qualified migrants feel under the risk of being disadvantaged or even 
discriminated against. For instance, the unemployment rate among German 
academics is 4.4 %, whereas it is 12.5 % among the academics with an immigra-
tion background. Third, in line with the integration of the Turkish economy 
with the world economy, the Turkish labor market became quite attractive for 
the highly skilled German-Turks. The attractiveness of Istanbul, as it is in the 
center of the branches of many German firms and as it is preferred due to so-
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cial networks and cultural closeness, also plays a role in the migration decision. 
German companies that have branches in Istanbul mostly prefer highly quali-
fied German-Turks, who immigrated to Turkey, hold the blue-card (free to work 
and reside in both countries) and speak both languages. 
The last contribution highlights immigration policies in Germany from 
the  1960s  to  today  with  a  special  emphasis  on  integration  discussions.  In 
Chapter 9, Mehmet Okyayuz  highlights the immigration policies in Germany 
from the 1960s to today with a special emphasis on integration discussions. He 
critically analyzes the determinants of the migration and integration debate 
from a socio-historical point of view. He argues that, from the bilateral agree-
ment between Germany and Turkey in 1961 until the recruitment stop of 1973, 
immigration policy was solely guided by the interests of the economic actors 
of the receiving country and was more or less equal to labor market policy. 
Starting from the mid-1970s, the social dimension of labor migration was em-
phasized in the sense that migrants themselves were integrated into debates 
concerning migration policies related to their living and working conditions. 
With  the  1980s,  a  notion  of  integration  emerged  in  which  the  migrants’ 
strategies were no longer considered useful for developing a diverse, multicul-
tural,  tolerant  and  democratic  society  that  respects  human  rights  and 
freedoms. This chapter assesses perceptions of integration and participation of 
foreigners, along with perceptions of socio-political order and multiculturalism 
underlying and steering the flow of the debates, in order to show tendencies 
within the process of the relations between the foreigners and the political 
sphere (reflected in the wide scope of responsibility and action of the state) on 
the one hand, and the social sphere (reflected in the wide scope of action of so-
cial actors) on the other hand. A special emphasis is given to the structural di-
mension of immigration policies best seen within the context of their possible 
functionalization as a mechanism to solve social tensions.

Demography and Migration in Transition:  
Reflections on EU-Turkey Relations
Ahmet İçduygu and Ayşem Biriz Karaçay
Introduction
Public and scholarly discourses on the relationship between the European Union 
(EU) and Turkey in the 1990s were dominated by discussions of “democracy”. 
This was mostly due to the conditionality of the Copenhagen Criteria in the 
context of  Turkey’s prospective EU membership, which was concerned with 
bringing  the  structures  and  procedures  of  Turkish  democracy  closer  to 
European standards.1 Interestingly, what seems to partly accompany this dis-
course in the 2000s is a discourse centered around another concept which also 
carries the prefix “demo”, that is “demography”, and together with it, one of its 
by-products, “migration”.2 These discourses stress the question of the compat-
ibility of demographic and migratory regimes between the EU and Turkey and 
largely focus on the related outcomes of observed or assumed incompatibility.3 
Likewise, it is also not surprising to see that migration issues are debated 
in a period of membership negotiation between the EU and Turkey. Debates 
about migration involve a variety of issues. For instance many politicians in 
Europe frequently speak of the “invasion” of migrants from Turkey when they 
publicly debate Turkish EU membership.4 Moreover, the commonly accepted 
view that Turkish immigrants who are already in Europe face integration diffi-
culties, together with intensifying Islamophobia on the continent, have made 
1 Çarkoğlu/Rubin (2003), Kramer (2000), Uğur (1999).
2 Behar (2006, pp. 17–31), Erzan/Kuzubaş/Yıldız (2006, pp. 3–44), Coleman (2004), TFHPF (Turkish Family, Health and Plan-
ning Foundation) (2004), ICT (Independent Commission on Turkey) (2004).
3 İçduygu (2010, pp. 59–71). 
4 Lagro (2008, pp. 58–78). 
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Turkey-related migration issues a topic of critical debate in European circles.5 How-
ever, proponents of Turkey’s EU membership argue that Turkey’s EU membership 
is in the Union’s interest, because it would reduce demographic pressures on the 
labor market by bringing workers into the Union.6 As these examples demon-
strate, migration-related issues in the context of Turkey’s prospective EU member-
ship have attained growing salience in public, policy, and academic debates in the 
EU because they have unique and multi-faceted implications for the economic, 
social, political and demographic structures and processes of the EU. 
Against this background, the main purpose of this paper is to map out the 
demography related debate in the context of the EU-Turkey relationship. 
Rethinking International Migration for the EU and Turkey
The early 1960s and the 1970s have witnessed the emigration of large numbers 
of  Turkish  nationals  to  Western  European  countries, particularly  West  Ger-
many. These emigration flows continued until recent times through family re-
unification schemes and the asylum track. However, today Europe is not the 
only point of destination for the migration movement from Turkey to abroad. 
In addition to the neighboring Arab countries and the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS), the geographical area to which migration of Turkish ori-
gin reaches includes countries such as the United States of America (USA), Aus-
tralia and Canada.7 More recently, Turkey has also become a country of transit 
for irregular migrants from Asian countries, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, who are trying to reach the Western world and for 
refuge for asylum seekers coming from neighboring Middle East countries and 
beyond. Furthermore, Turkey is also becoming a destination country for EU 
professionals  and  retirees  as  well  as  regular  and  irregular  migrants  from 
former  Soviet  Bloc  countries.8 Because  Turkey  possesses  multiple  identities 
within the context of international migration, the topic is inevitably of great 
importance in terms of the handling of migration issues within the relation-
ship between the EU and Turkey.9 
5 Erzan/Kirişçi (2009), Kaya/Kentel (2005).  
6 Constantinos (2004, pp. 203–217), Behar (2006, pp. 17–31), Muenz (2006). 
7 İçduygu (2004, pp. 88–99).
8 İçduygu/Kirişçi (2009), İçduygu/Toktaş (2003, pp. 25–54).
9 Ibid.
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The Republic  of  Turkey, which will  celebrate the centennial  of  its  pro-
clamation in 2023, is currently undergoing a very significant period of trans-
formation at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Since Turkey has been 
experiencing an intense period of economic, social and political transforma-
tion  based on democratic and liberal values – along with becoming increas-
ingly integrated into the world economy due to globalization – it is inevitable 
that Turkey has been faced with new migratory movements. In this process, 
the neighboring polities, including Europe, are also expected to face new dy-
namics of migration. Because of this, it is certain that the demographic pro-
cesses to be experienced in the upcoming years will have an impact on the mi-
gratory movements that Turkey, Europe and other neighboring regions might 
encounter. However, it is a fact that the “window of demographic opportunity”, 
which is expected to open when an “environment where labor supply, employ-
ment and the quality of the labor force constantly increases, leading to an in-
crease in economic performance”, emerges due to the “significant increase in the 
rate of the working age population”, will reduce possible migration tendencies in 
Turkey in the prospective new era that the Turkish demography will  enter.10 
Therefore, the future status of international migration should be considered 
together with its economic, social, political and demographic dimensions. 
The  emergence  and  continuity  of  international  migration  can  be  ex-
plained, in general, by the balance between the receiving country’s or terri-
tory’s need for a migrant labor force and the concomitant need of the source 
country or territory to reduce the pressure of the unemployed labor force on 
the economy. From this point of view, it is clear that there is a strong potential 
for  international  migration  within  the  geographical  area  that  includes  the 
European Union and Turkey within coming decades. The process initiated by 
rapidly  decreasing  fertility  rates  and  an  aging  population  creates  a  demo-
graphic gap that essentially calls for migration in order for the member states 
of the European Union to be able to reproduce themselves economically and 
socially. It is clear that in the EU’s immediate neighbors to the South and East, 
there is a large, geographically mobile labor force that cannot be absorbed by 
the economies of these countries and, hence, there exists the potential for mi-
gratory flows that could fill the aforementioned demographic gap within the 
European Union’s member states. However, one must recognize that interna-
tional migration does not simply emerge on the basis of a “principle of compu-
10 Behar (2008), Muenz (2006).
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tational fluid”.11 In addition to the comparisons of economic “supply and de-
mand” or “necessities and opportunities”, political and social “selectivity and 
choice” determines the emergence and continuity of migration, as well. It is 
precisely these social and political reflections that make the governance of mi-
gration difficult.  
Inevitably, issues of international migration relating to Turkey shall  be 
centered  around  the  European  Union, whether  Turkey’s  EU  membership  is 
realized or not.12 In other words, whatever course Turkey’s accession to the EU 
takes, and whatever results it brings forth, it remains certain that any interna-
tional migration debate regarding the EU will frequently include discussions 
focusing on Turkey. This is not merely due to the likelihood of intensive migra-
tion from Turkey into the European Union, but also because of the hundreds of 
thousands of immigrants of Turkish origin presently living in European Union 
member states. Furthermore, such issues are likely to remain on the agenda 
both because Turkey is a buffer zone between the EU and the source countries 
and territories that are the origin of migration towards the EU and because the 
economic, social, political and cultural bonds between Turkey and the EU are 
deep and profound. In this context, it is quite evident that a European Union 
including Turkey as a member state can oversee the issue of international mi-
gration in relation to Turkey more easily. Similarly, Turkey as a member state 
of the EU can handle the issue of international migration in relation to itself 
more easily. However, the key point to all remains constant: both the European 
Union and Turkey should realize that, through the policies they have drafted 
and will draft in the future, international migration is not a problem, but “a 
phenomenon that requires governance” through social  transformation. Both 
polities  must  further  realize  that  this  governance  is  only  possible  through 
“sharing problems and liabilities” related to migration and that the current ap-
proaches adopted by both parties, such as “passing the buck to the other”, will 
not provide any solutions.
It  is  not  surprising  that  the  international  migratory  waves  have  been 
questioned both quantitatively and qualitatively in the countries of destina-
tion since the phenomenon began. In other words, the question of “who has ar-
rived” in addition to “how many migrants have arrived” has been debated fre-
quently and from various perspectives in the countries receiving migration. In 
11 İçduygu (2006, pp. 47–58).
12 Erzan/Kirişçi (2008).
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the context of Turkey-EU relations – particularly in the case of the free move-
ment of labor – it is not surprising that the potential of Turkey for EU migra-
tion has created many quantitative and qualitative debates. However, what is 
surprising at this juncture is the extent that such debate has reached: for in-
stance, Turkey’s accession to the EU has almost been entirely evaluated on the 
basis of the magnitude of possible migration from Turkey to the EU. While the 
assumptions  on  the  magnitude  of  these  migration  waves  are  not  actually 
based on particularly scholarly studies, another course of debate based on the 
assumption that a migration wave from Turkey will be a solution to the signi-
ficant process of aging and demographic shrinkage process that the EU popula-
tion has entered into. In short, issues of international migration have begun to 
constitute an increasingly politicized area within EU-Turkey relations. 
Due to reasons such as the association of international migration issues 
with the European Union’s economic, social and political areas of integration 
in general, along with Turkey’s significant position as a “sending country”, “re-
ceiving country”, and “migration transit zone”  (especially within Eurocentric 
international  migration and asylum discourses), international  migration de-
bates  have become central to Turkey-EU relations. Within this framework, one 
observes that there are three main issues in EU discussions on the issue of inter-
national migration in relation to Turkey, including: (a)  whether an intense mi-
gratory wave towards the EU in case of free movement will create serious eco-
nomic, social and political adjustment problems (especially in the case of Turkish 
migrants); (b)  whether  Turkey’s  demography and, as  a  consequence  of  this 
demography, the migration waves of Turkish origin, will have a complemen-
tary role in the demographic shrinkage process (low fertility and intense aging 
population) in the EU and (c) whether Turkey, in its position as a “receiving 
country” and “migration transit zone”, will be successful, and, if so, to what ex-
tent,  in  producing  and  implementing  policies  in  compliance  with  the  EU-
centric international migration and asylum regimes. 
In regard to international migration, it is a fact that the aforementioned 
areas of debate will continue to persist regardless of the possible results of the 
course of Turkey’s EU membership accession process. In other words, whether 
Turkey becomes a member of the EU or not, discussions around the harmoni-
zation problems of Turkish-origin migrants currently living in the EU member 
states, along with the course of possible migratory waves from Turkey to these 
states  (family  reunification,  marriage  migration,  irregular  migration  and 
asylum-seeker movements), will continue. Even if accession does not occur, the 
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question of  whether Turkey’s  young population will  have a complementary 
impact on the aging population of the EU, or whether this young population 
will create an intense migratory wave towards the EU, will remain a topic of 
intense debate. Even if the accession issue is removed from the agenda, the 
question of how Turkey will protect the South-eastern border of the EU from 
migration waves will remain of crucial import. From this perspective, the im-
portance of thinking in terms of the issue of international migration within 
this relationship carries with it two distinct scenarios pertaining to Turkey’s 
accession to the EU – that is, the scenario of the realization of such accession, 
and the scenario of the failure of such accession. 
In the context of the emergence and continuity of international migra-
tion, differences in terms of development between countries or territories are 
frequently underlined as the most significant factors. Today, it is evident that 
Turkey’s socio-economic and demographic indicators show significant differ-
ences in comparison to the indicators of the EU member states; these differ-
ences, in turn, are frequently quoted as a cause of potential migratory waves. 
For instance, in terms of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, Turkey 
would be the poorest country in comparison to the EU member states.13 The av-
erage value in terms of the GDP-based Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) for 
the EU-27 member states is 100; this value is 105.5 for Italy, 48.7 for Poland and 
30.5 for Bulgaria – yet, for Turkey, it is only 28.5.14 Demographic indicators also 
highlight striking differences between Turkey and the EU-27, and other candi-
date states. For example, the natural growth rate of the population in Turkey is 
approximately 13 times higher than the population growth rate of the EU-27 
member states. In this regard, the direction and rate of change of these differ-
ences  between  countries  are  evidently  among  the  key  indicators  that  will 
highlight the intensity of the prospective migration waves. However, particu-
larly in considering the rates of change in the socio-economic indicators of the 
past 20 years, Turkey seems to be rapidly making up the difference with the 
other countries of comparison in terms of modernization steps. The increase in 
Gross National Product (GNP) per capita from 1,200 USD in the 1980s to 6,000 USD 
in the 2000s along with an increase in life expectancy to 70 years during the 
2000s (an increase of ten years since the 1980s) provide examples of such pro-
gress. In addition to these indicators, the Turkish economy has grown at a rate 
13 İçduygu (2006).
14 These figures were taken from the website of EUROSTAT (2011).
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of 6‒9 % in recent years. It is evident that the direction of transformation and 
development that Turkey has been experiencing in recent years points to reduc-
ing the pressure of migration in Turkey in the long run. On the other hand, it is 
also clear that a Turkey as a member of the EU will make up the difference in 
terms of development with the EU in a much shorter time compared to a Tur-
key that is not a member of the EU.  
Demographic Transition and Potential Migratory Flows from Turkey to 
the EU: Some Indicators and Scenarios
More important than the economic developmental difference, however, is the 
demographic difference that has been the key reason for intensive discussions 
of international migration within the context of Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
This demographic difference is seen as the most important source of debate on 
the magnitude of potential migration from Turkey into the EU, especially in 
the event that Turkey becomes a full member of the EU. In this regard, some 
have emphasized low fertility and an aging population (in terms of the EU), 
and the relatively high rates of population growth and the high percentage of 
youth within the country’s  total population (in terms of Turkey) as the key 
reasons for potential migration from Turkey to the EU. In analyzing this point, 
it is important to examine the details of the projected demographic processes 
in the EU and Turkey for the coming years.
Demography, the Labor Market and Possible Trends in the EU
Low fertility rates and increasing average life spans are, in an important sense, 
changing the structure of the age pyramid in European countries, reducing the 
share of the young population within the overall population, increasing the 
percentage of the elderly population and resulting in an aging labor force. Con-
sidering the medium-scale natural changes in population and migration as-
sumptions, the total population of the EU-27 member states will increase to 
478 million in 2025 from 472 million in 2005 before entering a phase of decline. 
In the year 2050, the population of the EU-27 member states will decrease to 
462 million. In the same period, in the event that they do not receive migration, 
the total population of the Western and Central European countries will begin 
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to decline after reaching a peak in 2010, decreasing to 460 million in 2025 and 
415 million by 2050.15 
The  working  population  (ages  15–64)  in  the  Western  and  Central 
European countries is expected to decline to 302 million in 2015, and to 261 mil-
lion in 2025 from 317 million in the year 2005.16 The number of youth recruited 
in the labor market is gradually decreasing in many EU member states, a situ-
ation that will apply to the entire EU-27 member states in the coming 45 years. 
In contrast to this age group, the numbers of those in the 65 + bracket will 
reach 107 million in 2025 and 133 million in 2050 (from a total of 79 million as 
of 2005) due to an increasing average life span.  Looking at the changes that 
have occurred in the median age as a measure reflecting the age structure of 
the population, the present figure for this data in these European countries is 
38.5, a full 6.5 years older than it was during the 1960s – a time when fertility 
rates were significantly higher. This figure, meanwhile, is expected to reach as 
high as 48 by the year 2050, meaning that virtually half of the entire European 
population will be comprised of people aged 50 and above by that date.17 
Demographic  processes, together  with  trends  in  the  labor  market  and 
labor force participation rates, determine the future size of the labor force. Cur-
rently, there are 227 million people in the labor market of the EU-27 member 
states. Of this number, 21 million (9 %) are of foreign origin. Based on the cur-
rent labor force participation rates, it is clear that the aging population will 
cause a rapid decline in the size of the labor force, meaning that its estimated 
size will decline to 211 million (a 7 % decrease) by the year 2025, and to 183 mil-
lion (a 19 % decrease) by 2050 in Western and Central European countries.18 In 
the event that these countries do not receive any migration, this rate of decline 
will  be  higher: the  size  of  the  labor  force  will  be  as  low  as  201  million  in 
2025,and 160 million in 2050. This means that unless a medium-scale migra-
tion occurs, the labor force in Europe will  decline by 67 million by the year 
2050. Together with the aging of the population, this process will undoubtedly 
have a negative impact on the social, economic and political order of Europe. 
It seems that in terms of the EU, there are three key options for handling 
the issue of demographic aging and the consequent decrease in the share of 
15 Muenz (2006).
16 İçduygu (2006).
17 Ibid. (p. 84).
18 Muenz (2006).
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the local population participating in the labor force: increasing labor force par-
ticipation rates, raising the retirement age and pursuing an active economic 
migration policy.19 In the event of a medium-scale migration, provided that the 
labor force participation rate in the EU-27 member states is equivalent to that 
of the three countries (Denmark, Iceland and Sweden) with the highest  labor 
force participation rates, the  size  of  the  labor  force  in  Western and Central 
European countries will reach 233 million in 2025 (an increase of six million 
over the figures for 2005) before beginning to decline to 222 million by the year 
2050. In the event of no such migration taking place, the size of the labor force 
will decline to 195 million (year 2050) from 222 million (year 2025) even if labor 
force participation rates are increased. However, if the labor force participation 
rates for women (age groups 15 to 64) in all the EU member states are equiva-
lent to the labor force participation rates for men, then the size of the labor 
force in Europe will remain at 224 million in the year 2025 before declining to 
205 million by 2050. In the event that the retirement age in the EU member 
states is raised by five years by the year 2025, and then ten years by 2050, then 
the size of the labor force will increase, as well. However, unless the EU mem-
ber states receive migration, a decline in the size of the labor force by 2050 is 
inevitable: the year 2025’s projected number of workers of 218 million will de-
crease to 190 million by 2050. If the EU member states do not receive any mi-
gration, but, instead, choose to follow only the first and second options stated 
above, then it appears that the aging population will have no negative impact 
on the labor force. If these two options are implemented together to the extent 
that the labor force participation rates equal those of the Scandinavian coun-
tries, then, by the year 2050, the size of the labor force in the Western and Cen-
tral European countries will be 228 million (this figure was 227 million in 2005, 
and is estimated to be 241 million in 2025). In short, any combination of these 
two options that does not meet the above levels will result in negative reper-
cussions for the numbers active within the labor force.20 
Undoubtedly, the question of the magnitude of migration required to fill 
the demographic gap in Europe is of the utmost importance. Considering labor 
force participation rates, and assuming that there is no migration, the size of 
the labor force in Western and Central Europe will decline by 26 million in the 
period  between  2005  and  2025  and  then,  approximately,  by  66  million 
19 İçduygu (2006, pp. 91–94).
20 Ibid. (p. 92).
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between 2005 and 2050. It is evident that labor force migration serves to fill 
this gap. In this respect, the EU-27 member states need to add 1.3 million mi-
grants into their labor force pool each year between 2005 and 2025. Between 
2025 and 2050, this figure will need to reach 1.6 million annually. If we consider 
that 70 % of the migrants heading towards Europe will be participating in the 
labor force, the annual net contribution to be obtained from migration will be 
around 1.9–2.0 million by 2025, and 2.3 million in the period until 2050. Accord-
ing to these estimations, 95 million migrants of ages 15–64 will  be required 
between the years 2005 and 2050.21 These figures foresee much higher num-
bers of migrants moving to the Continent in comparison to the annual number 
of migrants that have been received by Europe in recent years, suggesting that 
there is nothing realistic about such estimation.  
Demography, the Labor Market and Possible Trends in Turkey
Turkey completed its demographic transformation in the early 2000s in terms 
of the transition from a traditional social structure to a modern social struc-
ture. This transformation is also called a  demographic transition. In one way, 
this is a transition from very high birth and mortality rates to lower birth and 
mortality rates, and, in another way, it means the closing of the gap between 
birth rates and mortality rates. From another angle, it also reflects a significant 
decline in the population growth rate: Turkey’s annual population growth rate 
has been lower than 1.5 % in recent years.22 Life expectancy at birth has reached 
around 70 years of age. The total fertility rate is around 2.2 children and the 
child mortality rate is under 30/1000. Turkey’s population is expected to in-
crease at a constant rate corresponding to this level of growth rate in the com-
ing years. It is estimated to reach 90 million by 2025 from 73 million in the year 
2005 before hitting 100 million by 2050. However, it is also estimated that Tur-
key’s population growth rate might stagnate at this level in the 2050s (or, in-
deed, even before reaching 100 million) before entering a period of decline.23  
The main assumption underlying these estimations is that the average 
expected number of children per woman will fall to 2.1 – the figure required for 
a basic reproduction rate – in 2010 and then remain constant at this level for 
21 Muenz (2006).
22 İçduygu (2006, p. 95).
23 Behar (2008, p. 16).
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the following years. Estimations based on this assumption suggest that the ra-
tio of the age group 0–15 will decrease to 28 % of the 2005 ratio and then to 
22 % in 2025, before receding to 19 % by the year 2050. For the percentage share 
of the 15–64 age cleavage engaged in the labor force, 2005’s figure of 67 % will 
rise to 68 % by 2025 before declining to 62 % in 2050. In the light of these devel-
opments, it is apparent that the population will enter a process of rapid aging. 
The share of the population of the 65 + age group, which was 6 % in 2005, will 
reach 10 % by 2025 before rapidly increasing by 18  % in the subsequent 25 
years.24 
If we look at the status of the age group 15–64 within Turkey’s overall 
population in terms of absolute figures, it is probable that this age group will 
continue growing until the year 2035. Considering that people constituting this 
age group belong to the generations that were born in periods when fertility 
rates were quite high, the reason for the high figures (which will continue in 
the coming years) in this age group becomes clear. While Turkey’s population 
will grow by 30 % by the 2030s, the age group 15–64 will grow at a faster rate 
than the one predicted for the rest of the population. In this time period, the 
size  of  the  age  group  15–64  will  increase  from  42  million  to  60  million, a 
growth rate of 40 %. Certainly, this growth will be translated into increases in 
the labor force and labor force supply and, if the labor force simultaneously 
gains productivity, mobility and flexibility parallel to this demographic devel-
opment, there will  be no reason not to  term the outcome as a “window of 
demographic opportunity”.25 However, it should be noted that this window of 
demographic opportunity will gradually close after the year 2025 in proportion 
to the overall population in Turkey, due mainly to the increase in the 65 + age 
group and the corresponding decrease in the 15–64 age group. In this process 
of  demographic transformation, the population entering a significant  aging 
period is also inevitable. By 2050, it is estimated that while Turkey’s population 
will increase by approximately 40 %, the ratio of the 65 + age group will also 
double. This transformation will take place especially in the period following 
the year 2025 following a decline in fertility rates and the aging of the current 
generations, being replaced by a relatively smaller population. In this context, 
forecasts estimate that the size of the 65 + age group, which was 3.6 million in 
the year 2000, will reach 17 million in 2050. It seems that after the year 2025, 
24 Ibid. (p. 17).
25 Ibid. (pp. 17–19).
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Turkey will no longer have a young population. In this, the most significant in-
dicator is the increasing median age: estimates suggest that the median age 
will increase to 33 years by the year 2025 and to 39 years by 2050 from approxi-
mately 25 years in the year 2000. 
If  no  migration  occurs  between  2005  and  2025, the  population  under 
40 years of age (the active young population) will gradually become smaller, 
the 40–65 age group (the active middle-aged population) will remain constant, 
while the ratio of the 65 + age group (the retired population) to the entire po-
pulation will increase in the EU-27 member states.26 Because of this, the active 
young section (ages 20–40) will decline by 17 %, the active middle-aged section 
will remain the same, and the elderly section (ages 65 +) will reach over one 
third of the entire population (34 %). If Turkey were to join the EU today, the 
changes that would occur in the EU by 2025 would be as follows: the size of the 
active young section (ages 20–40) would decline by 12 %, the active middle-
aged section (ages 40–60) would increase by 6 % and the elderly section (ages 
65 +) would increase by 37 %. In light of the above comparison, it can be said 
that Turkey’s accession to the European Union might slow down the decline in 
the numbers of the active young population within the entire EU population 
given the former’s young population and growth rates that far outstrip those 
of the rest of the organization, yet it is evident that this will not completely re-
solve the issue of the EU’s aging population. 
When emphasizing the necessary and complementary impact of migra-
tion for Europe in demographic and economic terms, the question of “what 
kind of migration” is an issue that inevitably appears. In addition to the desire 
for “migration that will provide a qualified labor force that is more required”, 
the construction of “migration that will provide a labor force more in harmony 
with European societies in social and cultural terms” is also emphasized. How-
ever, an  overly  selective  migratory  approach  with  the  aforementioned  eco-
nomic, social, political and ideological positioning is not very realistic consider-
ing the magnitude of the migration that is demographically required by the 
EU, especially if one considers the narrow migratory market that will provide 
the potential migrants. For instance, a study conducted by the United Nations 
and cited in this work states that the number of migrants required to elimi-
nate the negative demographic tendency experienced in the EU-15 member 
states will vary according to the countries’ objectives. The study discusses that, 
26 İçduygu (2006, pp. 86–89).
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if the objective is to preserve the current magnitude of the working-age popu-
lation, then the European Union will need 79 million people (1.5 million mi-
grants each year) in the period between 2000–2050; however, if the objective 
is to preserve the “potential support ratio” (in other words, the ratio of the age 
group 15–64 to the age group 65 +), then 674 million people (14 million mi-
grants each year) will be required. 
It is evident that the number of migrants possibly required by the labor 
force market in the EU cannot be met even in the event of Turkey’s entire popu-
lation migrating to Europe. As we have emphasized before, the demographic 
change experts anticipate in the population of Turkey for the period between 
2005 and 2050 is as follows: the age group 15–64 will reach 63 million (31 %) in 
the year 2025 before slowing its growth rate to reach 67 million (40 %) by 2050 
from 48 million in the year 2005; in the same time period, the size of the labor 
force in Turkey, which is 25 million today, will reach 47 million (32 %) in the 
year 2025 and 51 million (45 %) by 2050. 
Magnitude of Possible Movements and Characteristics of the 
Potential Migrants 
In the context of the EU-Turkey relationship, the discussions on international 
migration issues are grounded in two essential questions: (a) What will be the 
magnitude  of  the  possible  migratory  movements  towards  the  EU?  and 
(b) What qualifications will potential Turkish migrant groups to the EU have? 
In a study27 conducted in 2006 for the purpose of providing answers to these 
questions, people’s desire to migrate to the EU member states was examined at 
two different levels. Firstly, the study examined the general intention of the 
people in question and queried whether a general desire to migrate to the EU 
member states was extant. Secondly, the study investigated the level of specific 
intention in an effort to acquire more definite and detailed information in re-
lation to the desire to migrate. 
When these two indicators are evaluated, Turkey demonstrates an inter-
esting picture. While Turkey has the largest number of people with a general 
intention to migrate among the 13 countries (the ten countries that became EU 
member states after the recent enlargement, plus the last new members Bul-
garia and Romania, as well as candidate country Turkey) examined, it is also 
27 Krieger/Maitre (2006, pp. 45–66).
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the country with the least number of people with a specific intention to mi-
grate. In this respect, only 0.3 % of the population of Turkey has a specific in-
tention to migrate in the following five years. When searching for an answer to 
the question, “How does this contradictory situation translate into possible mi-
gration from Turkey following the advent of free movement?”, it is possible to 
say the following: in 2003, the number of potential Turkish migrants was 48.9 mil-
lion, and one can estimate that the potential size of the population with a gen-
eral intention to migrate is 3.03 million. Yet, of these, only 150,000 have a spe-
cific intention to migrate. When the more fundamental intentions to migrate 
is examined, it is estimated that in the following five years, the possible size of 
migrants from Turkey to the EU–15 member states will be 400,000 people.28  
On the basis of the difference between the general intention and the spe-
cific intention to migrate explained above, the search for answers to the ques-
tion regarding the characteristics of people with a general intention to migrate 
has also revealed interesting results. The possible migratory movement from 
Turkey is expected to include people from rural areas and a lower level of in-
come. Meanwhile, mobility among the unemployed is expected to be relatively 
high. In relation to these three situations, it can be argued that the possible mi-
gration from Turkey of groups such as these will result in serious adjustment 
problems for the labor force markets of the countries receiving migrants. How-
ever, another important aspect regarding the prospective migrants within pos-
sible migratory movements from Turkey is the possibility of the majority of 
these migrants being university graduates or current students continuing their 
education. Considering this aspect, possible migratory movements from Tur-
key may not cause serious adjustment problems in economic terms. 
The results from another study29 that develop certain scenarios on pos-
sible migration from Turkey to the EU help us make the following two main in-
ferences: first, the expected migration will not actually be in extreme volumes 
at all and, second, if Turkey’s accession to the EU, and consequently free move-
ment, is not realized, then higher levels of migration will occur. Some crucial 
results of this study are as follows: if the scenario of freedom of movement is 
realized, then migration from Turkey to the EU member states will increase re-
latively less and reach a total of one million in the period between 2004 and 
2030. The second scenario, which is based on the notion of guest-workers mov-
28 İçduygu (2006, p. 113).
29 Erzan/Kuzubaş/Yıldız (2008, pp. 29–40).
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ing between countries (in contrast to the scenario of freedom of movement 
outlined in the first  instance), estimates that  there will  be  a significant in-
crease in the magnitude of migration after 2015 and that the rate of migration 
will almost double. However, even this migration scenario limits the number 
of migrants from Turkey to the EU by the year 2030 with a total of 1.8 million 
in 45 years.   
On the other hand, the first scenario yields the following results regard-
ing migration under conditions of high rates of economic growth, achievement 
of full accession to the EU and thereby free movement by 2015: an approximate 
increase of 2.1 million in the immigrants of Turkish origin in Europe in the period 
between 2004 and 2030 and an annual approximate increase of 25,000 during 
2004–2015,  followed  by  an  increase  of  125,000  during  2015–2030.  Another 
scenario option involves much higher volumes of migratory movements under 
the conditions of a low rate of economic growth in Turkey, failure to achieve 
EU membership and, thus, free movement. According to this scenario, by the 
year 2030, the total net migration from Turkey will exceed 2.7 million. In the 
period between 2004 and 2015, it is approximately estimated that over 70,000 
people will arrive in Europe as new immigrants annually, and that in the pe-
riod of 2015–2030, the annual average will be over 130,000.30 In other words, if 
Turkey’s membership is no longer on the agenda, then the EU will face a much 
more intense migratory wave. 
In addition to the basic findings we have tried to summarize here, it will 
be helpful to remember some other key points while discussing the migration 
issue within EU-Turkey relations. First  of all, it should be kept in mind that 
Europe is not the sole destination of the migratory waves originating from Tur-
key; traditional migration countries like Canada, the USA and Australia on the 
one hand, and newer migration countries like the Middle Eastern countries 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) provide employment op-
portunities for the hundreds of thousands of people emigrating from Turkey. 
Future migration estimates and assumptions should take into consideration 
that there will be other destination points for migratory movements from Tur-
key. On the other hand, Turkey has also acquired, especially in the last 20 years, 
the status of a “migrant receiving” and “migratory transit country” in addition 
to its identity as a “source country” within the international migration market. 
Considering that a similar process has been experienced by current EU mem-
30 Ibid. (p. 38).
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ber states such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, it can be said that these 
new migratory processes can bring Turkey to a status that is parallel to those 
of such states in the European migration- and asylum-seeking regimes.31 It is 
clear that such a transformation will be reflected in a gradual change and de-
cline in the pressure of migration from Turkey into the EU. Of course, the occur-
rence of such a process will only be possible if Turkey achieves a period of rap-
id economic growth and social development as the result of the prospect of 
eventual EU membership.  
As already discussed in this study, even though the importance of the 
economic, social and demographic differences between countries are empha-
sized in regard to the formation of migratory movements, migration is  cer-
tainly not a phenomenon to be assessed merely in a quantitative framework 
through simple arithmetic calculations such as “replacing negatives with pos-
itives” and “substituting one population with another population”. It is important 
to  consider  the formation and continuity of  migration multi-dimensionally; 
that is, both from  quantitative and  qualitative perspectives. Even though mi-
gration is the movement of a labor force on the basis of “supply and demand” 
and “needs and opportunities” in economic terms, it also involves “selectivity” 
in political and social terms. Migratory movements expected to form due to 
economic and demographic reasons may be shaped differently due to political 
and social choices. One form of migration might be preferred to another or one 
migrant  to  another  migrant. In  short, international  migration is  “a  political 
phenomenon that requires governance”. Moreover, the process of international 
migration is an area of politics – a politicized area – where internal actors (the 
migrant-receiving country, source country and the migrants themselves) con-
stantly negotiate. Within this framework, issues regarding international mi-
gration within the context of EU-Turkey relations necessitate that the parties 
or actors consider this matter as “a political phenomenon that requires gov-
ernance”.32 
31 İçduygu (2006, pp. 123–140).
32 İçduygu (2004, pp. 88–99).
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Concluding Remarks
This  study  aims  to  underline  that  both  the  view  of  discrepancy  based  on 
demographic difference and the view of complementariness based on demo-
graphic difference are inadequate in explaining how potential  international 
migratory movements will shape EU-Turkey relations in the future. These dif-
ferences may imply a potential for migratory movements, yet a series of quite 
different processes are required for this potential to be realized. What is im-
portant here is to explain how this process of transformation might occur in 
the future. On the other hand, it is neither particularly realistic to emphasize 
the prospective positive impacts of the migratory movement from Turkey on 
the EU population solely based on the demographic complementariness thesis, 
nor to expect that these positive impacts will immediately occur as soon as 
Turkey becomes a member state. Population and migration are dynamic ele-
ments, and these dynamic elements become even more complex through eco-
nomic, social and political processes. Within this framework and within a fu-
ture in which Turkey’s accession to the EU may be realized, the demographic 
process that populations in both the EU and in Turkey might undergo should 
also be examined. Of course, the transformation of the demographic difference 
between the EU and Turkey into one of complementariness will be related to 
the possible appearance of the “demographic demise” (the decline of fertility 
and an aging population) in the EU and the “window of demographic oppor-
tunity” (an environment of constant increase in the labor supply, employment 
and the quality of the labor force and, thus, in economic performance) in Tur-
key. 
For positive results for each of the EU, Turkey and the migrants them-
selves to occur, each polity must accomplish a series of tasks in addition to 
handling the issue of migration as a “political phenomenon that requires gov-
ernance”.  For  Turkey,  this  requires  rapidly  completing  membership  negoti-
ations, integrating with the EU and succeeding in complementing the “win-
dow of demographic opportunity” with “increasing the labor supply, the level 
of quality education, the rate of employment and maintaining a steady eco-
nomic growth” in the next 20 years. For the EU, meanwhile, this requires rap-
idly completing membership negotiations, integrating with Turkey and suc-
ceeding  in  complementing  its  “demographic  demise”  with  a  “far-sighted 
migration policy based on economic rationality and diversity and free of xeno-
phobia”. Should both the EU and Turkey succeed in doing this, the impact of 
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migratory movements from Turkey to the EU should be beneficial to all con-
cerned.
At the core of these demographic accounts lies a new aspect of migration 
debates between the EU and Turkey, which has emerged only recently, in the 
last  5–6  years: its  politicization  in  the  context  of  Turkey’s  accession  nego-
tiations. For the EU, such debates, developed during the course of its relations 
with Turkey and during discussion of international migration, do not only mir-
ror a pessimistic perspective over the capacity of the EU to manage migration 
flows for economic and social benefits, but also reflect the necessity of good 
governance of migration for the EU’s benefit. For Turkey, together with being 
part of both the conditionality and socialization principles of the EU accession 
process, these debates are largely indicators of her migration transition from a 
country of emigration to immigration, which requires new and complicated 
tools of management as part of integration into the global world system in 
general  and  into  the  EU  in  specific.  More  importantly,  these  debates  also 
plainly show the strategic use of “migration diplomacy” as a bargaining tool 
over and  during the membership negotiation process between the EU and 
Turkey.
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Turkey’s  “Critical  Europeanization”:  Evidence from 
Turkey’s  Immigration Pol ic ies
Juliette Tolay
Introduction
Turkey’s relationship with Europe has a long and complex history. It does not 
even start in 1959, when Turkey applied for an associate membership to the EU, 
but dates back from the Ottoman Empire interactions with European powers 
over the centuries, and the way subsequently this heritage has been memorized 
and interpreted. The Euro-Ottoman history in itself is ambivalent: it features a 
powerful and proud Ottoman Empire, well aware of military and technological 
superiority  over  backward  late-Middle  Age, European entities; it  features  an 
“equal among others” Ottoman Empire, engaging in warfare and alliances with 
the emerging European powers during the European Renaissance; and it fea-
tures in the 19th century a weakened Ottoman Empire, threatened by European 
imperialist ambitions, but looking for its salvation in its Westernization, as a 
means to resist European powers.1 
The history of the Turkish republic is no different. In the Turkish psyche, 
Europe represents both a model which Turkish citizens look up to, as well as an 
imperialistic force, from which Turkey had to free and protect itself. It was par-
ticularly true during the foundational experience of creating Turkey as a mod-
ern  nation-state, when  Mustafa  Kemal  fought  against  European  powers  in 
Anatolia (mainly British, Greek and French troops), while putting into place a 
political system openly emulating European institutions and values. In Turkey, 
Europe is both admired and despised. It is still true today.
Such  an  ambivalent  relationship  uniquely  impacts  Turkey’s  bid  to  EU 
membership in the 21st century. The well-known story of Turkey’s EU aspiration 
1 Goffman (2002), Faroqhi (2004). 
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is one of a twin process: the technical one, whereby Turkey, since 2001, en-
gaged in a fast-paced and extensive reform movement of its laws and institu-
tions in order to harmonize with the Copenhagen criteria first, and then the 
broader acquis communautaire, and the political one, whereby important polit-
ical actors in the different European countries and in Turkey have expressed 
fluctuating  enthusiasm  and  reluctance  towards  Turkey’s  EU  membership. 
These two processes have been intertwined and interactive, as the extraordi-
nary reforms done in the 2001–2004 period led to the opening of accession ne-
gotiations in 2005, and as the rise of strong voices against Turkey’s member-
ship in Europe, and the rise of skepticism in Turkey, have considerably slowed 
down the reform and negotiation process since 2006.2 
One of the areas in which the EU is sharply influencing Turkey’s policy is 
the field of asylum and migration. In the 1990s, Turkey used to have an out-
dated, incomplete  and  largely  ad-hoc  policy  towards  immigration  into  the 
country, including asylum, regular and irregular migration and border man-
agement. By 2011, the picture is quite different: in all domains, different reform 
packages have been passed recently, and a comprehensive new immigration 
policy has been drafted. 
The overall timing and nature of these reforms indicate the essential role 
played by the EU. However, it is important to understand why and how exactly 
the EU influenced this  process. Much has been written about “Europeaniza-
tion”, or the way in which the EU, intentionally or not, manages to transform 
member and candidate countries’ policies, politics and identities so that they 
would better align with EU practices.3 The way Turkey in particular becomes 
Europeanized has also been extensively discussed.4 The literature shows that 
there are different levels of “Europeanization”, with some reflecting an instru-
mental adoption of policies to gain particular advantages, while others denot-
ing  a  deeper  transformation  and  internalization  of  norms, characterizing  a 
more genuine “Europeanization”.5 From a European perspective, it is extremely 
important to understand how transformative and genuine Turkey’s reforms in 
2 Although, such discourses and behaviors are themselves predicated on more structural, economic, institutional and poli-
tical developments in Turkey and in the EU. See Tocci (2007).
3 Featherstone/Radaelli (2003), Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier (2005), Checkel (2007), Graziano/Vink (2007), Schimmelfen-
nig (2009).
4 Diez/Agnantopoulos et al. (2005), Kale (2005), Kaya (2007), Oğuzlu/Ozpek (2008), Ulusoy (2009), Lagrand (2010).
5 Lavenex/Uçarer (2004), Diez/Agnantopoulos et al. (2005), Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier (2005), Bauer/Knill et al. (2007), 
Schimmelfennig (2009).
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the field of asylum and migration are. Migration has become a particularly sa-
lient issue in Europe because it connects to existential issues such as human 
rights and individual freedoms, as well as concerns over societal and economic 
security. Knowing whether Turkey, its state and society, genuinely fall in line 
with the values and concerns of European countries is of crucial importance 
for many European actors. 
As this chapter demonstrates, critical actors in Turkey are engaged in a 
genuine, non-instrumental process of reform in the field of asylum and migra-
tion. However, contrary to what the Europeanization literature indicates, it is 
not so much because they identified closely with Europeans, but rather because 
they distanced themselves from European practices. In many ways, Turkey has se-
lectively adopted the values and concerns of  Europe, and transformed into a 
truly “Turkish” approach to asylum and migration. This has activated a sense of 
pride among Turkish officials, with the feeling that they can do “better than 
the Europeans”, or be “more European than the Europeans”.6 This phenomenon 
that I call “critical Europeanization” is not a traditional form of Europeaniza-
tion, yet one that fits particularly well Turkey’s ambivalent historical percep-
tion of Europe. 
To understand this process better, this chapter presents succinctly the re-
forms adopted in the field of migration, the different ways in which the EU has 
influenced the process and the critical reactions that it has triggered in Turkey. 
Turkey’s Immigration Policy Profile and Its Reforms
When one thinks of Turkey as a country of immigration, one often sees Turkey 
as a “new” country of immigration, devoid of any real immigration policy, and 
one which needs to catch up with Europe and adopt appropriate policies. This 
is only partly correct. Turkey is historically a country that has received impor-
tant inflows of immigration, especially from the Balkans, all throughout the 
20th century. But, this fact was overshadowed by the large influx of Turkish mi-
grants into Europe starting in the 1960s, which, on the international migration 
scene, characterized Turkey as a country of emigration.7 
6 Meeting with a police officer, October 2009, Van, Turkey, and with officials in charge of migration, October 2009, Ankara, 
Turkey. 
7 Kirişçi (2007 b), Abadan-Unat (2011).
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Similarly, Turkey had an immigration policy, articulated principally in the 
Law on Settlement of 1934, foreseeing the immigration of migrants of “Turkish 
culture  or  origin”, and the rights  to  which  they would have access  as  they 
settled on Turkish territory.8 Turkey was also among the drafters and first sig-
natories of the Geneva Convention in 1951, practically granting Turkey with an 
asylum policy.9 
However, these existing policies came to a serious crisis by the end of the 
Cold War, when the sudden qualitative and quantitative change in migration 
flows in the region rendered existing regulations largely irrelevant and archaic. 
By the 1990s, a large majority of newcomers coming from Eastern Europe and 
the Middle East to Turkey were “foreigners”(i. e., “non-Turkish”), and could not 
be  accepted in  Turkey under  the  Law  on Settlement. Likewise, most  of  the 
asylum seekers were coming from non-European countries (mainly Iran and 
Iraq) and therefore would not qualify as Convention refugees under the geo-
graphical  limitation  of  the  Geneva  Convention  that  Turkey  maintained.10 
Hence, the impression that Turkey was a “new” country of immigration, and 
that it was “lacking” any immigration policy. 
By the end of the Cold War, the Turkish state regulation of migration issues 
overall was incomplete and inconsistent. Pieces that made up Turkish immigra-
tion policy were to be found in various places such as in the Law of Resettle-
ment,11 the Law on Foreigners,12 the Turkish Citizenship Law13 and in various in-
stitutions,  mainly  the  Ministry  of  Interior  (especially  in  the  Foreigners 
Department within the General Directorate of Security) and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, as well as others.14 The new situation warranted new policies, 
and it is true that it took some time for Turkey to adapt its regulations. There 
have been several publications detailing the many reforms that took place in 
the last 20 years,15 but the main reforms could be summarized as follows:
8 Kirişçi (1996 a, p. 8).
9 Frelick (1997).
10 This option (recognizing as refugees only asylum seekers coming from Europe) is offered in Article 1B(1) of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention Related to the Status of Refugees. Most signatories of the Convention lifted the geographical limitation in 1967, 
but Turkey, to this day, retains the geographical limitation.
11 İskan Kanunu.
12 The Law on Movement and Residence of Foreigners in Turkey.
13 Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu.
14 The Gendarmerie, the Coastal Guard, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security are also invol-
ved in migration issues. See Kirişçi (2004, pp. 4–9).
15 Kale (2005), Kaya (2009 b), Lagrand (2010).
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- Early step: the 1994 Asylum Regulation.16 The first serious step that 
was taken to reform Turkey’s regulations regarding migration was in 
the realm of asylum and the adoption of an important regulation in 
1994. Since 1951, Turkey has been party to the Geneva Convention Rel-
ative to the Status of Refugees, but kept the original geographical lim-
itation. This  meant  that  only  asylum  seekers  coming  from  Europe 
could be recognized as refugees. By the early 1990s, there were no reg-
ulations  governing the  status  of  non-European refugees  in  Turkey. 
The  1994  Regulation  remedied  this  in  a  compromise  solution,  by 
granting rights to non-European Refugees to apply for asylum in Tur-
key (both to Turkish authorities and the UNHCR), with the condition 
that, once recognized with a refugee status, they would have to be re-
settled in a third country. Far from ideal, this regulation (amended in 
1999 and 2006 to accommodate more realistically the time within 
which asylum seekers had to apply for asylum) is the main frame-
work on which Turkey’s asylum system functioned up to 2011.17 
- First  package of  reforms:  2002–2005 reforms. Overall, the  period of 
2002–2005 represented a time of earthquake reforms in the Turkish 
legal system. In order to ensure the opening of negotiations with the 
EU (eventually granted in 2005), Turkey engaged in a breath-taking 
large-scale  revision  of  many  of  its  regulations.  This  impacted  the 
realm of asylum and migration, as well. Among other things, in 2003, 
the Law on Work Permits for Foreign Nationals was adopted, the Law 
on Citizenship was amended and the additional protocols against mi-
grant smuggling and human trafficking of the United Nations Con-
vention  Against  Transnational  Organized  Crime  were  adopted.18 
2002–2005 was also a period when Turkey was working hard on ad-
justing its visa system to the Schengen negative and positive lists, 
and took several steps in that direction.19 
- Further  plans  for  comprehensive  reforms: the  2005  National  Action 
Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Im-
16 The official title is: The Regulation On The Procedures And the Principles Related to Population Movements and Aliens Ar-
riving In Turkey Either As Individuals Or In Groups Wishing To Seek Asylum Either From Turkey Or Requesting Residence Per-
mission In Order To Seek Asylum From Another Country. 
17 Kirişçi (1996 b), Kaya (2009 a).
18 Çiçekli (2006), Kaya (2009 b).
19 Kirişçi (2005).
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migration (NAP). Following the enforcement in 2003 of the Turkish 
National Program on the Adoption of the EU Acquis Communautaire, 
a systematic effort was undertaken by Turkish authorities to identify 
the areas of  fit  and misfit  between the acquis  communautaire  and 
Turkish regulations. This effort resulted in the NAP,20 identifying the 
necessary  reforms  and  proposing  a  timeframe  to  undertake  them. 
This document is important, as it seems to be the first effort in which 
Turkish authorities think comprehensively about their immigration 
policy. 
- Period of adjustments: 2005–2008. Following the number of changes 
that occurred in the 2002–2005 period, a couple more important but 
limited reforms were achieved in the subsequent years. This includes 
the revision of the Law on Settlement in 2006 (which improved some 
of the outdated language coming from 1934, but without changing 
the main logic of  the document), the circulation of  the Implemen-
tation Circular from the General Directorate of Security in 2006 en-
couraging a better implementation of the asylum system, the adop-
tion of a new Passport Law in 2007 and the amendment of the Land 
Registry Law in 2008 providing easier access to property to foreign-
ers.21
- Launch of comprehensive reforms: 2008. In line with the principles 
adopted in the 2005 National Action Plan, a task force on migration 
and  asylum  was  established  in  late  2008  (“Asylum  and  Migration 
Unit for the development and implementation of legislation and ad-
ministrative capacities”).22 The  main  goal  of  this  task  force  was  to 
draft  new  legislation  on  asylum  and  foreigners  in  Turkey  and  de-
lineate  the  new  responsibilities  of  a  new  agency  responsible  for 
asylum and migration. This new step in the process of reforms of Tur-
key’s migration policies is extremely important for two reasons: first, 
it engages in the creation of a new comprehensive migration policy 
for  Turkey, and second, it  demonstrates  a change in approach and 
mindset within Turkish bureaucracy regarding issues of asylum and 
migration. This team of bureaucrats constituting the task force is ex-
20 Turkish National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Aquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration (2005).
21 Kaya (2009 b).
22 İltica ve Göç Mevzuatı ve Idari Kapasitesini Geliştirme ve Uygulama Bürosu. This office is attached to the undersecretary 
of the Ministry of Interior. 
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tremely open to change and new ideas, having been consulting sys-
tematically with academics, international organizations and NGOs (a 
quite unusual approach for Turkish bureaucracy). By mid-2011, they 
had an official draft of a new Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection ready to be submitted to the Parliament.23 The activities 
undertaken by this task force also seem to have had a trickle-down 
effect on actual policies, especially on asylum, as new circulars have 
been put into place to address some of the blatant problems in the 
system, as highlighted by the team of the task force.24 
By  2011,  the  extraordinary  reform  journey  undertaken  by  Turkey  reflects  a 
story of overall compliance to EU norms and regulations. As European actors 
expressed their concerns through official and unofficial channels, Turkish au-
thorities reacted and initiated a process of reforms. This process was, however, 
never linear and progressive, but rather involved a lot of politics, resistance and 
unequal developments. There is even one area where compliance initially took 
place, but then got reversed: this is the case of visa policies.
The area of visa policy and border management was one of the issues in-
cluded in the harmonization packages in the 2002–2003 period. The agree-
ment reached at that point was that Turkey would gradually adopt the nega-
tive  list  of  the  Schengen  agreement  to  align  with  the  visa  policy  of  the 
majority of EU member states. Turkey started to implement that policy, and by 
2005, Turkey was only five countries short on the list to be fully aligned to the 
Schengen negative list (down from 13 countries in 2002).25 However, this policy 
changed in 2005, at which point Turkey started to refrain from imposing new 
visa regulations on new countries. By 2009, Turkey started to actively reverse 
its policy by seeking to systematically remove visa requirements with almost 
every country it was entering in a political agreement. In 2009, in opposition 
to the Schengen practice, Turkey agreed to lift visa requirements with  Syria, 
Libya, Jordan and Albania; it continued to do so in 2010 with Russia, Lebanon 
23 Meeting with members of the Asylum and Migration Unit, October, December 2009 and June 2010, Istanbul and Anka-
ra, Turkey.
24 In 2010 only, the following were put into place: a Circular on Irregular Migration by the Ministry of Interior in March, a Cir -
cular on Refugees and Asylum Seekers by the Ministry of Interior in March, a Circular on Asylum Seekers and Refugees by 
the Social Services and Child Protection Agency in March, a Circular on Procedures concerning Asylum Seekers and Refu-
gees by the Social Services and Child Protection Agency in April, a Circular on Students of Foreign origin by the Ministry of  
Education in August and an update on the 2006 application directive on asylum by the Ministry of Interior. 
25 Kirişçi (2005), Kirişçi (2007 a).
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and Serbia, and seems to pursue this policy further in 2011 with discussions 
with Qatar, Malaysia, Bahrain and Kyrgyzstan. In May 2011, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu declared that in the last eight years, Turkey reached 
visa-free agreements with no less than 50 countries.26
Why do we observe this change of approach in Turkey’s position on visa 
policy? Why is visa policy the area where compliance did not occur while all 
other areas ensured compliance or steps towards compliance? How did the EU 
react  to  such  an  unexpected  move?  These  are  all  questions  that  will  be 
answered in the following sections. 
The Role Played by the EU: The Different Forms and Degrees of 
Europeanization
There is not much doubt regarding the central role played by the EU in this pro-
cess of reforming Turkey’s immigration policy. Except for the early changes in 
asylum policies in the mid-1990s,27 all the other reforms were explicitly situ-
ated in the framework of the EU harmonization process.28 
As has often been highlighted in the Europeanization literature, the EU 
can impact candidate countries in a number of different ways, including di-
rectly with conditionality requirements and indirectly as it affects a candidate 
country through a third actor, such as the ECHR (European Court of Human 
Rights), or domestic actors. Evidence of both processes can be presented here. 
The direct influence of the EU is evident in some of the 2002–2005 reforms, 
which were adopted in order to satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria. Sub-
sequently, the adoption of the National Action Plan (and the beginning of its 
application) is a clear outcome of the EU’s conditionality and demands for har-
monization. In this particular case, the EU was particularly efficient in ensur-
ing that Turkish authorities plan in detail the reforms needed by using the tool 
of a “twinning project”. In the period 2003–2004, no less than eight twinning 
projects were initiated on issues such as strengthening institutions in the fight 
against trafficking in human beings, visa police and practice, asylum, border 
26 Anadolu Ajansı (2011).
27 Even these changes, however, were clearly reacting to the European wave of criticism regarding Turkey’s approach to asy-
lum in the early 1990s. Kirişçi (1996 b). 
28 Kirişçi (2003), Kale (2005), Çiçekli (2006), Kirişçi (2009), Lagrand (2010).
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protection, law enforcement and migration issues.29 Since 2010, there are at 
least two ongoing twinning projects in the field of asylum and migration: one 
on “supporting Turkey’s capacity in combating irregular migration through the 
establishment of removal centers” and one on “establishing a system of recep-
tion, screening and accommodation for asylum seekers and refuges”.30 The EU 
is also funding “the establishment of reception centers in seven key locations 
in Turkey” and the “set-up of an asylum and country of origin information sys-
tems”.
But  the  EU  also  instigated  changes  in  Turkish  asylum  and  migration 
policies through indirect means: through decisions taken by the ECHR and by 
the development of civil society. As a member of the Council of Europe, and 
party to the European Convention on Human Rights, Turkey has often been on 
trial  in  the  ECHR, and  has  often  lost  the  case. Even  though  the  Council  of 
Europe and the EU are two separate institutions, the EU is pressuring Turkey to 
take the decisions of the Court seriously. Four cases are particularly important 
in the field of asylum and migration: the case of Jabari v. Turkey in 2000,31 the 
case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey in 2005,32 the case of Abdolkhani 
and Karimnia v. Turkey in 200933 and the case of Charahili v. Turkey in 2010.34 It 
is not the place of this article to go into the details of the cases,35 but in each 
case,  Turkey’s  practices  condemned  by  the  Court  then  triggered  a  higher 
awareness on the issue of asylum in Turkey and the shortcomings of the sys-
tem, which then often prompted changes in the system. Recently, Turkish offi-
cials within the Task Force have admitted that they have been “hit hard” by the 
most recent 2010 decisions of the Court, and that they were determined to put 
into place a new asylum system that would eschew altogether any such con-
demnation from the Court in the future.36 
But another, more profound and long-term indirect way in which the EU 
contributed to the process of reforms in Turkey was through civil society. The 
EU played an important role in encouraging and financing projects upheld by 
29 Kirişçi (2007 a, p. 8).
30 See The EU and Turkey Address the Common Challenges of Migration and Asylum (2010). 





36 Meeting with members of the Migration and Asylum Unit, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey.
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Turkish civil society. One of the most striking changes in the migration land-
scape in Turkey over the first decade of the 21st century has indeed been the 
creation and expansion of civil society organizations and actors. In 2000, there 
were very few organizations involved in the field of asylum and migration, and 
such institutions were almost exclusively engaged in first-hand relief  activ-
ities. Today, the situation is very different, with a larger number of NGOs very 
active in the terrain and involved in wide range of activities, from first-hand 
relief to legal, social and psychological counseling activities, and from raising 
awareness  campaigns  to  government  lobbying  activities.37 Many  of  these 
NGOs have greatly benefited from the symbolical and financial support of the 
EU. Symbolically, both the field of asylum and migration and the strengthening 
of civil society actors has always been a priority for the EU. Financially, the EU 
has financed several NGO projects,38 as well as large-capacity building projects 
for Turkish bureaucracy that always emphasizes the consultation and partici-
pation of NGOs working in this field.39 Such an indirect means of Europeaniza-
tion, whereby the EU enables and strengthens (if not creates) pro-EU values do-
mestic actors, who in turn impact the policies decided by the government, are 
a documented way of Europeanization.40 
One should, however, not overstate the impact of Europeanization in the 
field of asylum and migration in Turkey. The process of Europeanization out-
lined above should not overshadow the fact that Europeanization is  incom-
plete at two different levels. At the policy level, Turkey is still far from having 
applied all the different reforms envisioned in the National Action Plan neces-
sary to complete the process of harmonization. The most critical items that re-
main on the to-do list include the lifting of the geographical limitation, the 
37 Several NGOs work exclusively on rights and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants. These include 
ASAM (Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants), Mülteci-Der (Association for Solidarity with Refugees) 
and Mülteci-Net and GDA (the Solidarity Network for Migrants). Many other established NGOs have also created special  
migrant and refugee programs, such as the Turkish branch of the HCA (Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly), MazlumDer (The Asso-
ciation for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People), Amnesty International, Human Rights Association, IHH (The 
Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief), Deniz Feneri, etc. 
38 For instance, in 2009, the EU funded two projects. One with ASAM, called “Suspended Lives, Perceived Lives”, aimed at  
raising awareness and training public authorities and civil society officers on asylum seekers. The second one was with the 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey on the effective protection of the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and other persons 
in need of international protection. 
39 Meeting with official from EU delegation in Ankara, March 2011. 
40 Tocci (2005).
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signing of the readmission agreement41 and the alignment to the Schengen 
visa system. And at the population level, the Turkish actors that have been so-
cialized and accepted the norms of the EU represent a very limited segment of 
the broader Turkish population. These include a couple hundred civil society 
activists, academics and, more recently, officials of Turkish bureaucracy and 
some politicians. This is not to say that the rest of Turkish population opposes 
EU norms on asylum and migration, but rather that there is a lack of interest 
and public discourse on these issues, which makes it difficult to know how the 
rest of the population truly positions itself. At best, one can therefore only talk 
of a partial Europeanization. 
A more important question regarding the means and types of Europe-
anization of the issue of asylum and migration in Turkey is the extent to which 
the observed Europeanization is sincere and genuine, or whether it is simply a 
tactical move from Turkish counterparts in order to gain particular advantages, 
the most  central  one of  which  is  gaining EU  membership. Europeanization 
scholars  have  framed  this  question  with  different  terms,  such  as  “poli-
cy-Europeanization” vs. “societal-Europeanization”,42 or Europeanization driven 
by the “logic of consequences” (according to rational interests) or the “logic of 
appropriateness” (as actors truly adopt the EU values and believe them to be 
normatively the most appropriate values).43 
In the case of Turkey and migration, one can clearly see the works of the 
logic of consequences: there is no doubt that Turkish counterparts are using 
this process of reforms along EU guidance as a means to negotiate particular 
advantages. This is particularly obvious in the case of the signature of the read-
mission agreement between Turkey and the EU. In the last six years of nego-
tiations over the readmission agreement, Turkey has used it as a leverage to 
obtain other readmission agreements with countries sending migrants into 
Turkey, as well as to negotiate the liberalization of visa requirements for Turk-
ish nationals in the Schengen area.44 The case of the lifting of the geographical 
limitation in Turkey’s asylum system is another point in case: in the National 
Action Plan, this lift has been clearly conditioned on Turkey’s entry into the EU, 
indicating that Turkey does not consider the lift as a goal that could be materi-
41 Over the course of 2010, negotiations over the readmission agreement had resumed, but they collapsed in early 2011. 
42 Diez/Agnantopoulos et al. (2005).
43 March/Olsen (1989), Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier (2005).
44 İçduygu (2010). 
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alized absent of the EU carrot.45 But more broadly, one can see how over the 
years Turkish officials have gained a better understanding of the workings of 
the EU, and hence have become more skillful and tougher negotiators in the 
process. From a Turkish perspective, this is only fair, to say the least, as they see 
their relation with the EU as being strongly imbalanced in favor of the EU, with 
the EU being able to gain more advantage from the relation than Turkey does. 
Furthermore, such an approach is not incompatible with a deeper and more 
genuine form of Europeanization. 
In general, it is much more difficult to measure or prove the workings of 
the logic of appropriateness. In the case of the Europeanization of the issue of 
migration in Turkey, one can however point at a couple of issues that hinge on 
a more profound correspondence of so-called “EU” norms and “Turkish” norms 
(whether it was compatible or was the result of a transformation). The first one 
is discursive evidence, looking at the ways Turkish actors talk about the issue 
of migration.46 It is very clear from the discourse developed by civil society ac-
tors, and a cursory look at the literature that they have developed can easily 
identify the correspondence between the values upheld in the reports and the 
ones upheld by the EU. For instance, the website of the NGO Mülteci-Der47 is 
regularly uploaded with European news, court decisions, European NGO re-
ports, etc., alongside with domestic reports and news regarding asylum. Inter-
estingly enough, not only the secular NGOs sisters in form and content to the 
European NGOs, but also the so-called “Islamic” NGOs would employ, among 
others, concepts  of  rights  and  freedoms  that  clearly  refer  to  the  European 
norms: “[T]he inhuman conditions of the centers where foreigners are held, the 
need they have to resort to the administrative court, or even the ECHR because 
of the hardship they face, etc. are proofs that the legal problems faced by these 
people need to be solved. What refugees in Turkey need the most is legal assis-
tance. Accordingly, important responsibilities  befall  on bar associations and 
NGOs”.48 
This discursive adoption of European norms and standards can also be 
noted to some extent with high-ranking officials and bureaucrats in charge of 
45 Kirişçi (2007 a).
46 Beyond the Turkish migration, there have been numerous statements by high-level officials evidencing the genuine adop-
tion (or at least the intent to genuinely adopt) of EU norms. See, for instance, The New Anatolian (2005). 
47 Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği.
48 [My translation]. This sentence was said by a lawyer, member of the NGO Mazlumder, during a conference in 2008 organized by  
IHH. Both Mazlumder and IHH are known for being so-called “Islamic” NGOs. Quote can be found in Düşünce Gündem (2008). 
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migration in the Turkish political system. It is particularly true of officials who 
have received some form of training in Europe, and who, on some particular is-
sues only, report their admiration and desire to apply these same standards in 
Turkey. They tend to appreciate the fact that, in the EU, there is an existing offi-
cial  framework,  a  clear  and  intentional  immigration  policy  and  allocated 
means that allows for a more comprehensive and consistent state policy to-
wards migration.49 
The  other  piece  of  evidence  that  Turkish  actors  have  internalized  EU 
norms on migration is the timing of reforms. Most of the reforms happening 
after 2005, and especially the current drafting of new legislation, is happening 
at a time when the EU membership process is stalled, and as chapter 24 (on 
Justice and Home Affairs, where issues of asylum and migration are mostly 
contained) is not open to negotiations yet. There is therefore a certain discon-
nect  between the EU membership process  and the  reforms at  stake, which 
seems to indicate that Turkey is ready to adopt these reforms whatever the 
outcome of the EU accession process is. 
As it is highlighted from the paragraphs above, the existing Europeaniza-
tion literature and concepts offer a lot of room for a differentiated, nuanced 
analysis of a complex political process. Turkey, in the field of asylum and mi-
gration, is not simply Europeanized or not Europeanized, but rather demon-
strates  different  traits  in  which  a  process  is  ongoing,  overall  highlighting 
Europeanization, but  also  showing  areas  of  resistance  and  room  for  future 
changes. But, this Europeanization story does not tell  the whole picture: in-
deed, it does not explain why some reforms have been unproblematic and why 
some others are very much problematic. There are indeed some grey zones in 
the process of reform of migration policies, which cannot easily be grasped and 
understood from a European perspective using the tools of the Europeaniza-
tion literature. 
The major shortcoming of  this  literature is that it  envisions only non-
compliance, slow compliance and fast compliance. It does not envision a case 
of reversed compliance, or “de-Europeanization”. Hence, it can hardly shed any 
light on the reasons why Turkey, after an initial period of compliance in the 
field of visa regulation, then changed its mind and reversed its policy of apply-
ing  the  Schengen  visa  system  to  Turkey. Another  related  and  more  subtle 
shortcoming  of  the  Europeanization  literature  relates  to  its  underlying  as-
49 Meeting with members of the Migration and Asylum Unit, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. 
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sumption that the body of values, rules, regulations and practices embodied in 
the EU legal system is coherent. Therefore, according to this logic, the only con-
flict that can occur during the “Europeanization” process is one between do-
mestic rules and the EU. What the analysis of Turkey’s immigration policy re-
form demonstrates is that the EU system is in itself internally inconsistent and 
conflictual, which creates both problems and opportunities for domestic actors 
engaged in Europeanization. Very early on, Turkish officials have been aware 
of the contradictions inherent in the EU legal system in the realm of asylum 
and migration.50 
Turkey’s Critical Reading of EU Migration Policies
Europeanization is rarely a neat and consensual political process, which rallies 
the unanimous efforts of the different segments of the population. In almost 
every case, Europeanization challenges the existing balance of interests and 
forces  within a  particular  political  system, enabling  some actors  while  dis-
abling  some  others,  hence  creating  supporters  and  opponents  to  this 
Europeanization. In the case of asylum and migration in Turkey, however, it 
seems that, from the beginning, Europeanization has triggered a particularly 
high level of frustration, anger and feelings of unfairness. Whatever the rea-
sons  behind  this  situation  (whether  the  situation  is  objectively  unfair  or 
whether Turkish actors are more prone to be critical of the EU), this has created 
a situation where, for  the last 20 years, EU migration policies and practices 
have been read through a particularly critical lens in Turkey.
These critical arguments articulated in Turkey can be summarized as fol-
lows. The first  level  of  critique  is  about  the  cost  of  change and  is  a  rather 
straightforward and superficial critique, emphasizing the high-level costs im-
plied by some reforms of the system. This is particularly the case for policies 
that  require  either  Turkey  to  accept  and  better  receive  migrants  (mainly 
asylum seekers and refugees), or to have a more active policy for controlling 
migration, especially at the borders. The argument goes that this requires ex-
tensive  investment  in  an  area  that  may  not  be  a  priority  for  Turkey, even 
though it is a priority for the EU: “We agree to cooperate, but to put into place 
detention centers, we need financial support from the EU.”51 
50 See, for instance, the early writings of Kirişçi (1996 c), Kirişçi (1996 b), Kirişçi (2000).
51 [My translation.] Meeting with a member of the Asylum and Migration Unit, October 2009, Istanbul, Turkey. 
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The second level of critique is focusing on the process of EU accession, 
and the fact that there is an imbalance of power between the EU and Turkey. 
“Accession negotiations” is a poor term to reflect a process whereby Turkey has 
little to negotiate except the timing of reforms, given that the ultimate content 
of the reforms to be adopted are already pre-determined (the EU acquis).52 Con-
sequently, Turkey has no leverage over the process and is doomed to accept 
whatever demands the EU has, even if inappropriate. It is obvious, for instance, 
that Turkish counterparts are not comfortable and very critical about the EU 
visa policy scheme, but, in the long term, it does not seem that Turkey will 
have any alternative options, unless it is willing to jeopardize its EU member-
ship.53 
A third level of critique, again a process-oriented critique, relates to the 
contradictory demands and mixed signals sent to Turkey by the EU. There is in-
deed a keen sense of frustration and powerlessness from Turkish officials on 
the fact that the EU seems to be asking Turkey to simultaneously be “nicer on 
asylum seekers” and “tougher on irregular migrants” when in reality the dis-
tinction  between  the  two  is  very  blurred.  This  led  to  a  situation  where 
whatever Turkish authorities do, they will end up being harshly criticized by 
some EU actors. For instance, the rise in the number of apprehensions of irreg-
ular migrants by Turkish police forces in 2000 and 2001 was correlated with an 
increase  in  criticism  on  Turkey  over  its  violation  of  migrants  and  asylum 
seekers’ rights. 
A fourth level of critique is content-oriented and rests on the perceived 
securitization  of  the  issue  of  migration  in  Europe, and  the  fact  that  these 
policies are unfair to migrants. Not all Turkish actors have raised such a voice, 
as some actors have readily accepted the securitized understanding of migra-
tion.54 But, some have been extremely vocal against often invoking the “cool-
bloodedness and materialism” of Europeans contrasting to the “empathy and 
emotionalism” of Turks. The argument goes that seeing migrants from a secu-
rity  perspective  dehumanizes  migrants,  and  that  it  is  not  appropriate  for 
Europe to ask Turkey to apply securitized policies.55 
52 Tolay (2009).
53 Meeting with a high-ranking official in the Prime Minister’s office, October 2009, Istanbul, Turkey. 
54 Biehl (2009).
55 [My translations.] “If Turkey initiates the writing of a comprehensive asylum policy, for sure it will be more humanistic 
than the European approach. In Europe, the approach to migration is more materialist, i. e., the main question in their mind 
is ‘how much will I gain from migrants’ labor?’ In Turkey, the culture is different, our approach is more social and human-
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A fifth content-oriented level of critique is one that emphasizes how EU 
demands are unfair to Turkey. This relates to the deeply imprinted impression 
in Turkey that the EU migration policies and demands on Turkey are designed 
to use Turkey as a buffer zone and dumping ground of migrants in the process 
of building “Fortress Europe”. It also ties to the perception that Europe is trying 
to shift the burden of migration onto Turkey (as opposed to sharing the bur-
den) and that the EU is instrumentally using the accession process as a tool to 
“make good use” of Turkey.56 
Finally, the  sixth  content-oriented  critique, inter-related  with  the  two 
previous ones, points out the faultiness of certain EU migration policy. This is es-
pecially the case with the Schengen visa policy, about which Turkish counter-
parts emphasize the hypocrisy. The EU puts a strong emphasis on the benefits 
of a visa-free regime for the creation of a zone of stability and prosperity, as 
the EU did internally in the earlier years of the Community. However, it ex-
cludes third neighboring countries (including candidate countries) from this 
zone of stability and prosperity with a restrictive external visa policy.57 Turkish 
citizens are particularly frustrated and vocal about the unfairness of the strict 
visa regime that the EU applied to them.58 It is therefore unsurprising that Tur-
key would be reluctant to adopt a similar policy, hence partly explaining the 
“visa-openings” in which Turkey is involved. The fact that Turkey is positioned 
on the other side of the fence on this issue makes it particularly easy and con-
venient to identify the faultiness and critique EU policies. 
Understanding these critiques helps us understand the scope, extent and 
limits of some of the reforms undertaken in Turkey in the realm of asylum and 
immigration. In particular, it  explains why many reforms were undertaken, 
istic”. Meeting with members of the Migration and Asylum Unit, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. “Turkey sees the visa as a 
tool of soft power, as a way to reduce illegal migration. The EU, on the other hand, sees it as a security issue”. Meeting with 
an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. 
56 [My translations.] “It is conditional that the EU eventually shares the financial burden with Turkey. But even so, the police 
here is reluctant and feeling that we are going to become the ‘refugee garbage of the EU’ ”. Meeting with a civil society ac-
tivist, October 2009, Izmir, Turkey. “Now the EU is simply dumping people to Turkey”. Meeting with an official from the Mi-
nistry of Foreign Affairs, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. See also Kirişçi (2009).
57 Even though, with the ENP, the EU signaled its intention to facilitate and/or liberalize visa requirements with neighboring 
countries, but without much success so far. 
58 See in particular the reports published by IKV (Economic Development Foundation) as one illustration of the amount of 
frustration and activism developed in regards to EU visa requirements towards Turkish citizens. IKV-228 “Visa Hotline Pro-
ject” – Background Paper: Turkish Citizens’ Rights in the EU. IKV-231: “Visa Hotline Project” Project Report. IKV-232: 
Visa Policy of Member States and the EU Towards Turkish Nationals After Soysal. IKV-233: “Visa Hotline Project” – Sur-
vey Report. 
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while signing the readmission agreement and applying the Schengen visa sys-
tem were resisted (because they present securitized approach to migration) 
and so is the lifting of the geographical limitation (because of the cost it would 
entail for Turkey). 
But it  also tells  a particularly interesting story regarding the extent of 
Europeanization in Turkey. On one hand, it  demonstrates a certain distance 
put between Turkey and Europe. Partly as a reaction to the perceived “other-
ing” done by the Europeans, Turkish counterparts also perceive Europeans as 
“them” and are able to distinguish their practice and their norms from “ours” 
(Turkish ones). But on the other hand, it also demonstrates a deep appropri-
ation of EU norms (regarding migrants’ rights and the virtuous effects of open 
borders and integration), strong enough that Turkish counterparts are able to 
identify  and  criticize  when  European  partners  do  not  live  up  to  their  own 
standards. In that sense, and at least in the realm of migration policy, Turkish 
citizenship can claim the intent to  “become more European than the Euro-
peans”.59
This statement, “be more European than the Europeans”, which can be 
heard repetitively in Turkey in many different contexts, is very ambivalent and 
should be understood in the framework of this ambivalence. It is indeed often 
associated with an acute sense of national pride, which seems contradictory 
since it does not affirm that “Turks are better than the Europeans” but links the 
proud feeling of being Turkish with Europeanness. It  should also be under-
stood as a “sweet avenging” against Europeans, as they have always upheld 
Turkish people as “inferiors”. This statement is also rooted in a new feeling of 
confidence born out of Turkey’s recent economic expansion and pro-active for-
eign policy, at a time when Europe seems to be confounded in a succession of 
crises.  But  more  fundamentally,  this  statement  is  grounded  in  the  late-
19th/early-20th  century association of  Europe with the “standards  of  civiliza-
tion”, an evidently European discourse that also took root in the late Ottoman 
Empire  and  in  the  young  Turkey. Later  in  the  20th century  this  association 
between Europe and the standards of civilization was transformed into the as-
59 Meeting, Ministry of Interior, October 2009. See also: [My translations.] “There was a UNHCR program in Poland in 1998.  
Poland had no previous experience with asylum. We will not do like Poland, we are very experienced, and we will put into 
place a policy that is suitable to our country. We can do better than Poland. Already, what we put into place between 2003 
and 2007 was done, even before the deadline was set. We internalized the norms and acted fast”. Meeting with an official 
from the police department, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey. “The EU is making transactions with people, and thinks of mi-
gration at a political level. Our policy will be done according to our own standards, and the EU will see us as an example”.  
Meeting with a police official, October 2009, Van, Turkey. 
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sociation of Europe (or the West) and democracy, to the extent that for many 
the  term  “Europeanization”  equaled  the  meaning  of  “democratization”.  In 
many ways, Turkey in the 21th century engaged in the process of decoupling 
these two terms, hence addressing a problem of cognitive dissonance that has 
plagued Turkish history whereby Turkey would both praise Europe for what it 
achieved, and despise Europe at the same time for what it had done to Turkey. 
Such a decoupling is not an easy process, however, hence it is characterized by 
contradictions and ambiguities. 
This particular process in itself should be good news to Europe. Not be-
cause it means that Turkey will become a docile partner in negotiations – on 
the contrary, evidence seems to show that Turkey’s character will continue to 
be  felt  strongly  at  all  stages  of  negotiations  –  but  because, in  the  field  of 
asylum and migration, Turkey is truly adhering to the positive norms defended 
by the EU. In many ways, Turkey is  demonstrating that they are becoming 
“good but demanding Europeans”. The positive aspect of this is that this “criti-
cal Europeanization” of Turkey is working as a strong source of motivation for 
further reforms in Turkey. This comes at a time when Turkey feels rejected by 
the EU, and contrary to what had happened in a similar situation in the late 
1990s, the rejection is not directly negatively impacting the process of reforms 
(at least in this area) – reforms can be undertaken even despite the ill-will of 
the EU.60 Secondly, it is also good news for the EU, as Turkey can help the EU be 
more  aware  of  some  problematic  policies, or  play  as  a  laboratory  for  new 
policies (as is the case with the visa policy now). This can explain why, for in-
stance, the EU has so far refrained from openly criticizing Ankara’s visa policy 
even though it openly contradicts its EU bid European partners are curious to 
see how viable and replicable in less stable regions an open visa policy is. As for 
future reversals of the implementation of the Schengen visa system, high-rank-
ing officials are not saying that they gave up on the Schengen visa system, but 
rather that it can be applied later, at which point there will, in principle, be a 
change in the visa-free agreements with most Middle Eastern countries. Some 
officials even believe that by then Turkey will  have succeeded in convincing 
their European partners that a liberal external visa policy would also be benefi-
cial to EU.61 
60 [My translation.] “Why the reforms now? Everything should be done in time, we became aware of the issue, and we 
created a new public opinion on the issue of migration. The timing of the EU does not matter so much anymore”. Meeting 
with members of the Migration and Asylum Unit, October 2009, Ankara, Turkey.
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Nevertheless, this analysis should not overshadow the rest of the story. 
The phenomenon of “critical Europeanization” that has been identified here is 
a nascent phenomenon, a particularly interesting one that should be closely 
observed, but not a very broad and representative one. We have found evi-
dence of this among a small segment of the population, and regarding a very 
particular issue (asylum and migration). The more general story seems to be 
one of a combination of traditional Europeanization with trends of resistance, 
which could be a source of concerns. However, given the background and inter-
esting  ambivalent  relationship  that  Turkey  has  entertained  with  Europe, it 
might be that “critical Europeanization” is potentially a broader phenomenon 
that could explain and predict much more of Turkish behaviors in the future. 
Conclusion
This chapter has identified the existence, in the field of asylum and migration, 
of a non-traditional form of Europeanization, referred to as “Critical European-
ization”. On asylum and migration, Turkey has engaged in a formidable process 
of reform, testifying to its willingness to harmonize its regulation to the EU ac-
quis. However, the rationale behind these reforms are rooted both in the ac-
ceptance of the desirability of many of the norms and policies and in the cri-
tique addressed to many EU policies towards immigration. On that note, the 
form of Europeanization that Turkey has engaged in is  one that adopts the 
norms, internalizes them, and is able to use them confidently as standards to 
which they can upheld EU policies and demands towards Turkey, hence devel-
oping  an  openly  critical  voice  towards  the  EU. It  is  a  very  reinsuring  phe-
nomenon for the EU, who gained, admittedly, a difficult partner, but also one 
that can truly contribute to the EU construction. The fact that some segments 
of Turkish bureaucracy have internalized the idea of having a more systematic 
and rule-based policy toward migration will ease the path of reform in the fu-
ture by decreasing the fear that EU demands will go against Turkish interests. 
But, the road will remain bumpy. 
61 [My translation.] “Our visa policy is in contradiction to the EU policy? So what? When we get into the EU, then we will 
change our position. This is not at all a problem”. Meeting with a high-ranking official in the Prime Minister’s office, October 
2008, Istanbul, Turkey. 
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Turkey’s  New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of  It?
Kemal Kirişçi
Introduction
As  Turkey  becomes  increasingly  recognized  as  an  immigration  and  transit 
country for irregular migrants,1 Turkey’s asylum policies are receiving growing 
attention from the public as well  as the international  community. Recently, 
two  conferences  organized  by  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in January 2011 and International Organization for Migra-
tion (IOM) in May 2011 with local partners attracted a large attendance com-
posed of academics, civil society representatives, diplomats, and most import-
antly, officials. This interest is partly triggered by the release, in January 2011, of 
Turkey’s first draft asylum law.2 This draft law is the product of an unusually 
transparent process of law-making by Turkish standards that started back in 
late 2008. If the law is indeed adopted by the Parliament, Turkey will finally 
have a legal framework extending protection to asylum seekers and refugees 
together with an accompanying physical as well as administrative infrastruc-
ture. This will constitute a major break from past practice. This development 
also occurs at a time when Turkey’s accession negotiations are fast approach-
ing a dead end. Yet, the head of the team that prepared the draft law acknowl-
edges the role of the European Union (EU) and especially notes that the law is a 
step in the direction of meeting Turkey’s promises in its National Programme 
for the Adoption of the Acquis (NAAP) as well as the Action Plan on Asylum and  
Migration. The importance of preparing for accession negotiations on Chapter 
24 that covers EU acquis in this area is also cited as a reason for the preparation 
of the draft law. 
1 Tolay (forthcoming), Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2011), İçduygu/Kirişçi (2009), Kirişçi (2007 a).
2 Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu Tasarısı Taslağı.
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The draft law brings a significant number of improvements to current 
Turkish  practice  and  would  clearly  ensure  a  better-quality  protection  for 
asylum seekers in Turkey. However, strikingly the law stops short of lifting the 
geographical limitation with which Turkey has been a party to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Accordingly, Turkey is not obliged 
to extend refugee status to asylum seekers coming to Turkey as a result  of 
“events occurring outside Europe”. The lifting of the limitation is one if not the 
major condition that Turkey has to fulfill for EU membership. The EU has en-
joyed considerable influence on the transformation of Turkish policy on a wide 
range of issues with respect to domestic politics and foreign policy. Turkey in-
troduced  dramatic  reforms  to  meet  the  Copenhagen  political  criteria  and 
transformed its  foreign policy on Cyprus by supporting the United Nations 
Plan to reunite the island to be able to start accession negotiations. Since then 
reforms in relation to a range of chapters that are being negotiated and have 
yet to be opened continues. Hence, against the background of these reforms it 
becomes puzzling as to why the draft law stops short of meeting a major con-
dition of the EU. The EU, through consecutive  Accession Partnerships, Strategy  
Papers and Progress Reports, has unequivocally made it clear to the Turkish side 
that for the completion of the harmonization process the geographical limita-
tion would have to be lifted. This paper will argue that as much as the EU has 
impacted the process of the preparation of the new draft law on asylum, this 
has been a partial one and that the role of European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the UNHCR need to be taken into account, too. The UNHCR has 
had a very long-standing relationship with the Turkish government and then 
also with Turkish civil society. This relationship has contributed to a slow but 
sure process of socialization of Turkey into the norms and rules of an interna-
tional refugee regime. Against this background of socialization, the rulings of 
the ECtHR especially in the course of the last couple of years have played a crit-
ical role in creating a climate of urgency to reform Turkey’s asylum policy and 
practice. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section offers a brief 
description of the Turkish asylum system and its evolution. The second section 
discusses the relative roles of the EU, the ECtHR and the UNHCR in this reform 
process and the adoption of the draft law. The paper concludes by suggesting 
that, as much as the draft law is welcomed and is especially promising, as it 
suggests an important transformation in hearts and minds of Turkish officials, 
the acid test will only come if the draft law is indeed adopted and starts to be 
implemented. Even then it will be difficult to ascertain the role of the EU, as 
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the principal demand of the EU, the “lifting of the geographical limitation”, will 
remain unmet and is  likely  to  stay unmet as  long as Turkey’s  prospects  of 
membership remains grim. 
Turkey’s Asylum Policy and Practice
In the West, Turkey is traditionally known as a country of emigration. Yet, Tur-
key, like its predecessor the Ottoman Empire, has long been a country of im-
migration especially for Muslim ethnic groups, ranging from Bosnians to Po-
maks and Tatars, as well as Turks from the Balkans and to a lesser extent from 
the Caucasus and Central Asia. Between 1923 and 1997, more than 1.6 million 
immigrants came and settled in Turkey.3 Furthermore, after the Nazi takeover 
in Germany and then during the Second World War, there were many Jews 
who fled to Turkey and then resettled in Palestine. There were also many who 
fled the German-occupied Balkans for Turkey and returned to their homelands 
after the war had ended. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has also 
become a country receiving an increasing number of irregular workers and im-
migrants from Balkan countries and former Soviet Republics as well as Iran, 
Northern Iraq and Africa. These often include people that overstay their visa 
and work illegally. Turkey has also been a country of asylum, and is among the 
original signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention. However, Turkey is today 
among a very small number of countries that still maintains a geographical 
limitation to the agreement’s applicability as defined in Article 1, b(1)(a) of the 
Convention.4 Accordingly,  Turkey  does  not  grant  refugee  status  to  asylum 
seekers coming from outside Europe but has to extend temporary protection, 
and hence maintains a two-tiered asylum policy. 
The first tier of this policy is centered on Europe and is deeply rooted in 
Turkey’s role as a Western ally neighboring the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War. During that period, in close cooperation with the UNHCR, Turkey received 
refugees from the Communist Bloc countries in Europe, including the Soviet 
Union.  Such  refugees,  during  their  stay  in  Turkey,  enjoyed  all  the  rights 
provided for in the 1951 Convention. However, only a very small number were 
allowed to stay in Turkey, often as a result of marriages with Turkish nationals. 
3 For details, see Kirişçi (1996 a).
4 Monaco, Congo and Madagascar are the only remaining countries signatory to the Convention that continue to maintain 
a “geographical limitation”, Joanne (2005).
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Current  Turkish  legislation  limits  immigration  a  full-fledged  refugee  status 
with the integration option only to  persons of  “Turkish descent or  culture”. 
Hence, the overwhelming majority of the refugees were resettled out of Tur-
key. Although it is very difficult to obtain accurate statistics on their numbers, 
the Ministry of Interior (MOI) has indicated that some 13,500 asylum seekers 
benefited from the protection of the 1951 Convention between 1970 and 1996. 
Statistics  for  previous  years  are  not  available.  In  addition, approximately 
20,000 Bosnians were granted temporary asylum in Turkey during hostilities 
in the former Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995. Some of the refugees were 
housed in a refugee camp near the Bulgarian border, while many went on to 
stay with relatives in large cities such as Istanbul and Bursa. Since the signing 
of the Dayton Peace Plan in 1995, many of these refugees have been steadily 
returning to Bosnia. In 1998 and 1999, approximately 17,000 Kosovars came to 
Turkey to seek protection from the strife in their ancestral homeland. The ma-
jority has returned. There are also an undetermined number of Chechens resid-
ing in Turkey in a somewhat a legally grey zone. Most importantly, in 1989 
more than 310,000 Bulgarian nationals of Pomak and Turkish origin fled to 
Turkey en masse. More than 240,000 of them were naturalized. However, the 
regime change in Bulgaria and membership to the EU culminated with many 
of the refugees returning or taking up dual nationality. Beyond these major 
mass movements of refugees Turkey has received only small numbers of ap-
plications from individuals coming from Europe. Their numbers from 1995 to 
2010 add up only to 289 applications out of which just 30 have received a long-
term residence permit (daimi ikamet). However, there are a greater number of 
asylum seekers such as Chechens from the Russian Federation and some Cen-
tral  Asian republics who have been discouraged from formally applying for 
asylum and instead been allowed to stay on in Turkey sometimes under pre-
carious conditions. 
The second tier of Turkey’s asylum policy deals with persons from outside 
Europe. The new policy emerged in 1980s in the aftermath of the Iranian Re-
volution, and subsequent instability in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast 
Asia. Upheaval in these areas led to a steady increase in the number of asylum 
seekers coming from outside Europe. For a long time, the government allowed 
the UNHCR considerable leeway to temporarily shelter these asylum seekers 
with the tacit understanding that they would be resettled out of Turkey if the 
UNHCR recognized them as refugees, and that those whose claims were re-
jected would be deported. However, the growth in the number of illegal entries 
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into Turkey and in the number of rejected asylum seekers stranded in Turkey 
strained this practice. The situation was also aggravated by the 1988 and 1991 
mass influxes of Kurdish refugees amounting to almost half a million. Officials 
were also concerned that among these asylum seekers were militants of the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan – PKK) trying to enter 
Turkey from Northern Iraq. 
It was against such a background that the government introduced a de-
cree, the Asylum Regulation, in November 1994.5 The Regulation became the 
first piece of legislation at the national level and ambitiously aimed to bring 
status  determination  under  the  control  of  the  Turkish  government.  It  was 
primarily drafted with national security concerns and hence introduced strict 
regulations governing access to asylum procedures with little regard for the 
rights of asylum seekers and refugees.6 It is not surprising that the practice 
that evolved in the first few years of the application of the Regulation attracted 
serious and concerted criticism from Western governments, as well as major 
international human rights advocacy groups.7 Critics argued that Turkey was 
undermining the rights of asylum seekers and refugees by denying them ac-
cess to asylum procedures or failing to provide them adequate protection by 
violating the principle of non-refoulement. The Regulation had introduced the 
requirement that asylum applications be filed within maximum five days of 
entry into Turkey. The rule was often interpreted strictly and applications were 
refused on the grounds of being late. Such refusals were often followed by de-
portations. There were also cases of bona fide refugees recognized by the UN-
HCR being deported on the grounds that these persons had never actually filed 
applications with Turkish authorities and were in violation of the regulation. 
This led to frequent conflicts between Turkish authorities and the UNHCR that 
continued to receive applications and assess them on their merits independ-
ently of the provisions of the Asylum Regulation.
However, the situation began somewhat to improve by the late 1990s. In-
terestingly, a good part of these improvements began to occur before the EU 
actually engaged Turkey as a candidate country for membership and where 
primarily encouraged by the UNHCR. There were a number of reforms. Most 
importantly, in 1997 the way to judicial appeal was opened when two local ad-
5 See Official Gazette (1994).
6 Kirişçi (1996 b), Kirişçi (2007 b, pp. 170–183), Frelick (1997 a), Zieck (2010). 
7 For example, see the U. S. Department of State: Turkey Country Report on Human Rights for 1996 and Frelick (1997 b). 
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ministrative  courts  ruled  against  the  deportation  orders  on  two  Iranian 
refugees recognized by the UNHCR. These refugees had originally entered the 
country illegally and had not filed in their applications with the Turkish au-
thorities in time. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) had ruled for their deportation 
under the provisions of the 1994 Asylum Regulation. The MOI’s appeal to a 
higher court against the decision of the lower courts was struck out, too. The 
UNHCR played an important role in encouraging and supporting the asylum 
seekers to approach the courts and try the judicial appeal process. This was 
also accompanied by an ECtHR ruling (Jabari v Turkey)8 against the deporta-
tion of an asylum seeker on the grounds of the provisions of the 1994 Regula-
tion and that, if this order was carried out, this would constitute a violation of 
the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  These  judicial  developments 
played a central role in getting the government to amend the Regulation in 
1999 by initially extending the time limit to ten days.9 
Another indirect reform of the Turkish asylum policy came through the 
introduction of training seminars initially for the Foreigners Department of 
the Police. The first of these took place in September 1998 and involved officials 
that directly dealt with asylum seekers and refugees. These early seminars or-
ganized by the UNHCR were the first of their kind. A steady stream of officials 
went through these seminars assisting the gradual accumulation of expertise 
accompanied  with  a  process  of  socialization. This  process  significantly  im-
proved the officials’ understanding of the issues involved and helped them be-
come familiar with international standards. These seminars also contributed 
to  a  significant  change  in  the  attitudes  of  many  of  these  officials  towards 
asylum seekers and refugees. The training programs were gradually expanded 
to include other officials such as judges, prosecutors and gendarmes, as well. 
Gendarmes  are  often  the  very  first  people  that  asylum  seekers  would  en-
counter in border areas. Awareness programs to differentiate between illegal 
immigrants and asylum seekers were introduced to the training of the Gen-
darmerie. Programs were also held with the Bar Associations for prosecutors 
and judges focusing on refugee law. The police and gendarmes normally have 
to  report  immigrants  or  foreigners  illegally  present  in  Turkey  to  the  local 
courts. Hence, prosecutors and judges play a critical role in whether such per-
sons are deported or not. The seminars in these respects were critical in raising 
8 Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights (20oo).
9 Official Gazette (1999).
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awareness of a body of law and practice to help distinguish between illegal im-
migrants and asylum seekers and Turkey’s legal obligations under international 
law.  
A parallel development was the growing cooperation between non-gov-
ernmental organizations and the government. An increasing number of non-
governmental organizations ranging from the Turkish branch of Amnesty In-
ternational to the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) began 
to  cooperate  with  the  government in  organizing  and  running  some  of  the 
above training programs for officials but also seminars for lawyers and human 
rights activists. The UNHCR branch office in Ankara actually took the initiative 
to encourage the establishment of the first Turkish Non-Governmental Organi-
zation (NGO), the Association of Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants, 
in 1995 dealing solely with refugee-related issues. The UNHCR also instituted 
the practice of organizing seminars with first human- rights associations and 
then began to include also NGOs focusing on social issues such as women’s 
and children’s rights as well as local NGOs extending humanitarian assistance 
to asylum seekers and refugees. Bar Associations in big cities such as Ankara, 
Istanbul and İzmir, as well as some border towns, also developed various sup-
port programs geared to providing legal assistance for asylum seekers as well 
as training programs on asylum law and human rights of asylum seekers to 
their members. More recently, a group of NGOs interested especially in the hu-
man-rights dimension of asylum formed the Platform of Refugee Rights (Mül-
teci Hakları Koordinasyonu). In due course, some of these NGOs also developed 
an expertise in filing complaints with local courts as well as the ECtHR. Actu-
ally, they did not hesitate to instrumentalize the ECtHR to put pressure on the 
government for reform. 
More importantly and in a most fascinating manner  the close coopera-
tion between the UNHCR and the Turkish authorities culminated in a situation 
where the UNHCR came to perform de facto refugee status determination on 
behalf of Turkey. Even though the Asylum Regulation identified the MOI as the 
body responsible for status determination, MOI officials came to rely increas-
ingly on the judgment of the UNHCR. They were quite content to go along 
with UNHCR decisions as long as the asylum seekers were also registered with 
them and eventually those who were recognized as refugees did get resettled 
out of Turkey. The occasional differences were usually sorted out through in-
formal  consultations. Training seminars  and close cooperation also enabled 
the  UNHCR  to  gain  access  to  groups  of  irregular  migrants  that  got  appre-
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hended by the Turkish authorities, particularly in border regions of Turkey. Ac-
cording to Turkish government statistics  there were approximately 3,500 to 
4,000 asylum applicants filed a year between 1995 and December 2008 while 
for the last three years the average has gone up to about 9,000 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Asylum Application in Turkey (1995–2010)
The figures include asylum seekers from Europe * and outside Europe **.
* Includes Albania, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Switzer-
land, Ukraine and Yugoslavia.
** Includes Algeria, Bangladesh, Birmania (Myanmar), Burma, Burundi, China, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,  
Ghana, Guinea, India, Israel,  Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia,  
Libya,  Malaysia,  Mauritania,  Morocco,  Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Palestine,  Philippines,  Rwanda,  Sierra  Leone,  Sri  
Lanka, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United States of America, Yemen  
and Zaire. 
Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI. Data current as of 10.1.2011.
An overwhelming majority of the asylum seekers are from Iran and Iraq. Dur-
ing this period there were a total of more than almost 77,400 asylum applica-
tions and just above 39,000 of them were recognized as refugees (see Table 1). 
Turkey’s New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of It? 71
Table 1: Applications under 1994 Regulation in Turkey (1995–2010)
Country Applications Accepted Rejected Pending Undetermined Status
cases cases cases
Iraq 30,342 15,647 5,368 6,720 2,607
Iran 35,468 21,784 3,723 7,434 2,527
Russia 99 15 52 14 18
Afghanistan 5,947 571 368 4,912 96
Uzbekistan 402 96 75 189 42
Azerbaijan 55 3 25 16 11
Other* 144 58 64 11 11
Other** 4,973 994 477 3,248 254
Total 77,430 39,168 10,152 22,544 5,566
* Includes Albania, Armenia, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Romania, Switzerland, Ukraine and Yugoslavia.
** Includes Angola,  Algeria,  Bangladesh, Belarus, Birmania (Myanmar),  Burma,  Burundi,  Cameroon, Central  
African Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Israel, Ivory  
Coast,  Jordan,  Kazakhstan,  Kenya, Kuwait,  Kyrgyzstan,  Lebanon, Liberia,  Libya, Malaysia,  Mali,  Mongolia,  
Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia,  Stateless,  Sudan, Syria,  Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia,  
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United States of America, West Sahara, Yemen and Zaire. 
Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI. Data current as of 10.1.2011.
The overwhelming majority of the recognized refugees were resettled out of 
Turkey mostly to the United States and Canada but also a number of EU coun-
tries (Table 2).10
10 The figure of refugees and resettled refugees has to be interpreted cautiously, as the grand figures included refugees 
with applications pre-dating 1995. 
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Table 2: Resettlement out of Turkey by Country of Origin and Country of Settlement
Country of Origin Country of Settlement 
Canada USA Oceania Other 
Europe
Scandinavia Others Total
Afghanistan 192 258 3 17 89 559
Iran 4,841 10,061 2,921 269 3,667 12 21,771
Iraq 1,043 10,335 1,788 689 1,732 33 15,620
Africa 436 326 1 7 55 825
North Africa 15 1 16
Asia 34 13 145
Middle East 74 4 10 7 6 1 102
Bosnia Herzegovina 45 1 46
Total 6,699 21,063 4,723 990 5,563 46 39,084
Africa: Angola, Burundi, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan
North Africa: Guinea, Mauritania, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia  
Asia: Burma, China, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Sri Lanka  
Middle East: Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Yemen
Oceania: Australia, New Zealand
Other Europe: Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain,  
Switzerland, Ukraine, Greece, Poland, Czech Republic, Belgium
Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
Others: Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Dubai, Indonesia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab 
Emirates
Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI. Data current as of 10.1.2011.
EU Rule Adoption and Transforming the Turkish Asylum System
It is extremely difficult to judge the impact and the timing of the EU’s role in 
this process of transformation. This is the case because the EU came on to the 
scene at a time when a “paradigmatic shift” was occurring among Turkish offi-
cials, primarily a product of the UNHCR’s long and patient engagement of Tur-
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key. This was a shift from a paradigm that framed the issue of asylum policy 
from a primarily “national security” perspective to one that increasingly em-
phasized human rights and international refugee law. The role of the EU has 
been more visible in respect to the setting of a formal agenda and a time-table 
for eventual “rule adoption” for Turkish policy. In this respect, the consecutive 
Accession Partnership documents of 2001 and subsequent ones clearly induced 
Turkish officials to recognize that at some point the lifting of the geographical 
limitation  would  have  to  take  place  and  that  Turkey  would  have  to  adopt 
structural and institutional as well as legislative reforms. In 2002 the govern-
ment formed a Task Force that brought together officials from various agen-
cies, possibly for the first time in their history, to actually discuss what needed 
to be done to meet the conditions set by these documents. These documents 
also broadened the scope of the ongoing informal debate between officials di-
rectly dealing with asylum on the one hand and academics and experts as well 
as representatives of non-governmental organizations and the UNHCR on the 
other. 
The  EU’s  High  Level  Working  Group  (HLWG)  on Turkey did  also  make 
funds  and  experts  available  for  training  seminars  specifically  on  asylum.11 
These seminars were critical in the words of a UNHCR official in helping to de-
velop a “common language” between Turkish officials and their EU counter-
parts.12 Furthermore, the adoption of the NAAP was also critical given its ac-
ceptance  to  lift  the  geographical  limitation  despite  the  conditions  it  set. 
However, more important in this respect was the “twinning project” that the 
British and Danish governments supported. This project not only enabled Turk-
ish officials possibly for the first time in their careers to work for months on a 
daily basis with their EU counterparts but the exercise also helped Turkish au-
thorities to prepare the  Action Plan on Asylum and Migration  that was sub-
sequently adopted by the government in March 2005.13 This document in great 
detail identified both national legislation and the EU acquis on asylum and mi-
gration. It also laid out in broad outlines the tasks and time-table that Turkey 
intended to follow to prepare Turkey for the development of a fully fledged na-
tional status-determination system, lift the geographical limitation and adopt 
EU directives on asylum and migration in general. 
11 For a detailed analysis of the HLWG of the EU, see Selm (2002).
12 Exchange of email messages with a UNHCR official in Ankara.
13 The Turkish National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Aquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration was officially  
adopted by the Turkish government on March 25, 2005. 
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The renewed Accession Partnership adopted in January 2006 subsequent 
to the beginning of accession talks with Turkey in October 2005 set a medium 
period (the end of 2009) as the deadline for the completion of the “rule adop-
tion” exercise and the lifting of the geographical limitation. The document also 
expected Turkey, in the area of asylum, to make visible progress in setting up 
reception centers for asylum seekers, to develop a country of origin informa-
tion system, to introduce national asylum legislation and to set up a special-
ized administrative unit to deal with asylum and status determination. In the 
meantime, the screening process concerning Chapter 24 dealing with asylum 
was completed in 2007. The report of the Commission concerning the outcome 
of the screening process highlighted the gaps in the area of asylum and con-
siders Turkey not to be compliant with the EU acquis.14 However, the report to 
this day has still not been formally adopted as Cyprus and France continue to 
block the opening of accession negotiations on Chapter 24. Naturally, these de-
velopments aggravate doubts about the EU’s credibility and deeply influence 
Turkish public policy makers’ cost calculation.
Turkish decision-makers have been fully aware that previous candidate 
countries had to go through a similar “rule-adoption” process. They are also 
aware that there were a number of countries that had to lift their geographical 
limitations such as Hungary, Latvia and Malta and that the first two countries 
did so well before their accession negotiations started.15 They also realize that 
they have to follow suit. However, they have faced a major dilemma provoked 
by their mistrust of the EU’s credibility in respect to the ultimate “reward” of 
membership. The greatest nightmare scenario for them is one in which they 
would  find  themselves  lifting  the  geographical  limitation  without  Turkey’s 
membership being taken seriously by the EU. Turkish officials are also con-
scious and deeply affected by the European public resistance to Turkish mem-
bership. They also have firsthand knowledge of the experience of their coun-
terparts  in  some  of  the  new  member  countries  against  which  they  can 
compare their own dilemmas and “cost-benefit” calculation matrices. They are 
deeply aware that their counterparts, when making a critical decision, were 
pretty much confident that eventually membership would take place. A high-
level MOI official involved in asylum issues for almost a decade and an advo-
cate of the reform of the Turkish asylum system put his deep concerns pretty 
14 European Commission Enlargement (2010).
15 These countries maintained their “geographical limitation” until 1998, 1997 and 2002 respectively.
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bluntly. This official during a visit to Hungary to learn about the Hungarian ex-
perience of lifting their geographical limitation and putting into place a fully 
fledged  asylum  system  had  actually  asked  his  Hungarian  counterpart  how 
they were able to take on financially and politically very costly decisions. The 
Turkish official reflected on how “his heart sank” when his Hungarian counter-
part simply said that this was never a major concern for them because they were 
always sure that they would become a member of the EU at the end.16 
Another  issue  that  marks  the  cost  calculation  of  Turkish  officials  is 
burden-sharing. Owing to its geographical location, Turkish officials are con-
scious that Turkey risks becoming a buffer zone or a dumping ground for the 
EU’s unwanted asylum seekers and refugees. The adoption of the current  ac-
quis  would make Turkey a  typical  “first  country of  asylum” responsible  for 
status  determination  with  membership  and  a  “safe  third  country  of  first 
asylum” before  then.17 This  raises  considerable  concerns  among  officials  in 
terms of the economic, social and political implications. Turkish officials will 
expect to see burden-sharing mechanisms that would go beyond what the cur-
rent Refugee Fund can offer.18 Traditionally, refugees have been resettled out of 
Turkey. Turkish officials  want to see an arrangement that would allow this 
practice to continue for some transitional period. However, the current acquis  
does not allow for such a practice.19 This fear of becoming a buffer zone is also 
aggravated by Turkish officials’ perception of a growing EU tendency to exter-
nalize its asylum policies and its efforts to create a “fortress Europe”. Ironically, 
these officials learn about the details of these policies from the very experts 
and representatives of non-governmental organizations that they encounter 
during training seminars and conferences. In other words, a Europe that tries 
to complicate if not deny access to asylum seekers to reach the EU is not set-
ting a good example for Turkey in terms of harmonization and credibility. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the transformation that has been going on in 
the area of asylum over the last decade had been nudging Turkey towards a po-
sition that is closer to the one that is more in parallel with EU demands. In June 
16 The visit took place between May 22–26, 2006 as a part of a project supported by the British government and the Inter-
national Catholic Migration Commission.
17 Council of the European Union (2003).
18 Commission of the European Communities Commission (1999), Council of the European Union (2000).
19 The issue of burden-sharing has been one of the difficult challenges that member states faced in developing a common 
asylum policy; see Thielemann (2003, pp. 253–273), Thielemann (2005, pp. 807–824). This challenge has been greater in the 
case of candidate countries; see Byrne (2003, pp. 336–358).
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2006 the Department, responsible for asylum matters, circulated an internal 
regulation20 (Genelge) that, according to a high-ranking UNHCR official, “pleas-
antly surprised them”.21 The document basically sends instructions to the po-
lice in general to speed and facilitate the implementation of tasks laid out in 
the  Action Plan. In its introduction, it recognizes that the regulation aims to 
meet the standards mentioned in the 1951 Geneva Convention and the EU ac-
quis. It  introduces very specific measures that aim to improve access to the 
asylum system and ensure continuity for the trained personnel in their cur-
rent position rather than to risk being moved to other irrelevant tasks as part 
of the standard rotation system. It lays out for the first time rules concerning 
the  process  of  identity-determination  of  asylum  seekers  as  well  as  clearly 
states that asylum seekers may well enter the country without identity and 
that this cannot be held against them.22 Furthermore, this internal regulation 
also identifies the procedures to be followed to determine the outcome of an 
asylum application and appeal procedures for rejected cases. It also incorpo-
rates elements from current EU directives concerning country of origin infor-
mation, provision  of  translation  facilities  and  a  positive  interview  environ-
ment. Lastly, it also underlines that refugees and asylum seekers having a valid 
residence permit would be entitled to a work permit, too, and it provides for 
the  granting  of  “secondary” or  “subsidiary” protection  short  of  full  refugee 
status. A close reading of the Regulation reveals that the authors of the Regula-
tion benefitted closely from the EU’s “Qualifications” Directive, betraying one 
of the most conspicuous manifestations of “rule adoption” thus far. 
However, this Regulation did not bring a major improvement in the situ-
ation of asylum seekers in Turkey. At least two reasons played a role in this 
outcome. Firstly, the  enthusiasm  to  reform  and  adapt  Turkish  practice  and 
policy to EU norms reflected in the NAAP and the Action Plan fizzled out as EU-
Turkish relations began to deteriorate from late 2006 onwards. 
The mood to resist “conditionality” and “rule adoption” was captured in a 
very  telling  manner  by  a  high-ranking  Turkish  diplomat  at  a  meeting  in 
September 2007 with UNHCR officials. He made references to the Negotiation 
Framework and noted that “if the EU aims to keep the negotiations open-
20 İçişleri Bakanlığı (2006). 
21 Interview with a high-ranking UNHCR official.
22 This is extremely fascinating because the principle that asylum seekers cannot be denied access to asylum procedures on 
the ground of false papers or no identity papers was a point that would come up regularly in the context of the discussion 
of the 1951 Geneva Convention.
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ended so we shall also keep developments open-ended”. He added the impor-
tance that Turkey attributes to “reciprocity” and noted that during the pre-ac-
cession  period  Turkey  would  adopt  those  rules  and  regulations  that  are 
deemed to benefit Turkey. Turkey on the other hand would keep an “open-ended” 
approach to the adoption of policies that do not offer mutual benefit. He gave 
the lifting of the geographical limitation as an example of an area where Tur-
key would be reluctant to adopt EU acquis as long as uncertainty over Turkish 
membership prevails.23
A second reason stemmed from the situation deteriorating in Iraq and 
also in Somali resulting in a sudden and significant increase in the number of 
asylum seekers coming to Turkey. This led to the security-oriented approach in 
Turkey to make itself felt again. One important consequence of this was an in-
crease in cases of refoulement as well as a growth in complaints about access 
to asylum procedures. A growing number of non-governmental organizations, 
including the Turkish branch of Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, as well as the Hu-
man Rights  Watch  (HRW), became critical  of  government policies  and pub-
lished reports that attracted considerable public attention.24 This was also fol-
lowed in 2009 by a Council of Europe report prepared by Thomas Hammerberg 
raising very specific criticisms ranging from the practice of obliging asylum 
seekers to pay residence permit fees to inhumane conditions in detention cen-
ters.  Most  importantly,  in  2009  the  ECtHR  in  its  decision  Abdolkhani  and 
Karimnia found Turkey in violation of a number of articles of European Hu-
man Rights Convention (EHRC) resulting from attempts to deport two Iranian 
refugees to Iran and for denying them access to contest deportation decisions. 
The ECtHR also sentenced Turkey to pay a substantial sum of reparations to 
the  complainants.  Furthermore,  the  Court  concluded  that  Turkey  failed  to 
provide effective remedy opening the way for accepting applications without 
seeing the exhaustion of domestic paths to remedy. This decision became a 
turning point. During the period from 1991 to 2008 there had been 13 cases that 
were taken to the Court and only one had led to a conviction against Turkey. 
However, the case of  Abdolkhani and Karimnia was followed by twelve addi-
tional cases culminating in rulings of convictions and most accompanied with 
demands for compensation to be paid to the complainants. 
23 Information obtained from the diplomat and third parties present at the meeting. 
24 Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği (2007), Human Rights Watch (2008).
78 Kemal Kirişçi
The growing criticisms and the rulings of the ECtHR had very visible ef-
fects. Firstly, the Minister of the Interior, Beşir Atalay, soon after the appear-
ance of the HRW report, appointed in November 2008 two special inspectors to 
investigate the allegations in this report and also why commitments made to 
the EU in the context of the harmonization process were not being met. The in-
vestigation culminated in a major personnel change in the Department of For-
eigners within the police while a new office, the Migration Unit tasked to pre-
pare a draft law on asylum, was set up within the MOI. The office in an effort 
to address some of the more immediate practical complaints and criticisms 
initiated the adoption of a series of new regulations. The first of these regula-
tions  introduced  the  possibility  to  waive  resident  permit  fees  for  asylum 
seekers and refugees as well as measures to improve access to asylum proced-
ures and social services.25 This was followed by two additional regulations in-
troduced by the Social  Services and Child Protection Agency as well  as  the 
Ministry  of  Education extending their  services  to  asylum seekers  and refu-
gees.26 Officials also recognized that ECtHR rulings were “raining on Turkey” 
and that “the current situation is becoming untenable”.27 Turkey did not have 
any other choice but to reform its asylum policies. 
It is against such a background that a draft law was prepared and sent to 
the Prime Minister’s Office in January 2011. This is a law that addresses prac-
tically all the issues raised in the most recent Accession Partnership of 200828 as 
well as the “informal” screening report mentioned above short of lifting the 
geographical limitation. It incorporates the current EU acquis and foresees the 
setting up of a separate authority to deal with asylum and other migration-re-
lated issues including provisions to improve the integration of refugees. Never-
theless, there is a consensus shared by academics, experts and UNHCR officials 
that the draft law and the manner in which this draft has been prepared signify 
a major transformation in Turkey’s asylum policy. It is not surprising that the 
25 İçişleri Bakanlığı (2010).
26 Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu (2010).
27 Remarks shared with the author on a number of occasions, in particular during the MiReKoç conference on “Critical Re-
flections in Migration Research: Views from the South and the East”, October 7–9, 2009, Koç University, Istanbul.
28 The Accession Partnership calls for making “progress in the preparations for the adoption of a comprehensive asylum 
law in line with the acquis including the establishment of an asylum authority” (Council of the European Union [2008, 
p. 13]) under “short term priorities” and for continuing “with alignment with the acquis in the field of asylum, in particular 
through the lifting of the geographical limitation to the Geneva Convention and through strengthening protection, social 
support and integration measures for refugees” (Ibid, [p. 17]), under “Medium Term Priorities”.
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres became the 
first ever High Commissioner to visit Turkey in November 2010. He used the 
occasion both to praise the government for an open consultation process it 
adopted in preparing the law and for drafting a law that enlarges the protec-
tion space for asylum seekers.29 The UNHCR representative in Ankara stressed 
the similar remarks during the opening of a conference on the “Tradition of 
Asylum in Turkey”. Furthermore, the draft law offers provisions to prevent the 
danger of deportation of any person to countries where their life may be in 
danger or where they risk being tortured as well as provisions that aim to en-
sure the improvement of detention conditions and access to judicial review. 
Hence, the adoption of this draft law needs to be seen as a function of as 
much the socialization effect of the UNHCR and ECtHR on Turkey as harmoni-
zation with EU acquis. This was strikingly evident when the head of the Migra-
tion Unit but also the permanent secretary of the MOI during a UNHCR organ-
ized local conference in Ankara in January 2011 emphasized in their speeches 
the importance in addressing the human rights of asylum seekers. Both offi-
cials argued that the draft law represented a shift in mentality away from a 
purely security- (asayiş) driven approach to one where the focus would be on 
human rights. They also added that the law also reflected a desire “to do things 
for  ourselves (kendimiz için yaptık)  because that  it  is  only  such  a law that 
would live up (yakışır) to a Turkey that has become the 16th largest economy in 
the world”. Undoubtedly, these are words that do represent political considera-
tions and a desire to curry favor with the public and international community. 
The conference was after all  organized by the UNHCR, was attended by the 
diplomatic corps in Ankara and was held just before the first-ever visit of a 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to Turkey. However, this kind 
of language was absent in the discourse of high-level officials previously and it 
is also highly unusual that Turkish bureaucrats will speak, even implicitly, crit-
ically of a previous practice in front of a public audience attended by foreign 
officials. For  someone  who  has  observed the  asylum scene  in  Turkey  since 
1989, I believe this transformation in language can at least partly be attributed 
to a greater sense of associating oneself with the broader international com-
munity dealing with asylum issues. 
29 Today’s Zaman (2010).
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Conclusion
This paper focused on the adoption of a draft law on asylum that aims to re-
form Turkey’s asylum policy and practice. The law would open the way to Tur-
key meeting most of the requirements set by the EU short of the lifting of the 
geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention. This is a stark reminder 
of the limits of EU “conditionality”. Otherwise a strong inducer of reform, in the 
case  of  Turkey  it  is  problematic. EU-Turkish  relations  have  reached  a  point 
where on the Turkish side the expectation of eventual membership occurring 
is low. Asylum actually belongs to a chapter that is currently blocked from be-
ing opened by the vetoes of a number of member states. Hence, the paper ar-
gued that at least part of the explanation for reform lies in the influence that 
the UNHCR and the ECtHR have enjoyed. In the case of the UNHCR, this influ-
ence has been spread across almost two decades during which the UNHCR 
contributed to the socialization of Turkish officials and civil-society represent-
ations to the norms of international refugee law. In the case of ECtHR, the in-
fluence is much more recent and more of a direct one. The authors of the draft 
law openly acknowledge this influence by referring to the rulings of the Court 
against Turkey and the need to respond to it. It will actually be interesting to 
follow the fate of this draft law and see what happens when the legislative 
process starts. The ultimate test of where the balance among these three insti-
tutions as inducers of reform lie will surely become much clearer once the law 
becomes operational and starts to be implemented. The ultimate test, however, 
will still depend on the lifting of the geographical limitation and that seems 
unlikely to happen unless the prospects of EU membership for Turkey become 
credible.
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Is  Migration Feminized? 
A Gender- and Ethnicity-Based Review of the Literature on 
Irregular Migration to Turkey 
Gülay Toksöz and Çağla Ünlütürk Ulutaş
Turkey today is both a sending and a receiving country in migration. In the 
1960s and 1970s, there were flows of mass migration from Turkey to various 
European countries, including Germany in the first place, to cover the labor 
shortage  then  existing  in  these  countries.  When  the  countries  of  Western 
Europe stopped receiving migrant workers, the direction of migrant workers 
from Turkey shifted to oil-rich Middle Eastern countries and, starting from the 
1990s, to the Commonwealth of Independent States including the Russian Fed-
eration. Meanwhile, Turkey encountered the immigration of ethnic Turks from 
Bulgaria in the late 1980s as a result of political pressures there and irregular 
migration inflows swelled from various countries nearby in the period after 
1990. While some irregular migrants traveling and/or staying without satisfy-
ing specific requirements related to migration eventually target Western coun-
tries after temporary stays in Turkey, there are others who come to find jobs to 
work specifically in Turkey. 
There are three fundamental patterns of development that trigger irregular 
migration. The first is the radical transformation that the Eastern Bloc countries 
underwent in the 1990s, which led to the collapse of hitherto existing economic, 
political and social regimes. It was followed by a transition to a market economy, 
accompanied by unemployment and poverty as major drivers of migration. Ri-
gid migration regulations introduced by the EU countries closed the doors to 
new migrants, redirected people to look for other countries where they can 
find  jobs  and  consequently  Turkey  became  a  center  of  attraction  for  these 
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people  with  her  employment opportunities  in  a  rather  large, informal  eco-
nomy. The second is the fact that irregular migrants originating from various 
Asian and African countries who have no chance of being legally accepted as 
migrants by EU countries use Turkey as a transit country while they wait for 
opportunities to move ahead to Europe. Migrants in this group as well move to 
informal  sectors  for  subsistence  during their  stay in  Turkey. The same also 
holds true for the third group of migrants who flee from some oppressive re-
gimes in the Middle East and reach Turkey for seeking asylum.1 While their 
motives for arrival may differ, the common characteristic of all irregular mi-
grants is their participation in informal labor markets either for short or longer 
term. Migrants’ participation in labor markets that are structured on the basis 
of gender and ethnicity certainly takes different forms in regard to sex, and 
migrants encounter different working conditions as well as different forms of 
exploitation and exclusion depending on their countries of origin. 
By focusing on the state of migrants coming to Turkey for employment 
and within the framework of existing literature on migration, the purpose of 
this paper is to seek an answer to the question of the extent to which the global 
phenomenon of migration is feminized. The increasing share of female migrants is 
true for Turkey, and, while seeking an answer, we hope to shed light on the com-
parative employment status of males and females from different ethnic origins. 
Though remaining scarce for some time, studies on labor migration in Turkey 
and working conditions of migrants as actors in this process of migration have 
recently been increasing. What is interesting to note at this point is that these 
studies mostly focus on migrant women in domestic and care services. 
Labor Migration to Turkey 
Leaving aside a tiny minority with legal permission to stay and work in Turkey, 
migrants in Turkey largely consist of those who work illicitly without any offi-
cial permission. The status of those staying and working legally in Turkey is 
provided for by the Law No. 4817 (2003) of Permission of Employment Granted 
to Foreigners. According to the provisions of this law, the Ministry of labor and 
Social Security (MoLSS) examines applications and, considering the needs of 
labor market, grants permission to the employment of expatriates given that 
domestic laborers cannot be found for any particular area of employment. Ac-
1 İçduygu (2006, p. 2).
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cording to information available in regard to those employed on  the basis of 
permission, newly granted and extended permissions increased in the period 
2003–2009, jumping from 7,302 in 2004 to 14,023 in 2009.2 Of the countries of 
origin of these migrants with work permission, China leads the list with 18.4 %, 
followed by the Russian Federation (11.2 %). The combined share of EU coun-
tries in total is 20 %. Looking at the distribution of work permits granted in 
2009 by fields of employment, we see that those from China constitute the 
largest group as private company employees. It is known that Chinese firms 
engaged in mining in particular bring along their employees. This is further 
confirmed by the fact that Zonguldak is among the top five provinces in terms 
of the number of work permits granted to migrants. Migrants from the Rus-
sian Federation and Ukraine, on the other hand, make up the bulk of permits 
granted in the context of tourism. As for those coming from the EU countries, 
they mostly enjoy permits granted for academic purposes. As for gender distri-
bution of work permits, males constitute the majority with 61.6 % while the 
share of females is 38.4 %.3
Since the legislation in effect envisages the granting of work permits to 
expatriates only in case domestic laborers are not available, the number of per-
mits granted is extremely limited. A large part of migrants employed in Turkey 
work  informally  for  unqualified  jobs  that  can  be  taken  up  by  domestic 
laborers. Though origin countries of irregular migrant workers may change in 
the course of time, these are mainly the republics of the former Soviet Union or 
Eastern Bloc countries. These include Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Mol-
dova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Migrants 
arriving without the need to get tourist visa or by getting their visas issued at 
the border find jobs in an informal economy and turn out to be illicit when 
they remain after the expiration of their visas. According to data provided by 
the General Directorate of Security, there were over 700,000 persons in the 
period  1999–2009  identified  while  illicitly  entering  the  country  or  leaving 
after delay. It can be said that the second category mainly consists of migrant 
laborers.4 These persons stay in the country legally with tourist status; some 
maintain this  legal  status by leaving and re-entering depending upon their 
visa periods and others continue to stay in Turkey illicitly. Those who exceed 
2 MoLSS (2011).
3 Ministry of Interior, GDS, cited by IOM (2010, pp. 37–40). An absence of studies on migrants with legal permission is 
the reason why our assessment in regard to such migrants is limited to statistics.
4 IOM (2010, pp. 15–16).
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their visa periods have to pay a fine at the border and they are not allowed to 
re-enter Turkey unless staying in their home countries for a period of time cal-
culated on the basis of the period they stayed in Turkey in excess of their visa.5 
Consequently, some migrants continuously postpone return and the penalty 
mentioned produces an impact, which extends the period of stay in the coun-
try rather than dissuading irregular migration. Making money in temporary 
jobs found in Turkey, and returning back to the country of origin after some 
time and re-entering Turkey when there is need for jobs, constitute the com-
mon characteristics of these migrants, and the process is defined as circular or 
shuttle migration.6 The point in choosing Turkey as a place to work and save 
money is related to some factors. These include a flexible visa system, geo-
graphical proximity, ease in access, existence of networks formed by family 
members and acquaintances already working in Turkey and possibilities  of 
finding jobs in informal economy.7 
For a labor supply to be functional there must be demand for it. An ex-
tensive informal economy and employment, a  shortfall  of  institutional  care 
services and a demand for informal labor in Turkey are determining factors for 
the emergence of a migrant labor supply. In this respect, Turkey resembles the 
countries of Southern Europe, which are the destination points for irregular 
migration. In countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, gaps left by 
rudimentary welfare states in the delivery of care services as well as the exist-
ence of a wide informal economy based on small enterprises create demand 
for cheap labor mainly in the sectors of services, agriculture and construction, 
and the part of this demand not responded to by domestic labor is covered by 
migrant workers. In Turkey, the dominant character of the labor market is sur-
plus labor, which manifests itself in high rates of unemployment and under-
employment. There is demand for migrant workers in spite of the existence of 
such a labor surplus.8 This  demand emerged following the partial  improve-
ment in real wages in the period 1989–93 which came after falling wages in 
the 1980s and historically coincided with the period during which people from 
the countries of the former Eastern Bloc used their newly gained freedom to 
travel  and  to  start  migrating  for  employment.  While  a  transition  to  out-
5 Ibid. (p. 29).
6 İçduygu (2008, p. 4), Erder (2007, p. 43).
7 İçduygu (2004, pp. 48–49).
8 Toksöz (2007).
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sourcing and sub-contracting facilitated informal employment, irregular mi-
grant workers  were phased in as a reserve labor  force in the face of  rising 
wages for domestic laborers.9 Migrant workers are employed in labor-intensive 
and  low-paid  sectors,  the  manufacturing  industry  including  garments  and 
food, construction, agriculture, tourism, entertainment  and  commercial  sex 
and domestic and care services. With the exception of construction sector, it 
can be assumed that females  outnumber males in all  sectors. Female labor 
dominates particularly such sectors as domestic and care services, entertain-
ment and commercial sex, and garment production while both male and fe-
male migrants are employed in other sectors including food-restaurants, vari-
ous sub-sectors of tourism and, particularly in the Black Sea region, agriculture. 
In the garments, tourism and construction sectors, the subsistence of small en-
terprises  depends  upon  the  employment  of  cheap  labor  provided  by  mi-
grants.10 While legislation envisages heavy fines for the employment of illicit 
migrants, they are not dissuading people from it due to insufficient inspection. 
Or, in cases where inspection is conducted, bribes paid to officials are attractive 
enough to let cases go “unnoticed”.11 A relatively higher level of education and 
better work discipline on the part of migrant workers, their laboring without 
posing any problems to their employers, an absence of social rights and bene-
fits and any tendency to get unionized make migrant workers preferable for 
employers.12 Here the major factor that brings along the absence of any protec-
tion is the fact that migrants reside illicitly in Turkey and that, even in cases 
where their stay is legal, they work without working permits. The principal 
fear common to all migrants is the fear of being spotted and deported. While 
migrant workers may accept working longer hours than domestic laborers and 
being paid less than others, what they consider to be a gross injustice and a 
case of desperation is when they are not paid at all, a situation against which 
they have no place to apply.13 In addition to these, female migrant workers also 
mention such risks as sexual harassment and, for those in commercial sex, get-
ting infected.14
9 Akpınar (2010).
10 İçduygu  (2004, pp. 45–48), İçduygu (2006, pp. 6–7).
11 İçduygu (2004, pp. 54–55), Dedeoğlu (2011), Akpınar (2010).
12 Erder (2007, pp. 65–66).
13 Dedeoğlu (2011), Toksöz/Akpınar (2009).
14 İçduygu (2006, p. 9).
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Feminization of Migration in the Context of the Gap in Care Services in 
Turkey 
In the countries of Southern Europe that have some common socio-economic 
characteristics with Turkey, child, elderly and sick care services are mostly re-
garded as matters of family responsibility, and the delivery of public services in 
these areas have remained weaker relative to Northern European countries. 
With the further weakening of welfare regimes in the process of neoliberal re-
structuring, public  care  services  have  gradually  disappeared. Moreover,  the 
weakening of family ties, which once maintained home care, and higher rates 
of labor force participation on the part of women, who have traditionally as-
sumed the burden of care, led to the emergence of a rather striking problem of 
a “care gap”. As female citizens who used to be employed in domestic and care 
services find other opportunities of employment and refuse to undertake “low 
status” domestic and care services as there emerged a rising demand for fe-
male migrants who could fill the gap. Consequently, the burden of domestic 
and care services for women, which is the outcome of a gender-based division 
of labor, shifted from upper-middle class women in a given country to lower-
class migrant women.15 In European countries, those who covered the gap are 
women  mostly  from  the  former  Eastern Bloc  countries. Since  gender-based 
power relations had remained intact in these countries where wage-work used 
to be a norm for women during the period of state socialism, it was women 
who, in the face of upheaval, brought along with them the transition to a mar-
ket economy. These women decided to migrate, bearing the responsibility to 
protect their families and in particular to meet the needs of their children. It is 
often in domestic and care services that these women found jobs and work. 
Since their goal was to save money while working in other countries and to re-
turn back home afterwards, their traffic between two countries is defined as 
“settlement in mobility”.16
While the employment of migrant women in domestic and care services 
in Turkey has some characteristics similar to the case in developed countries, 
there are differences as well. In many countries of the world, the rise in de-
mand for migrant domestic labor is explained by women’s increasing partici-
pation in the labor force.17 As women increasingly take part in the labor force, 
15 Campani (1993), Kofman et al. (2000), Lazaridis (2007).
16 Morokvasic (2004).
17 Parrenas (2001).
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it  is  observed  that  women  shift  their  traditionally  given  domestic  roles  to 
waged migrant labor. However, contrary to the worldwide trend, Turkey faces 
a situation where women’s  participation in the labor force is  falling. In the 
2000s, the women’s labor force participation rate was around 26 % and this 
rate falls short of explaining the rise in demand for migrant labor. However, 
the share of women in professional occupations is around 37 %, which is close 
to that in developed countries, and it can thus be asserted that it is the factor 
that determines the demand for migrant laborers.18 As a matter of fact it is up-
per-middle class women in professional occupations, regarded as employers, 
that tend to hire migrant women laborers in Turkey.19 
The “care gap” that invites migrant labor is not a recently emerging prob-
lem in Turkey, where care-related welfare state policies have never developed 
and become institutionalized, but a long-standing and deep-rooted one. As a 
result of the absence of state intervention in this area and a consequent weak-
ness of institutional care facilities, care for the elderly, the disabled and chil-
dren turned out to be unpaid family service  shared by female members of 
families. Under the given circumstances, only women in professional jobs, en-
joying relatively higher incomes, can afford to use institutional care services 
provided by the private sector or hire persons for home-based care. Among 
those  available  for  such  services, the  number  of  migrant  women  has  been 
rising steadily in recent years. “Migrant female labor in Turkey emerges not as 
a remedy for the withdrawal of a well advanced system of welfare state but as 
elements of labor that provides for the welfare of only a part of families within 
a welfare regime where family plays a central role”.20
In Turkey, women in professional occupations can take part and make a 
career in working life on equal footing with men only by purchasing domestic 
and care services while, on the other hand, migrant women working for them 
say they move out of their countries for ensuring the well-being of their chil-
dren in particular, covering their costs of education and providing for family 
subsistence.21 The mobility of women to provide for their basic needs started in 
the early 1990s with the enjoyment of the right to travel in the Eastern Bloc 
countries. The heroines of the “luggage trade”, experienced in the early 1990s 
18 Ecevit et al. (2008).
19 Kümbetoğlu (2005), Kaşka (2006), Keough (2006), Akalın (2007).
20 Gökbayrak (2009, p. 76).
21 İçduygu (2004, p. 44), Kaşka (2006, p. 46).
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and  considered  as  the  harbinger  of  irregular  migration  movements,  were 
mainly women from this bloc, who were engaged in such activity for mere 
subsistence. In a study shedding light upon this issue, Yükseker (2003) draws 
attention to the fact that the Soviet women who developed skills in providing 
for daily subsistence needs maintained these skills, upon the collapse of the 
system, by  engaging  in  small-scale  trade  activities.  The  luggage  trade  that 
provided significant foreign currency inflow to the Turkish economy through-
out the 1990s and early 2000s later lost its importance as the former Eastern 
Bloc countries, including Russia in the first place, integrated with the world 
economy as the scale of the trade expanded and was institutionalized. Never-
theless, small-scale  trade  activities  still  persist  with  actors  from  the  poorer 
countries.22 In this process, women kept moving to Turkey to work and make 
money in various sectors. Of their engagements, the sector of entertainment 
and commercial sex of course had wider media coverage and was of wide pub-
lic interest. Our priority topic here, however, is domestic and care services in 
which we can assume many more women are employed. 
Migrant Women in the Sector of Domestic and Care Services 
Since the majority of migrants in Turkey working in domestic and care ser-
vices are women from the former Eastern Bloc countries, almost all literature 
in this field is on women moving in from these countries, including Moldova 
in the first place, with the exception of Weyland’s (1994) study on migrants 
from the Philippines and Danış’s (2007) study on Christian migrants from Iraq. 
However, changes in visa regimes together with bilateral agreements between 
Turkey and other countries bring along a striking impact on the national com-
position  of  migrants  employed  in  domestic  and  care  services. According  to 
Atatimur,23 for example, while the labor force profile of agencies in 2007 was 
composed of women from Moldova, Romania and Turkmenistan, others from 
Caucasian countries, including Georgia in the first place, gained weight start-
ing from 2008. This change can be explained by the duration of visa agree-
ments acted with the countries concerned as well as ease in getting visas is-
sued. 
22 Erder (2007, pp. 49–55).
23 Atatimur (2008, p. 121).
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While in European countries the demand for low-status and low-paid do-
mestic services not preferred by nationals is met by a migrant labor force, in 
Turkey  these  services  are  shared  by  live-in  migrants  and  daily  paid  local 
people. Due to the given conservative environment and their role of reproduc-
tion in their own families, Turkish citizens usually do not prefer to work in the 
sector  of  live-in  care.  Hence, the  gap  in  boarded  and  flexible  labor  mostly 
needed by employers working long hours in professional jobs is covered by mi-
grant laborers. In other words, migrant laborers are left not only with low-paid 
jobs but also those that are not preferred by nationals for various reasons. Mi-
grant women, on their part, prefer being live-in workers without paying any 
rent or for daily accommodation.24
Another  important factor, which boosts demand for  migrant domestic 
workers, is that it has the function of consolidating the identity and life-style 
images of  middle-class  families in Turkey. Indeed, many employees explain 
their preference for migrants over nationals by the “European” and “more civil-
ized” characteristics of the former while considering the latter as uneducated 
and of a rural origin. There are also other reasons for this preference, including 
the more disciplined nature of migrants in fulfilling their tasks and complying 
with rules set by their employers and the possibility of constant checking since 
they live and work in the same space.25
The Migration Journey and the Employment Processes of Migrants in 
Domestic Services 
As stated earlier, women migrating to work in the sector of domestic and care 
services in Turkey enter and leave the country with short-term tourist visas 
and are thus engaged in a circular (shuttle) form of migration. After their stay 
in Turkey, they return to their home countries to renew their visas, to help 
their families in agricultural works and to check the situation of children they 
have left behind. But there are others who keep staying in Turkey over their 
visa periods.26 This second group of people, who are penalized for violating visa 
rules and denied re-entry, find ways of convincing border-gate authorities, in-
cluding bribes or resorting to counter-strategies, such as divorcing or using a 
24 Akalın (2007, pp. 214–215).
25 Demirdirek (2007, p. 17), Atatimur (2008, p. 140).
26 Demirdirek (2007), Kaşka (2006), Keough (2006), Akalın (2010).
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maiden name for getting a new passport and tourist visa.27 The Gagauz region 
in Moldova is the leading one with its migrant workers going to Turkey and 
this preference for Turkey derives from region’s native tongue, which is Turk-
ish. The migration of women in Moldova has also become a life strategy trans-
ferred from generation to generation. Some nurses who used to work in care 
services in Turkey say they worked in Turkey to raise their children and now it 
is their daughters’ turn to do the same to raise their own. This situation, coined 
as “settlement in mobility” by Morokvasic, reflects the necessity of migrating 
out in order to have a better life in their countries later. 
It is observed that migrant women arriving in Turkey finance their travel 
and visa costs in four ways: with their own savings, receiving pre-payment 
from  their  prospective  employers, borrowing  from  relatives  or  usurers  and 
through employment agencies that they apply to. Employment agencies may 
provide for travel and they mostly bill employers as their clients for the cost of 
travel  and other necessary documents. Following the agreement, employers 
pay a commission fee of 500 USD, which is a kind of guarantee for the agree-
ment acted.28 Women, whose first travel is through employment agencies, may 
later arrange for their travel after finding good employment opportunities and 
learning about the route, fees and the working of the system.29 When travel is 
arranged by employment agencies, intermediaries visit villages to announce 
the date of departure and migrants complete their exit procedures within a 
month. Then, when the time of departure comes, migrant women are collected 
from various stations and transported to Turkey by bus or plane. The migration 
literature assumes that the poorest cannot migrate for not having enough fin-
ances to do so; however, with the phasing in of employment agencies, even the 
poorest can take part in the process of migration.30
Agreements with agencies involve no written contract and these organi-
zations seize the passports of migrant women as long as they are employed. 
According to the manager of an employment agency, this practice of seizing 
passports is not only a guarantee for them but also a protective one for mi-
grant women preventing their shift to other sectors. The manager draws atten-
tion to the importance of trust between the firm and the client and stresses 
27 Ozinian (2009).
28 Atatimur (2008, pp. 113–114).
29 Keough (2006, p. 441).
30 Atatimur (2008, pp. 115–118).
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that an agency alleged to be involved in commercial sex has lost all its clients. 
It is also stated that there are hundreds of such agencies active in Turkey.31 As 
put by Kaşka (2006), the sole basis of this relationship devoid of any formal 
contract  and taking place illicitly  is  trust. In a sense, agencies  regulate  this 
chaotic area with their “unwritten” rules. The absence of any state regulation 
on this irregular labor migration, which has been on the rise for about two dec-
ades, invited too many informal structures to fill the gap. These informal struc-
tures include, for example, “transporters” who convey goods and remittances 
of migrant women back to their families, employment agencies that conduct 
their activities as “consulting firms” and more experienced migrant women 
who make money as intermediaries by arranging jobs for new migrants.32
Besides employment agencies, networks of relatives and friends also play 
a role in the process through which migrant women find jobs. It is a common 
practice that returnees leave their jobs in Turkey to their relatives/friends or 
seek jobs for them through their employers. Indeed, according to a study con-
ducted by Erdem and Şahin,33 54.7 % of migrant women covered in their study 
found their jobs through employment agencies while 37.7 % had jobs thanks to 
their friends. While ethnic ties play an important role in providing jobs to Ar-
menian migrants in domestic services, both ethnic and religious ties come to 
the fore in the case of Christians from Iraq who moved to Turkey after war for 
reasons of unemployment and insecurity. The study conducted by Danış (2007) 
revealed that Christian women from Iraq who moved to Istanbul or planned to 
move forward to European countries via Istanbul could find jobs as domestic 
workers for families belonging to Syriac and Armenian communities in Istanbul. 
Working Conditions of Women Employed in Domestic and 
Care Services in Turkey 
Domestic and care labor as a form socially dis-valued and traditionally under-
taken by women maintained its low status and gender-based character even 
after its commoditization and transformation into wage labor. Consequently, 
in the determination of the working conditions of migrant women in domestic 
services, consideration of domestic labor as “valueless” and “invisible” on the 
31 Ibid. (pp. 122–124).
32 Kümbetoğlu (2005, p. 19).
33 Erdem/Şahin (2009, p. 306).
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one side and the status of being “migrant” and “woman” on the other are inter-
acting factors. The other two factors that shape the working conditions of mi-
grant domestic workers are the facts that work is done “at home” and employ-
ment is “informal”. 
Coinciding living and working environments of migrant women and the 
fact that these environments are those of the upper-middle classes in receiving 
countries make the distinction between public and private spheres ambiguous. 
The women-specific nature of the home space as well as production in this 
space creates a relation of employment whose parties are women.34 As a mat-
ter of fact, the term “employer” in the literature on migrant domestic laborers 
is used for describing not the employing family but the woman concerned. The 
study by Atatimur shows that married employers as well as single parent em-
ployers pay migrant women out of their personal incomes and this situation 
confirms that this employment relation in Turkey is in fact between women.35
Wages paid to migrant domestic workers vary from 300 to 800 USD. For 
care services, employers make their preference between new migrants who do 
not speak Turkish but are ready to work for lower wages and higher-paid mi-
grant women who have some experience in working for middle-class Turkish 
households. Those who can use weekly days off are given stipends of 7–13 USD 
on those days. Payment of wages on a monthly basis enables the employer to 
extract more services from the employee in return for wages and also transfers 
all responsibilities of reproduction to boarding migrant workers who can use 
their working time in extremely flexible ways.36
Kümbetoğlu37 summarizes the negative impacts of “informality” prevail-
ing in working and living conditions of migrant women in domestic services 
as follows: dying hair black to look Turkish, rare meetings with friends in order 
not to be spotted by security, preference of private homes rather than public 
places in such meetings, feeling of loneliness, missing children back home, ab-
stinence in order to save as much as possible, and undertaking even the most 
disrespected work  in  spite  of  a  good educational  background. Preconceived 
ideas fueled by the presence of women from the former Eastern Bloc countries 
in commercial sex led to the stigmatization of migrants in domestic services as 
34 Ünlütürk Ulutaş (2010, p. 288).
35 Atatimur (2008, p. 141).
36 Kaşka (2006), Özinan (2009), Akalın (2010).
37 Kümbetoğlu (2005, p. 21).
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“Natashas”, as well as to their harassment when out of their working places.38 
Political considerations too may determine some negative attitudes towards 
migrants. For example, when political strife between Turkey and Armenia in-
tensifies upon such issues as bills related to Armenian genocide or Karabağ, 
migrants from Armenia feel themselves more threatened by possible deporta-
tion.39
Unfavorable  working and  living conditions  leave migrants  to  face  the 
problems of chronic stress. While not being able to go out freely for the fear of 
getting  spotted and deported aggravates  the  psychological  problems  of  mi-
grant  women,  those  who  can  more  frequently  return  to  their  countries 
through shuttle migration and get together with their friends on their days off 
are in much better  condition. When migrant women (who permanently re-
main in home environments mostly alone with the child, the elderly or the 
sick person under their care) have to spend their leave days too in the same en-
vironment, their potential for renewal and comfort is also seriously compro-
mised.40 Since migrants in Turkey other than refugees or asylum seekers can-
not benefit from any health insurance scheme, migrant women in domestic 
services either use medicine they brought along or wait for their next return to 
the home country for medical treatment. It is only in very serious cases that 
they can use private health facilities. Since a frequent emergence of  health 
problems may cause the loss of a job, they often tend to hide such problems 
from their employers.41 
In upper-middle class homes, migrant women abide by high norms of 
work discipline in favorable conditions in some cases and with a rather heavy 
work burden in others. Women conceive of work as an essential part of life and 
express their attitude towards work by saying “it is better if there is work to do, 
otherwise we start worrying about ourselves and our children”. These women 
are saddened and disturbed in conscience not by their own circumstances but 
by the situation of their children back home who may feel abandoned.42 Never-
theless, it  is  also the case that they may face humiliating attitudes in their 
working environments. A woman states that she once faced following type of 
38 Keough (2006).
39 Özinian (2009, p. 26).
40 Lordoğlu and Etiler (2010, p. 109).
41 Ibid. (pp. 103–108).
42 Kümbetoğlu (2005, p. 17).
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questions in her apply for a job: “Do your feet stink?”, “Do you wash out well 
after defecating?”, “Do you have a boyfriend and do you think about bringing 
him here if there is?” and “Do you eat much?”.43
In  studies  on  migration, while  excessive  exploitation  and  unfavorable 
working conditions exemplified above are focal points, it is necessary to care-
fully analyze the relations between the migrant woman worker and her em-
ployer and not to assume that it is a one-way relation emerging in a single 
form.44 In other words, the relation in between must be analyzed by taking due 
account of the dimension of mutual dependence. 
Employer-Employee Relations: Intensive Exploitation or 
Mutual Dependence? 
The “fictive ties of kinship” with migrant workers and the fact that the living 
environment of the employer is also that of the migrant worker create a rela-
tion of employment where migrants do their jobs not only as a result of a ne-
cessity but their willingness to do so. The rhetoric of kinship ensures the as-
similation of the worker in the family of the employer and consequently the 
latter’s  approach  to  professional  work  as  a  natural  responsibility.  Just  like 
mothers/spouses who cannot be “off” household work, any boarded servant/ 
caregiver, too, cannot. The migrant worker is expected to leave aside the fact 
that she is employed professionally and instead turn into a housewife by ac-
cepting the home environment of the employer as her own.45 When care ser-
vices are concerned, the relationship between the worker and employer assumes 
an even more complex character. This relationship between the caregiver and 
her employer can be constructed both in a form that yields “mutual benefits” 
and in another form that is based on the exploitation of the workers. The form 
of  relationship  is  determined by multiple  economic and socio-cultural  vari-
ables. Care labor which is otherwise devalued by the patriarchal system and 
structural  dynamics  of  the  market  becomes  “valuable”  through  the  social 
meaning attributed to care responsibility as well as the emotional dimension 
of the service delivered. This system of clashing values determined on the one 
43 Ibid. (p. 21).
44 Akalın (2007, p. 221).
45 Ibid. (p. 220).
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side by wage and status of work and on the basis of human relations on the 
other shape the working conditions of migrants who deliver care services.46 
The  emotional  dimension  of  care  services  enables  migrant  women  to 
have control over what they do while encouraging them to feel themselves as 
a part of the families they work for; but at the same time this position forces 
them to be “loyal caregivers”, always patient and understanding. For example, 
migrant worker Maria with her four children back in Moldova could not stop 
her teardrops when she saw her employer returning home cheerfully with her 
children. Her employer, on the other hand, scolded her for her sullenness in-
stead of asking whether there was any problem.47
Care labor necessitates close surveillance as well as physical and emo-
tional care. Particularly in cases of childcare, the relationship between the care-
giver and children is one where various ideas and experiences of the caregiver 
are transferred to children and basic life skills as well as cultural norms and 
values are taught.48 In the case of elderly care, on the other hand, the caregiver 
takes over the responsibility for ensuring the physical and emotional well-be-
ing of the elderly person while, at the same time, accompanies as a friend the 
elderly person who is isolated and whose physical mobility is restricted. This 
situation makes the employer dependent on the caregiver who spends more 
time with her child or household member in need of care. However, common 
ideas about affection, family and child-rearing mask different power dynamics 
and  inequalities  inherent  in  waged  care  labor.  The  contradiction  between 
motherhood and commoditized care labor makes lines of demarcation as to 
which duties are to be transferred from the mother to the caregiver ambigu-
ous.49 Thus, the existence of co-habitation in the same home with the employ-
er, constructed with the rhetoric of kinship, may create both advantageous and 
disadvantageous outcomes for women in domestic services. Women employed 
in closed home environment and facing the threat of deportation are vulner-
able to almost all forms of exploitation and abuse. Nevertheless, such factors as 
the employer’s sharing of her home and family with the migrant worker and 
the establishment of an affection-based relationship with the child or elderly 
person when care services are concerned may also create relatively favorable 
46 Uttal (1999, p. 759).
47 Demirdirek (2007, p. 18).
48 Uttal (1999, p. 762).
49 Ibid. (p. 759).
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working environments in which migrant workers may put their employers in 
the place of their own families back at home. Since the cessation of the care rela-
tionship (which is tightly connected with the caregiver due to its emotional di-
mension) may create adverse outcomes from the point of view of the employer, 
the relation between the employer and worker may in some cases be founded 
upon mutual dependence. Such a relation of dependence cannot be observed 
in other sectors where migrants are employed. 
Migrant Women in Entertainment and Commercial Sex Sectors 
When the concepts  of  pleasure and desire  gained a transnational  character 
with globalization, the demand for sex services increased and more and more 
women started to work in the sectors of entertainment and commercial sex. 
Along with the rise in demand, services offered diversified and sector workers 
from various countries and ethnic origins became accessible. The development 
of communication technologies and the feminization of migration led to the 
global expansion of the sector, which is rather based on the commoditization 
of woman’s body. Upon the collapse of the Soviet System, which was followed 
by the inflow of women from the former Eastern Bloc and their participation 
in commercial sex in Turkey, there emerged a diversification in the sector and 
a  rising  demand  for  expatriate  women.50 After  domestic  and  care  services, 
commercial sex is the sector where demand for migrant women is the highest. 
Contrary to such sectors as the manufacturing industry, tourism, agriculture 
and construction, in which there is competition with a domestic labor force, in 
domestic services, entertainment and commercial sex, domestic labor and mi-
grant workers constitute two distinct groups responding to different demands 
by employers/clients. 
Migrant women in the sector of entertainment and commercial sex can 
be addressed in three different groups in respect to their entry into the sector 
and their  working conditions. The first  group comprises  those employed as 
persons granted permission to work in the entertainment sector. The second 
group consists  of  those entering Turkey with a tourist visa and working in 
commercial sex either as free-lance or by paying to intermediaries. Persons in 
this second group have either migrated directly for the purpose of working in 
this specific sector or shifted to it after having worked for some time in the 
50 Ünlütürk Ulutaş/Kalfa (2009, p. 16).
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luggage trade, tourism and domestic services. The third group is composed of 
the victims of human trafficking who have been deceived by promises of em-
ployment in other sectors and then forced to take part in commercial sex. This 
third group differs from the first two since a process of exploitation is force-
fully imposed and will not be addressed here as a distinct topic of study. Unlike 
the sector of domestic services, studies and statistical data relating to migrant 
women in the sectors of entertainment and commercial sex are scarce, natu-
rally leading to very limited information on their living and working condi-
tions.51
In the entertainment sector where mostly women from Ukraine and Rus-
sia are employed, formal employment is  more common than others sectors 
where migrant workers are also employed. According to data provided by the 
MoLSS, work permits granted to those from these two countries are mostly for 
the entertainment sector and enterprises in this are considered a part of the 
tourism sector. The procedure is firstly to reach show groups to be employed in 
entertainment facilities over agencies in origin countries and then to apply to 
the MoLSS for work permit.52 The protection of migrants working in this sector 
is ensured through the employment contracts of migrants in their native lan-
guages as well  and informing them about their rights emanating from the 
Labor Code.53 Legal and formal employment facilitate the access of women in 
this  sector to health and security services and make it  possible for them to 
work in more favorable conditions than other irregular female migrants.
While some migrant women in commercial sex move to Turkey specifi-
cally to work in this sector, there are also others who shift to the same sector as 
a result of such reasons as not being able to find other jobs, low wages offered 
and others. A study by Kalfa (2008) reveals both sexual violence encountered 
by women in domestic  services  and a  transition from domestic  services  to 
commercial sex. In whichever sector they are employed, the perceived status of 
women from the former Soviet countries as sex workers and their stigmatiza-
tion as “Natashas”  may lead to their harassment in other sectors as well an 
eventual drift to commercial sex.54 The wide presence of migrants in commer-
51 As the most accessible of all, data from the General Directorate of Security reveal the criminal dimensions of the issue; 
however, even these statistics fall short of enabling us to gather information regarding the motives and processes of mi-
gration and conditions that women encounter. 
52 Erder/Kaşka (2003, p. 66).
53 Dedeoğlu/Gökmen (2010, p. 54).
54 Gülçür/Ilkkaracan (2002, p. 414).
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cial sex is so pronounced that even when they go back to their own countries 
there emerges a preconception that all migrant women to Turkey are moti-
vated by commercial sex. This is the reason why migrant women in all sectors 
may be disrespected and made objects of harassment in both Turkey and in 
their home countries.55
The motives of women migrating to work in the sector of commercial sex 
largely overlap with the motives of others migrating for employment in other 
sectors. However, considering the working conditions of women in this sector, 
it  is  possible to infer that commercial sex which is extremely vulnerable to 
sexual, physical and psychological violence, accompanied by illegality and be-
ing foreigner, will generate much more adverse conditions. Sexuality, which is 
directly about a person’s self and body, is an area that is extremely conducive 
to direct violence against woman’s body.56 Meanwhile, their illicit  residence 
and working status deprive these women of all means of access to and claim-
ing  of  their  rights.  Forcible  employment  by  intermediaries,  long  working 
hours, non-payment of their earnings and the withholding of passports are 
problems frequently observed in commercial sex. Women lack the means of re-
sorting to legal procedures when they suffer harassment or violence in their 
daily lives, too. The fear of being deported prevents their application official au-
thorities in case of any violation of their rights while the shame they feel be-
cause of their engagement keeps them from applying to their own consulates 
as well.57 Other than clients, intermediaries and police may also be the actors of 
violence that women suffer.58 In their study Gülçür and Ilkkaracan reveal that 
migrant women who are working in commercial sex sector are detained by 
the police frequently and upon threats of deportation must bribe officers for 
release.59 
55 Kalfa (2008), Keough (2006).
56 Ünlütürk Ulutaş/Kalfa (2009, p. 23).
57 Gülçür/Ilkkaracan (2002), Kaşka/Erder (2003), İçduygu (2004), Kalfa (2008), Üstübici (2010).
58 Ünlütürk/Kalfa (2009, p.16).
59 Gülçür/ Ilkkaracan (2002, p. 416).
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Ethnicity-Based Participation in the Labor Market: Those Who Are 
Close and Distant from “Us” 
In such feminized sectors as domestic and care services and entertainment 
and commercial sex, ethnicity is an important factor in determining who will 
be involved in which. In other sectors too, ethnicity in addition to gender is an 
important factor in shaping the preferences of employers. Even though it may 
change depending on the region and nature of work, employers mostly prefer 
Muslim migrants who can speak Turkish. It is also stated that the police too are 
more lenient to those akin to “us” in its approach to irregular migrants. This 
state of affairs is particularly relevant when it comes to Turks from Bulgaria, 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.60 However, whatever the ethnic origin of mi-
grants may be, what makes them preferable for employers is their lack of pro-
tection due to illicit status and openness to all kinds of exploitation.
Migrant Women in Garment Workshops 
Going out of households, garment workshops are common production units 
employing migrant women. A study conducted in Istanbul points out that poor 
families especially from the Nahcevan region of Azerbaijan come to Turkey for 
employment, male members work in construction or remain jobless while fe-
males are employed in garment workshops as a cheap source of labor. While 
informal employment is common to all laborers in these workshops, women 
from Azerbaijan are  paid lower than nationals  doing the same work, work 
longer hours and sometimes they are not paid at all. They have no means of 
standing up against injustice they suffer. What is striking here is that children 
accompany their mothers to workshops and work there with them. Since they 
cannot have their children enrolled in school because of their illicit status, it 
seems to mothers better to have children with them while working. Children 
who are deprived of their chances for education are destined to spend their 
adult lives as unskilled workers. Because of the similar culture, common lan-
guage and religion, people from Azerbaijan are not “aliens”, but “the other”. The 
submission of “untainted” Azeri women, acceding solemnly and silently to all 
kinds of work that may be assigned, shows how functional patriarchal cultural 
norms can be in creating a docile worker profile for employers. In her work, 
60 Danış et al. (2009), Akpınar (2009), Erder (2007).
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Dedeoğlu  (2011)  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  process  of  migration 
makes women the major actors in household subsistence, bearing the poten-
tial of strengthening the status of women in their families though it may not 
bring along any serious change in a gender-based division of labor. 
Migrants in Trade and Tourism 
Besides  their  objective  characteristics,  some  subjective  characteristics  attri-
buted to migrants are influential in determining where they are employed. At 
the centers in Istanbul where luggage trade is intensive, such service personnel 
as salesmen, interpreters and receptionists who can speak Russian and Serbian 
are commonly employed in communicating with foreign traders. Likewise, for 
complying with product standards and demand from the former Eastern Bloc 
countries, there is need for and thus employment of qualified workers such as 
models  and  stylists.61 However  while  Muslim-  and  Turkish-origin  migrants 
from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are employed in textile and garment work-
shops  even  when  they  can  speak  Russian,  men  or  women  from  Moldova, 
Ukraine and Russia are preferred as sales personnel in shops.62 Influential in 
this preference is  the subjective cultural characteristics such as “better edu-
cated”, “cleaner” and “more disciplined” attributed to the second group. In fact, 
these cultural attributions are used as instruments of making use of bodily 
performance of migrant women. The “sexy” and “fantasy” nature of women’s 
dresses sold by some stores and acceptance by migrant women employed in 
these stores to serve as models exhibiting these dresses means “bringing down 
two birds by throwing a single stone” by employers. It is observed that some 
migrants performing well in sales are able to negotiate wages with their em-
ployers. As to migrants who work as unqualified laborers in cargo shops and 
workshops, they can react to unfavorable working conditions only by changing 
their jobs or they just remain silent. 
There are some migrant women who legally stay in Turkey upon their 
marriage with Turkish citizens and obtainment of Turkish citizenship, having 
a work permit. In spite of this favorable status, they are still employed infor-
mally. According to a survey conducted in a touristic settlement, these women, 
almost all of whom are university graduates with experience in their profes-
61 Erder (2007, p. 67).
62 Dağdelen (2008).
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sions, face problems in confirming the equivalence of their diplomas and are 
consequently  employed  in  the  tourism  sector  as  tourist  agents, massagers, 
guides, tour operators, animators or saleswomen despite their qualification.63 
There are also cases where these women are employed in jobs that are not pre-
ferred by nationals for low wages offered or paid lower than others. Since sea-
sonal employment is the distinguishing character of the tourism sector, these 
women work only half of the year and they explain this lack of any social pro-
tection by their origin. The problem of non-payment, which is frequently ex-
perienced by illicit migrants, emerges to a limited extent when it comes to mi-
grants with legal status. Among problems they face as women they cite verbal 
or physical sexual harassment at their workplaces.
Migrants in Construction Sector 
A very interesting study revealing how employers can functionalize ethnicity 
for raising the level of exploitation is the one by Akpınar (2009) on the employ-
ment of migrant workers in the sector of construction. Extremely informal as a 
result of widely practiced sub-contracting, the construction sector is a point of 
entry to Turkish labor market for male migrants. Migrants are employed as the 
lowest  status  of  unqualified  workers  in  building  construction/  restoration, 
road and bridge construction/restoration and in the restoration and preserva-
tion of historical properties which change many hands in the chain of sub-con-
tracting. They are employed for  long hours at very low wages and in some 
cases they are dismissed without the payment of wages due. A field study con-
ducted in Istanbul shows that mostly migrants from Turkmenistan, Azerbai-
jan, Afghanistan and Georgia  are  employed in  construction;  migrants  from 
countries other than Georgia identify themselves as Muslim-Turks, a ground 
upon which they are recruited by employers who then seek from them a kind 
of loyalty and gratitude. While not of Turkish stock, Georgians are recruited 
with an emphasis on their friendship and kinship ties with the people of East-
ern Black Sea region. Migrants are preferred over Kurdish people as national 
source of labor in construction works. Behind what seems as nationalistic sen-
timent against Kurds, there is  the fact that, unlike Kurds, migrants have no 
means to claim their rights and they can be more readily exploited than oth-
ers. The same state of affairs is observed in industrial enterprises in the region 
63 Gökmen (2011).
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of Thrace. In the 1990s and early 2000s, it was the primary preference of em-
ployers to recruit industrial laborers from among Turks from Bulgaria. When it 
was observed that unqualified Kurdish workers from South-Eastern Anatolia 
had a tendency to  get  unionized and as the number of  migrants  incoming 
from Romania and Bulgaria decreased, employers preferred to bring in work-
ers from Istanbul. It is further observed that in Bursa, which is the most pre-
ferred place of settlement for Turks coming from Bulgaria, they are considered 
as “cognates” and not “aliens”, and their status in the labor market is not disad-
vantaged  relative  to  the  long-settled  inhabitants  of  Bursa  and  they  are  re-
ceived much more warmly than Kurds recently migrating to Bursa.64
Refugees and migrants from Africa who have a small share in irregular 
migrants are completely different in terms of their culture, language and reli-
gion. Even when they are Muslims, their different skin color prevents them to 
be close to “us”. Their participation in the labor market is much more limited 
than other migrant groups. According to a study conducted in Istanbul focus-
ing on the enmeshing of migrant and refugee groups, in case their appeal for 
refugee status is rejected, refugees switch to the status of irregular migrants 
and start seeking jobs in the informal sector to subsist and save some money 
while waiting to be transported to EU countries by human smugglers. These 
migrants, who are subsisting in worn-out buildings in the depressed areas of 
the city-state, point to difficulties in finding a job and working as the biggest 
problem. Some of these people work in small garment or illumination work-
shops, some  sell  goods  in  marketplaces  and  some  women  visit  houses  for 
cleaning  works. Among  them, there  are  also  those  engaged  in  the  luggage 
trade, depending on their countries of origin. Their wages are even lower than 
legal  minimum  wage, if  it  is  paid  at  all. The  Roma people  and Kurds  from 
South-Eastern Anatolia inhabiting the same depressed areas live and work un-
der similar conditions.65 In the labor market hierarchy, black migrants have the 
lowest status while sharing the same fate with those excluded categories of 
the domestic labor force, mostly subsist on scavenging.66
64 Erder 2007 (p.65–72).
65 Yükseker/Brewer (2010).
66 Saltan/Yardımcı (2007).
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Conclusion
A large number of studies on irregular migrants living and working in Turkey 
cover migrant women employed in domestic and care services and provide de-
tailed information as to their state and working conditions. This can be ex-
plained by a mostly upper-middle-class origin of researchers that facilitates 
their access to the employers of migrant women or by the fact that their rela-
tives or close acquaintances are employers. As to other areas of employment, 
the negative attitude of employers towards researchers as well as the fear of 
migrants from being spotted and deported makes related studies much more 
difficult to conduct. In spite of the difficulties of conducting surveys and col-
lecting data, research focusing on migrant women shows us that the question 
posed as “Is migration feminized?” can be answered positively.
The point common to all studies examined is that they expose the un-
protected status and vulnerability of migrants. No matter in which sector or 
job they are employed, irregular migrants are employed in much more unfa-
vorable conditions, for longer hours and also paid lower than nationals and 
they have no channels to claim their rights in cases of non-payment. From the 
point of view of migrant women, additional risks include sexual harassment 
and, in the case of working in commercial sex, sexual violence and sexually 
transmitted diseases. 
The transformation of the demographic structure and the growing share 
of the elderly in the total population increase the need for care services in Tur-
key. Parallel to this development, more women graduating from universities 
start to work in professional jobs. And yet, the state withdraws from the provi-
sion of institutional care services, adopts social policies that reinforce the fa-
milial supply of care services along traditional lines and few private companies 
offering care services demand high prices for their work. Under these circum-
stances, it is quite predictable that the demand for female migrant workers in 
middle and upper class families will increase. In the entertainment and com-
mercial sex sectors, the prevailing interest in the young and blonde “other” will 
perpetuate the demand for migrant women from former Eastern Bloc coun-
tries. In the tourism sector, the increasing number of  tourists  coming from 
Russia and their expanding share in tourism revenues will raise the demand 
for Russian-speaking employees who are mainly migrants from former East-
ern Bloc countries. In all of these service sector sub-branches, where the com-
petition with native workers is weak, it is important to take measures for the 
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legalization of migrant workers. As long as the demand for migrant labor re-
mains and Turkey accepts the pressures for the alignment of her migration 
policy with that of EU, it would not be an exaggeration to say that migrants’ 
efforts to reach Turkey will take place under more dangerous and risky con-
ditions. 
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Turkey in the New Migration Era:  Migrants between 
Regularity  and Irregular ity 
Sema Erder and Selmin Kaşka
A Troublesome Concept: “Irregularity” and “Irregular” Migration 
Since the 1990s, Turkey has been facing new population flows, namely “irregu-
lar” migration movements, whose features have been markedly different from 
former  experiences.  These  new  population  movements,  both  in  and  out, 
mostly are the unexpected consequences of various political and economic de-
velopments going on at the regional level, and not the direct choice of Turkey. 
The arrival of all kinds of migrants, such as asylum seekers, transit migrants 
and especially those who are willing to seek out their fortunes in Turkey, was 
an unexpected event, as Turkey had considered herself as a “sending” country. 
Nowadays, “irregular  migration” from  the  regional  countries  has  become  a 
new challenge to both researchers and policy-makers in Turkey as for other 
countries around the globe. In this article, we will analyze the new migration 
flows to Turkey and then we will focus on the implicit position of new mi-
grants in the Turkish informal labor market. 
To begin with, we have to point out that “irregular” migration is a trouble-
some concept, one that is hard to tackle. In general, we consider the current 
massive migration movements to be a response of ordinary people to the glob-
alization process. “Irregularity” in a way is repercussion of the failure of the 
current policies in dealing with this new global challenge. Restrictive migra-
tion policies and criminalization of entry, stay and employment accelerate the 
inter-country movements, which are realized without full compliance with na-
tional laws and regulations.1
1 Ghosh (1998), Castles/Miller (2003), Düvell (2006).
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Current terminology used by the academics and policy makers is diver-
gent  and  includes  terms  such  as  “undocumented  migration”,  “illegal  mi-
gration”, “clandestine migration”, “unauthorized migration” and “irregular mi-
gration”. In social sciences, “irregular migration” or “undocumented migration” 
are terms usually used to prevent criminalization and stigmatization of mi-
grants, whereas the term “illegal migration” is  mostly used within the legal 
system and political discourse. In general, we claim that fair rules for trade and 
capital flows need to be complemented by fair rules for border-crossing move-
ments; new rules for settlement and working would eliminate “irregular” mi-
gration and, moreover, exploitative practices of migrants. 
As it is well known, declining costs of transportation and intensive com-
munication on the one hand and economic and political collapse and unrest on 
the other hand resulted in  the potential  for  considerable  population move-
ments around the globe. Thus, in some cases, this migration may hide in tem-
porary tourism movements, while, in other cases, it may lead to seeking a safe 
place for permanent settlement.  Thus, irregularity in population movements 
may occur at various stages and in various forms. In other words, irregularity 
depends  on  chance  and  circumstances  a  migrant  may  experience.  When 
viewed from the perspective of a state, it here refers to regularity vis-à-vis the 
law rather than the migrants’ experience. Here we can also define irregularity 
in terms of migrants’ ability to access labor markets and other social services. 
A full understanding of contemporary migratory movements will not be 
achieved  by  relying  on  existing  tools  and  concepts. The  complex  and  mul-
ti-faced nature of “irregular migration” requires a more interdisciplinary, com-
parative work that incorporates a variety of perspectives. The existing litera-
ture on “irregular” migration mostly reflects the experiences and perspectives 
of the West, where regulations both on the labor market and on migration are 
comprehensive and strict.2 In this context, it is meaningful to discuss to what 
extent the term “irregular migration” is relevant in non-Western societies.  
As we know, in Southern and Eastern countries, such as Turkey, where 
regulations  on  the  labor  market  and  migration  are  either  lacking  or  loose, 
types of irregularity and thus, the meaning of irregularity within social life, 
may differ. Therefore, an articulation of irregular migrants within society may 
reflect different experiences. Thanks to the recent interest on the region where 
Turkey is located, the peculiarity of the migration patterns in this part of the 
2 Jordan/Düvell (2002), Düvell (2006), Düvell/Vollmer (2009), Jagersen et al. (2010).
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world has been noticed by both Turkish and European researchers.3 In the first 
part of the article, we will attempt to give an overall insight into the general 
features of irregular migration in Turkey and then, in the second part, we will 
appraise existing research on the articulation of the irregular migrants within 
the labor market.  
Turkey and New Population Flows: Tourism, Circular Migrants and 
Irregularity
Turkey’s  relatively liberal  border policy, vast informal sector, extensive com-
munal networks, unregulated migration regime and restrictive rules for for-
eigners for longer staying may be considered as the peculiarities of the Turkish 
case. 
As far as migration policies are concerned, it would be accurate to say 
that  “conventional”  Turkish  migration  policy  has,  for  the  most  part,  been 
shaped by “ad hoc” rules and practices, influenced by changing daily political 
or economic concerns. Thus, we may claim that a comprehensive migration 
policy has never been developed. 
Conventional migration policy is mainly based on two major institutions, 
which reflect the Turkish migration history. The first one was established at 
1930s, during a nation-building period, to allow admission only for the Turkish 
and Muslim communities  who steadily fled to Turkey from Balkans and to 
control  immigration  from other  countries.  The  second  one  was  established 
during 1960s for “exporting labor” to Europe, which was mitigated the restricted 
border policy. 
We may state that Turkey was (and is still, in terms of rules and regula-
tions) a relatively closed society, not only in accepting immigrants, but also for 
allowing long-term residence or work permits to foreigners. Thus, we have to 
3 Zeybekoğlu/Johansson (2003), Berggen et al. (2007), Erder/Yükseker (2009). Being participants of the IMILCO network (In-
ternational Migration, Informal Labor and Community in Europe: Swedish-Turkish Initiative for Research and Policy), we 
have to state that the Turkish-Swedish research initiative, which was active during 2001–2006, also stimulated compara-
tive research among a wider circle of experts working on this issue. IMILCO organized four workshops and conferences in  
Istanbul and several workshops in Stockholm with the participation of researchers from across Europe. These two publica-
tions referred to above are products of this network.  
The conference “The Critical Reflections in Migration Research”, organized by Koç University in October 2009, was also an-
other attempt to develop a dialog among researchers working on the peripheral countries. A paper presented by Erder and 
Yükseker reviewed migration research from a critical perspective (Erder/Yükseker 2009). 
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mention that the tourism policy, which was developed in the 1960s, has en-
couraged the opening up the borders to foreigners only for short periods.4 That 
was the beginning of  the so-called “liberal  border policy” for  short-term ar-
rivals. 
After the 1990s, Turkey became a stage for new diversified types of popu-
lation  entries,  such  as  shuttle  traders  and  circular  migrants  from  Eastern 
Europe, asylum seekers from the region and transit migrants from countries as 
far away as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sub-Saharan Africa. The dissolution of 
Iron Curtain on the one hand and formation of Fortress Europe on the other 
had formed two different border regimes; rules for inward mobility are rela-
tively liberal from all directions, however rules for outward mobility are strict 
for the Western border. Ironically, Fortress Europe, which was an abstract term, 
is becoming a concrete phenomenon, not only by the application of the Schen-
gen regime but also by the construction of a Turkish-Greek border wall which 
will be guarded by Frontex. The “gatekeeper” position has loaded a heavy bur-
den on Turkey by pressing it to function as a “waiting room” for the transit mi-
grants. 
Table 1 illustrates the overall change in the “legal” entries of foreigners to 
Turkey during  1988–2009. As  one  may easily  observe, the  share  of  arrivals 
from neighboring countries increased, whereas the share of EU countries de-
creased in this period. As we mentioned before, a “liberal” visa regime provided 
a convenient milieu for legal entries not only from the region but also from 
other countries. Citizens from regional countries can easily obtain a “touristic” 
visa on arrival and can stay in the country from one to three months legally, 
whereas a visa is not applied for some of the neighboring countries, such as 
Syria. 
The most striking change is the growth in the arrivals from the “ex-So-
viet” countries, where all relations had been interrupted since the Soviet Re-
volution. More than five million arrivals were reported in 2009, compared to 
only 4.5 thousand in 1988. Even though the “ex-Soviet” countries differ among 
themselves  in  terms  of  their  economic, cultural, social  and  historical  back-
grounds, their migration patterns have some similarities, being short-term and 
circular. 
4 Erder (2003).
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Table 1: Arrival of Foreigners in Turkey (000)5
1988 1988 2000 2000 2009 2009
Numbers Percentage Numbers Percentage Numbers Percentage
Balkans 708.8 20.3 1,180,6 11.3 2,781,2 10.3
Middle East 314.0  9.0  524.0  5.0 2,178,2  8.0
(F)USSR 4,5  0.1 1,403,8 13.5 5,634,5 20.8
Sub-total 1,027,4  29.4 3,108,4 29.8 10,593,8 39.1
EU 4 1,955,3 55.9 5,537 53.1 12,801,5 47.3
Other  515.3 14.7 1,782,8 17.1 3,681,8 13.4
TOTAL 3,497,9 100.0 1,0428,2 100.0 27,077,1 100.0
Source:  Calculated  from  the  data  provided  by  the  General  Directorate  of  Security.  Unpublished  data  
provided by the GDS (1988), Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (2000, 2009).
In general, we have to state that it is a really hard task to estimate the amount 
or the share of irregular migrants within these arrivals, even though research 
and observations indicate  that  there are “many”. The arrival  of  circular  mi-
grants, either for trading or for working from the regional countries, has be-
come a social reality in daily life, even though these migrants are registered as 
“touristic” arrivals. In order to make a rough estimation, we are representing 
the results of periodic research conducted by the State Institute of Statistics, 
which is designed to follow the developments in the “tourism” sector in the 
Table 2. 
5 Balkans: Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, (F)Yugoslavia; Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Syria; (F)USSR: for comparison, mem-
bers of USSR are recalculated; EU4: for comparison, Greece, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia and Romania are 
excluded as they are calculated in other categories. 
118 Sema Erder and Selmin Kaşka
Table 2: Reasons for the Arrival of Foreigners in Turkey (000)
2001 2001 2009 2009
Numbers Percentage Numbers Percentage
Excursion, travel, etc. 6,276,3 55.7 15,680,3 57.4
Visiting relatives 794.7  7.1 2,826 10.4
   Business, shopping, etc. 2,072,6 18.4 2,539,8  9.3
Other 2133 18.8 6,268,1 22.9
Total 11,276,5 100.0 27,314,2 100.0
Source: Calculated from the data collected from “Survey on Foreigners” conducted at borders during depar-
tures. Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (2001, 2009).
According to this survey, nearly 40 % of the entries were made for non-tourist-
ic purposes. Unfortunately, we do not have the data on a country basis. But still, 
we may claim that a liberal visa regime is providing not only touristic or cul-
tural interactions but also other social and economic ones within the regional 
countries.
As we mentioned before, in spite of Turkish “liberal” border policy, legisla-
tion for foreigners for longer staying (and thus for having access residence or 
work permits) is very restrictive and reflects the characteristics of a “closed” so-
ciety.6 Moreover, as Turkey is applying the original geographical limitation of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, refugees from non-European countries cannot 
obtain refugee status, even though they can wait in Turkey until the UNHCR’s 
final decision.7 Thus, for a foreigner, even though to enter is relatively liberal, to 
settle and/or to enter the working life through formal ways is not an easy task. 
Within these conditions, “irregularity” for some of the foreigners, mostly for 
circular migrants, is a common situation they will face after arrival.
The amount of foreigners living in Turkey within “formal” regulations is 
presented in Table 3. According to the official records, there are nearly 175,000 
registered immigrants, whereas only 11  % are staying with working permit, 
16 % are students and 73 % are falling into “various” categories including fam-
6 Erder (2007), Güzel/Bayram (2007). For a more detailed analysis, see the report on the research project (UGİNAR- Interna-
tional Migration, Labor Force and Population Movement) sponsored by Marmara University, which investigated the condi-
tions of foreigners in the formal and the informal labor market in 2000–2001 (Arı [2007]). 
7 Kirişçi (2002).
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ily members (spouses and children) and asylum seekers waiting for the UN-
HCR’s final decision. 
Table 3: Foreigners Living with a Residence Permit
2000 2008




Source: General Directorate of Security, unpublished data (2000), Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü (2008).
State  authorities  consider  a  foreigner  who  breaches  migration  legislation 
(passport, visa, residence and work permit) to be an “illegal migrant”. However, 
there is no information or systematic estimation on the number of “illegal mi-
grants”, apart from the statistics on the total number of migrants apprehended. 
Those “illegal migrants” are mostly arrested for violating either passport legis-
lation or entered into or exited from the country illegally. As it is known, en-
forcement operations for the violation of residence or work permits are not 
strictly applied, unless they are related with “criminal” activities. 
Table 4: Total Number of Illegal Migrants and Human Smugglers Apprehended in Turkey
Year Illegal Migrants Human Smugglers
2003 56,219  937
2004 61,228  957
2005 57,428  834
2006 51,983  951
2007 64,290 1,242
Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı (2010).
According to the official  data, more than 50,000 migrants are apprehended 
yearly in Turkey and more than 700,000 migrants were apprehended during 
1995–2007. Table 4 outlines yearly apprehension numbers of the “illegal” mi-
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grants and human smugglers in Turkey. Since 2003, Turkey has considered hu-
man smuggling and human trafficking activities as “organized crime” and has 
started to apply an active policy for combating these activities.8 
In general, it is obvious that there is no methodologically reliable estima-
tion on the real volume of “irregular” migrants. However, some statements fre-
quently appearing in the media, reflecting the rough guesses of experts or bu-
reaucrats and/or media myths, are within the range of from 150 thousand to 
two million. In general, these figures, besides the “rumors”, stigmas and other 
media-generated prejudices, reflect the contradictory reactions to the arrival of 
foreigners in the Turkish labor market. Mostly, trade unions and employee organ-
izations have anti-immigrant tendencies, and they are very effective in the 
formation of the rules of the formal labor market as being organized by pres-
sure groups. Trade unions consider foreign “irregular” workers as “rivals” to 
native workers, as they are weakening the struggle against the “informal” eco-
nomy and sustaining the subsistence of insecure working conditions. Employ-
ee organizations are also against “irregular” foreign workers, as they are enlar-
ging the “informal” job market and creating a milieu for the continuation of 
unfair competition by exploiting “cheap” labor. In a way, some of the exagger-
ated estimations are  used for  lobbying to  force  government and for  taking 
severe measures against  their  employment,9 whereas some of  them are re-
flecting the xenophobic tendencies. 
In general, we may claim that the irregular migrants from regional coun-
tries are finding their way in the “informal” labor market, which is quite large 
and vivid in Turkey. Table 5 outlines some major indicators of the Turkish labor 
market. As may be seen from this table, the Turkish labor market consists of a 
young and male-dominated population working mostly in the non-agricultur-
al sectors. More than 40 % of the employment is informal. In general, we may 
argue that the informal economy and the informal labor market are some of 
the major characteristics of the Turkish economy which reflect the structural 
difference from the West. 
In this article, we are not going to discuss the reasons or the impacts of 
the  informal  economy in  Turkey. We only want to  point  to  this  difference, 
which will help us to understand the relative position of the irregular foreign 
8 Erder/Kaşka (2003).
9 For example, in a recent article published in the journal of an employer organization (TUSIAD-Turk Sanayicileri ve Isadam-
lari Dernegi), the total number of “illegal” foreign workers is estimated as two million, which is the topmost (Karaarslan 
[2011]). 
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migrants in Turkey. In the following part of this paper, we will describe the ma-
jor areas of employment of migrant labor by reviewing the findings of the re-
search.  
Table 5: Some Indicators on the Turkish Labor Market (000) (2009)
Population Age + 15 51,686
Participation Rate % 47.9
Male            % 70.5
Female           % 26.0
Employment           21,277
Agriculture         5,254
Non Agriculture      16,023
Rate of Unemployment      % 14.0
Agriculture         % 1.8
Non-agriculture       % 17.4
Undocumented Employment     % 43.8
Source: TÜİK Household Survey from Annual Report of Central Bank of Turkey (2009).
The Position of New Migrants in the Turkish Labor Markets
The existing information on the new migratory movements shows that apart 
from regular migrants, there are two different categories of irregular migrants 
directed to Turkey. The first category consists of transit migrants, who violate 
the rules when crossing the borders. They aim to obtain refugee or asylum-
seeker status in Turkey or in other countries. The second includes circular mi-
grants, who aim to work in Turkey by keeping their ties close with their home 
countries. It is clear that these two categories are different from each other in 
terms of origin, migration pattern and access to the labor market in Turkey.
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The Limits and Potentials of Legal Framework
As it is pointed out above, in terms of the institutional and legal framework, 
Turkey was caught somewhat unawares by the new migration flows. In other 
words, the legal framework did not foresee the sudden and massive influx of 
people. In this context, immigrants try to find a place by using Turkey’s “liberal 
border policy”, the informal labor market and its incoherent migration regime.
With regards to irregular migration, until 2003, the lack of a proper and 
systematic legal framework had been an important point repeatedly raised by 
the authorities, and it was this necessity that stimulated the attempts to devel-
op new laws and regulations in parallel with the ongoing migratory flows. 
Although the migration regime of Turkey has been and will be changed, 
though slightly, according to the ongoing developments (for instance the new 
bilateral visa regulations for Syrians, Russians, etc.), there are two main pieces 
of legislation that may have significant effects on irregular migrants. 
Firstly, in 2003, the Turkish Parliament introduced some changes to the 
Turkish Citizenship Law. As we mentioned before, the acquisition of Turkish 
citizenship for a foreigner particularly with a non-Turkish origin is a hard as-
signment. Before being amended, the Turkish Citizenship Law played an im-
portant role in the sharp increase of acquisition of citizenship through mar-
riage. The amendment has made it more difficult  for a foreigner to acquire 
Turkish citizenship through marriage by imposing a three-year waiting period 
before a foreign spouse may obtain Turkish nationality. Therefore to become a 
“regular” migrant through marriage has become more difficult. Nevertheless, 
marriage may still seem to be an option in “regularizing” a migrant’s status.
Secondly, in the same year, the Parliament enacted the Law Concerning 
Work Permits for Foreigners. This law provides for a system of work permits 
and the related rules that will make it easier for foreigners to work in Turkey. 
(Please see Table 3, which gives information on the total number of foreigners 
with residence and working permits). While earlier various ministries and gov-
ernment institutions could grant work permits, this law designates the Min-
istry of Labor and Social Security as the main responsible official institution 
for issuing work permits. On the other hand, this law opened up an opportu-
nity for some of the irregular migrants to be formally employed, which was 
not possible before. However, the impact of this law is quite limited consider-
ing the fact that only a small portion of migrants with resident permits hold 
work permits, for instance in domestic work.  Therefore, we should emphasize 
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that this institution issues work permits predominantly for highly qualified 
laborers who are employed by local and global companies.
The Possibility of Becoming Regular or Irregular: Migrants in a Spectrum
As we have noted above, since the beginning of 1990s, Turkey has become a re-
ceiving country for migrants with different characteristics in terms of origin, 
ethnicity, gender, skill and expectations.
We have to state that even though Turkey is considering herself to be a 
country of “migration”, migration studies is a relatively neglected area in the 
social sciences. Recently, after the experience of “new” migration flows, migra-
tion studies has started to be a challenging area. Nowadays, the literature on 
migration to Turkey is increasing; researchers from different methodological 
backgrounds have started to focus on certain aspects of migration. However, 
some of them are descriptive and for some areas no data is available. Besides, 
we have to rely on rough estimations since official statistics are either lacking 
or not easily accessible for researchers. In this part of the article, we try to draw 
a picture of the relative position of migrants in the labor market, from the most 
advantageous to the most vulnerable ones, within the limits of the available 
data.  
A “Special” Group of Migrants: Migrants with a Permit
As one may follow from the earlier arguments, formal channels for migrants 
are rather restrictive and thus, an overwhelming majority is pushed to remain 
“irregular” in one way or another. Thus, it  is  no exaggeration to  define the 
group of migrants with residence and/or work permits as a “special” group. 
The available literature on migration is mostly concentrated with “irregular” 
migrants in Turkey. Luckily, there are few exceptions, which describe the ori-
gins, experiences and expectations of a “special” group of migrants. 
According to Ulukan’s calculation, EU citizens and citizens of the neigh-
boring countries, such as the Middle East and the Commonwealth of the Inde-
pendent States, formed a majority of those applying for work permits.10
10 Ulukan (2007).
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We have to  admit that  the most advantageous and therefore “special” 
group consists of EU citizens. Kaiser’s research on EU citizens to date has been 
one of the few studies conducted on this  “special” group.11 Kaiser estimates 
that between 100,000 and 120,000 EU citizens live in Turkey, in which Ger-
mans constitute the largest group, amounting to approximately 60,000.12 
Apart from the EU nationals in Turkey, migrants who work in some spe-
cific sectors, like tourism and domestic work, can obtain a “regular” status ac-
cording to the 2003 Law we mentioned above. We still do not have evidence to 
measure the impact of the law on the tourism industry. 
As it is known, tourism is one of the most important sectors in Turkey in 
terms  of  its  contribution to  the national  income and employment. Like  do-
mestic work, the tourism industry is one of the most popular sectors for wo-
men migrants in Turkey. It is also a sector where migrant women are not in an 
open competition with Turkish workers. In these two sectors, the supply of local 
labor is limited. A migrant woman might work as a masseuse or as an anima-
tor, jobs which are not preferred by the Turkish women. 
According to Dedeoğlu’s and Gökmen’s research findings, most of the mi-
grant women interviewed in Marmaris, a  popular holiday site, have formal 
jobs. They interviewed women from Russia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, 
Georgia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Chechnya who have formal  jobs, as 
they attained Turkish citizenship through marriage.13 Apart from that “special” 
group, we are certainly aware that there is quite a large number of women em-
ployed in the tourism sector without a permit. However, it is almost impossible 
to know their exact number. 
11 Kaiser (2003).
12 Kaiser classifies the EU citizens in Turkey as follows:
(1) EU spouses of Turkish citizens, most of whom are women (more than 95 %).
(2) Descendants of EU spouses of Turkish citizens, most of whom have double citizenship.
(3) Retired EU citizens particularly living on the Southern coast of Turkey.
(4) Alternative life-style seekers.
(5) EU citizens of Turkish origin, most of whom are “pink card” holders.
(6) Descendants of Western European immigrants to the Ottoman Empire.
(7) Posted personnel whose majority is male and often accompanied by their spouses and children.
13 Dedeoğlu/Gökmen (2010).
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Migrants in the Informal Labor Market 
As mentioned before, despite the restrictions for foreigners to have work per-
mit, the large and vivid informal labor market and liberal visa regime provide 
them opportunities to participate in the labor market through informal rela-
tions. The intention to employ foreigners in the Turkish labor market is a new 
debate among social scientists in Turkey. The most common argument follows 
the lines of “exploitation of cheap labor” and “competition with native labor”. 
However, some of the research points out that they actually fill gaps in the 
labor market. In certain sectors of the labor market, they fill gaps deserted by 
natives, either due to the lack of  necessary qualifications or due to cultural 
thresholds. Thus, we may claim that, in some sectors, there is almost no room 
for competition, while in other sectors there certainly is. 
Even though it is a necessity to undertake further research, we may claim 
that there is a division of labor among migrants by origin, by gender and by 
purpose of stay. The migrants are not placed in the labor market haphazardly. 
At the first glance, we observe that irregular migrants mostly occupy certain 
areas of the informal labor market, such as agriculture, construction, small in-
dustry, domestic work and informal trading.
However, irregular migrants do not form a homogenous group. Circular 
migrants from regional countries, for instance, have relatively better positions 
in the labor market compared to transit migrants. Circular migrants do have 
possibility to construct trust relations with their employers, one that is crucial 
for survival in informality. In the following, we will try to describe these vari-
ations.
In a society in which informality is extensive, one of the niches that mi-
grant women discover in the labor market is domestic work. Global care-givers 
(made up of women from the neighboring countries in the Turkish context, 
particularly the Moldovans) is the group whose migration and work patterns 
are well-known not only by the researchers but also by the public.14 
Domestic work is absolutely one of the most common job opportunities 
for  unskilled native women in Turkey and it  constitutes  an important  and 
gendered part of informal labor market. Therefore, it is not possible to estimate 
an exact number. However, if one considers the fact that to employ a “servant” 
has always been a common practice in Turkey in middle-class houses, it is pos-
14 Akalın (2009), Kaşka (2009).
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sible to predict its significance. The novelty in this area is the attempt to for-
malize this area only by including a small portion of domestic workers per-
forming their jobs in cleaning companies. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the total of registered local domestic workers was 3204 in 2010.15
Since the 1990s, migrant women have been employed in middle- and up-
per-middle-class houses for cleaning, cooking and caring. Like the tourism sec-
tor, it is impossible to estimate their number. However, it can be easily predicted 
that their number will increase owing to trends in changing demographic pat-
terns and the Turkish welfare regime, which depends on informal institutions 
like family. Women from different countries (like Moldova, Bulgaria, Armenia, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Philippines) work in-
formally in domestic works.
The 2003 Law has made it possible to obtain a work permit for domestic 
workers. Nevertheless, since this date, the total number of work permits issued 
has been negligible, namely 48 in 2005.16 Therefore, it is obvious that domestic 
work  is  informal  both  for  locals  and  migrants.  However,  as  Akalin  (2009) 
points out, migrant domestic workers are “shuttling regularly between docu-
mentedness and undocumentedness” in being shuttle or circular migrants. 
The construction sector, like domestic work, offers informal jobs to un-
skilled men, both to rural migrants and migrants from the neighborhood coun-
tries.  Akpınar’s  research  provides  information  on  male  migrants  in  Turkey 
working in the construction sector. He interviewed migrants from Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Migrants from Afghanistan are transit 
migrants, who have to wait in Turkey during their search for finding a channel 
to enter European countries. We have to state that the degree of irregularity 
differs among migrant groups; whereas migrants from neighboring countries 
shuttle with a tourist visa, most of the Afghan migrants enter illegally. There-
fore, transit migrants are working in the waiting room.17
The textile sector, like tourism, is another important industry in Turkey in 
terms of its share in the national income and employment. The sector mainly 
depends on small-scale workplaces and it offers informal jobs in the cities par-
ticularly to male, female and child migrants from rural Turkey. Now this sector 
also offers informal jobs to the migrants from neighboring countries.
15 Karadeniz (2011, p. 111).
16 Kaşka (2009).
17 Akpınar (2009).
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Dedeoğlu’s and Gökmen’s research (2010) gives some information on mi-
grants working in the textile industry in Turkey. The research is conducted in 
Istanbul and focus on a specific migrant group: Azeris. This research clearly 
shows that Azeris are working, particularly in small-scale workshops, which is 
the main feature of the Turkish textile industry. Not only Azeri women but 
also their children work in the textile ateliers in the periphery of Istanbul.
The  migration  pattern  of  Azeris  seems  to  be  determined  by  gender. 
Dedeoğlu and Gökmen emphasize that Azeri women stay in Turkey after their 
tourist visa is expired but Azeri men fit in to the pattern of circular migration. 
Dedeoğlu and Gökmen explain this by looking at their position in the labor 
market: if women migrants have relatively permanent jobs, they stay in Tur-
key irregularly. But, men work in marginal and temporary jobs while they are 
in Turkey.
Although there is only limited knowledge on the migrants working in ag-
riculture, their existence particularly in the Northern part of Turkey is visible. 
In the Black Sea region of Turkey, seasonal jobs in agriculture have been be-
coming common in the last decade since the labor force remained insufficient. 
According to Pelek’s recent research, most of the seasonal workers are coming 
from the Eastern and Southern Eastern Anatolia, whereas Georgians are also 
becoming new-comers to this area. Pelek observed that Georgians living in the 
neighborhood are circulating through tourist visas and working as seasonal 
workers, just like ethnic Kurds. Pelek observed a hierarchy among the seasonal 
workers: at the bottom are women and children who are ethnically Kurdish, 
then come male workers of Kurdish origin, Georgians and local workers sub-
sequently. For  Pelek, employers  prefer  Georgians, since they are evaluated as 
more hard-working employees and because of cultural similarities.18
Migrants in Informal Trade: An Umbrella Activity for Circulars 
A complete novelty brought by the new migratory flows represents itself in 
another area: informal trade. 
Since the 1990s, thousands of migrants from the Eastern European and 
former Soviet Union countries have begun to come to Turkey for trade activ-
ities. This activity is called in Turkey “suitcase/luggage trade”, which implies 
both its small-scale nature and the vague legal status of the transactions.
18 Pelek (2010).
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Although the term implies small-scale trade activities, it consists of a con-
siderable amount of foreign trade income for the Turkish economy.19 Although 
its volume is fluctuating, “suitcase trade” is a very important aspect of migra-
tion.  This  activity  also  represents  the  peculiarity  of  the  Turkish  case  as  a 
product of a liberal visa regime and an informal labor market.
Yükseker’s  innovative  research  gives  very detailed information  on  this 
trading activity.20 In this research, Yükseker explores the complexity of trading 
activities, serving as an umbrella also for those who are employed in different 
sections of the labor market, including sex work.  
Yükseker indicates that undocumentedness is the most important aspect 
of  the  shuttle  trade: production, transportation  and  sales  are  mainly  unre-
gistered. A district in Istanbul, Laleli, is the most visible site of this activity. Mi-
grants from the former Soviet Union and rural migrants from East Anatolia 
have developed interactions socially, economically and personally in this dis-
trict.
The Dark Side of Irregular Migration: Trafficking and Sex Workers 
As we repeatedly argue in this  article, the new migration movements have 
been experienced for more than 20 years in Turkey in an overwhelmingly in-
formal context. Informality with its many aspects may provide some benefits 
for some migrant groups. It is that reason that this flow continues in an accel-
erated manner. However, informality may have harmful, risky and threatening 
consequences for some other migrant groups. In other words, trafficking in hu-
man beings appears as the dark side of irregular migration. Irregular migra-
tion, by nature, contains in itself exploitation, deception, insecurity and threats 
from official institutions, mostly fear of police, for all groups of migrants and 
for both women and men. However, those who are working in the sex industry 
are particularly the most vulnerable migrants. 
The serious attempts and activities of the International Organization of 
Migration (IOM) in Turkey have brought this issue into the official institutions’ 
agenda, and  into  public  opinion. Moreover, it  stimulated  and supported  re-
search activities.21 
19 About ten million USD in the 1990s, while the official export income amounts to 25 million USD.
20 Yükseker (2003).
21 Erder/Kaşka (2003), Ayata et al. (2008).
Turkey in the New Migration Era: Migrants between Regularity and Irregularity 129
According to Turkish legal regulations, although licensed sex work is not 
a crime in Turkey, it is prohibited for foreigners. However, our research con-
firmed the growing importance of the sex industry in Turkey and the involve-
ment  of  foreign  women.  The  activities  related  to  “trafficking  in  women” 
between Turkey and the Eastern European countries  are intermingled with 
massive irregular migration movements and are concealed in tourist activities, 
entries for irregular work, the sex trade, regular and irregular trade and migra-
tion with the intention to settle.
Conclusion
The Turkish migration experience reflects the interaction of a vivid and large 
informal labor market and a liberal visa regime. In this context, some “irregu-
lar” migrants have learned about the specific rules of informality and created 
relatively “regular” trust  relations. These are crucial  for  surviving in the in-
formal labor market, not only for foreigners but also for the natives. For some 
of the employers, the legal situation of migrants vis-à-vis the state authorities 
do not have much importance, as they are more interested in the rules of the 
informality. Thus, the term “irregular”, in Turkey, like for the other peripheral 
countries, does not refer to the same feature observed in societies, where in-
formality is negligible. 
We have to note that the “informal” labor market has also stratifications, 
conflicts and competitions within it, just like other markets. Thus, irregular mi-
grants find themselves in different positions according to gender, origin and 
legal status in this market. Circular migrants, who are involved in the trading 
activities, may have a better position in the informal labor market compared to 
the transit migrants struggling to survive in the “waiting room” or trafficked 
women as the most vulnerable ones. It should be noted, however, that the wel-
fare system is too far to reach all irregular migrants.  
The Turkish liberal border policy provides rich examples of the effects of 
circular  migration, on migrants  and countries  on both sides  of  the borders. 
However, some trade unions, industrialists and xenophobic circles have some 
reservations and reactions to this policy. But still, Turkish authorities consider 
this policy as a “win-win” policy and do not take measures to discourage the 
entries from regional countries. Meanwhile, as we know, the Schengen visa re-
gime will not allow the continuation of this “flexible” border regime.  
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For  future  prospects,  we  may  predict  that  if  Turkey  will  be  a  part  of 
Schengen regime, the relative position of Turkey in the global migratory flows 
will  change dramatically. Turkey will continue to be a hub for refugees and 
asylum seekers coming from regional countries; however, for circular migrants 
it will lose its attractiveness and will not be a convenient destination anymore.
If it happens without fundamental reforms in the welfare regime, migra-
tion policy and burden-sharing implementations with European countries, the 
situation of the transit migrants will be worsened. And, moreover, if it hap-
pens, the term “irregular” may have the same content as it has in the European 
countries. 
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Causes and Consequences of  the Downturn in Financial  
Remittances to Turkey:  A Descriptive Approach
Giulia Bettin, Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar
Introduction
For decades, migrant remittances have been a fundamental external source of 
capital for the Turkish economy. Between 1960 and 1981, remittances covered 
about 80 % of the Turkish trade deficit and about 60 % of the current account 
deficit. In these earlier times, Turkey has been one of the top remittance recipi-
ents among all countries.1 Due to the fact that remittances did not lead to an 
inverse outflow of capital by interest payments or other kinds of repayments, 
their impact on the balance of payments was more positive than it was with 
other  monetary  inflows  (such as  foreign direct  investments  [FDI]  or  loans), 
which would have the same effect in purely accounting terms. 
Since the late 1990s, remittances to Turkey have declined sharply. This ar-
ticle evaluates the causes and consequences of the poor performance of aggre-
gate remittances flows to Turkey in the post-1998 era. It presents an overview 
of relations between the changes in remitting behavior since the late 1990s to 
today and the dynamics of Turkish migration from an economic point of view 
and in its historical context. The paper also analyzes the trends in workers’ re-
mittances in the financial crises of 1994, 2000/1 and 2008 and questions the 
transformation of motives behind remitting decisions in the pre- and post-cri-
ses periods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
overview about the changes of remittances to Turkey in the last decades. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the determinants and the effects of remittances and Section 4 
1 İçduygu (2005 a).
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goes into the reasons behind the declining trend in the remittance flows to 
Turkey after the year 1998. Section 5 concludes.
Remittances to Turkey
It is very well known that a large share of private money transfers is conducted 
via informal channels. This is the case for Turkey as well.2 Consequently, the 
overall dimension of the phenomenon might be underestimated, if only offi-
cial  data  are  considered. Nevertheless, since  estimations  of  informal  remit-
tances are extremely hard to provide, this is a common drawback affecting all 
empirical studies on aggregate remittance flows.3 In the case of Turkey, one of 
the most important data deficiencies is the lack of availability of remittance 
data disaggregated by country of origin. This might increase our understand-
ing of the phenomenon, and be particularly useful to discern, if the fall in re-
mittances is attributable to a different geographic pattern of Turkish emigra-
tion in the last decade compared to the previous ones.
Figure 1 presents the amount of remittances flows to Turkey from 1974 to 
today. The impact of consecutive devaluations in the Turkish economy follow-
ing the oil crisis of 1974 upon the remittances trend in the 1970s is quite visible 
in Figure 1. Two factors  played a role  in the 1980s, namely liberalization in 
trade/finance  following the  military  coup  of  1980  and encouragement  pro-
grams of Western Europe to promote return migration. The 1999 earthquake in 
Turkey and the financial crisis after the mid-1990s had remarkable effects on 
the remittances trend of 1990s and 2000s. Overall, it is sufficient to argue that 
between 1974 and 1988, with some tiny exceptions, the volume of aggregate re-
mittances increased; whereas, there occurred a dramatic decline after 1998. 
2 Officially recorded remittances were greatly surpassed by the "luggage trade" made by migrants to Turkey. Non-recorded 
remittances may have reached six billion USD, surpassing by far the recorded remittances of about 1.2 billion USD; see İç-
duygu (2008).
3 Freund/Spatafora (2008).
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Figure 1: Remittances to Turkey, 1974–2009, Million USD 
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. 
Remittances from citizens living abroad sent to support families and relatives 
back home have been a very important source of capital accumulation for Tur-
key. Before the recent decade, they played an important role in feeding the 
Turkish economy with capital. At that time, the level of remittances was about 
four to six times higher than the level of FDI (see Figure 2). Today, remittances 
still are a significant source for the accumulation of capital; however, due to a 
dramatic increase of FDI, remittances have lost their overall significance and 
reached only one sixth of the level of FDI in the last six years.4
Recently, also remittance outflows from Turkey to the neighborhood have 
become more important. An increasing number of workers from the Black Sea 
area and the Middle East have come to Turkey to get a job that is better paid 
4 While in the times of the “Gastarbeiter” system most of the remittances were either consumed (for buying a car, apart-
ment or house) or invested in trade (bazaar shops) or transportation facilities (taxis), more recently remittances have more 
and more been used to build up construction sites, farms or small manufacturing enterprises. This is especially true for the 
use of Anatolian capital. Companies in Anatolia, such as Kombassan, Büyük Anadolu Holding, Yimpaş, Endüstri, Sayha, Itti-
fak and Jet-Pa, were founded primarily with the savings sent by workers abroad (see Ömer, Acar and Toprak, Anatolian Ti-
gers). Some of the Anatolian Tigers went through legal investigation and it is legally proven that these companies used 
workers’ remittances outside of its collection purposes. It is also very well known that some of these firms have strong links 
with Islamic foundations, media and press. Most of these firms, also named as Islamic capital or green capital, bankrupted 
and were accused of cheating migrants. It is also important to keep in mind that there are also some successful examples 
among Anatolian firms who functioned very efficiently and had no Islamic ties.
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than at home. They remit parts of their income to their family members left 
behind in their  region of  origin. These economic activities have come to be 
known as the “suitcase trade”, due to the fact that not only money but also 
goods of all kinds have been sent back home. Along with the remittances sent 
home from Turkey, a growing number of joint ventures and Turkish FDI into 
the neighborhood have appeared.5
Figure 2: Remittances and FDI to Turkey, 1988–2008, Billion USD
Source: World Bank: Quick Query Database.6
The Determinants and the Effects of Migrants’ Remittances
The level of remittance flows depends on both the migrants’ ability (income 
and the savings from income) and the motivation they have to remit savings 
back to the home country. The propensity to remit depends also on the dura-
tion of migration (whether it is temporary or permanent), the family situation 
of migrants (the partner, children) and the connections they have in the home 
5 Kirişçi/Tocci/Walker (2010, p. 19).
6 “Remittances (R) compared to FDI” means: if value =1, then R = FDI, if >1, then R > FDI: if < 1, then R < FDI.
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(whether migrants move alone or with other family members, and whether 
they keep attachments to those left behind).7 
Why Do Migrants Remit? Some Theoretical Expectations
When looking at the motives that migrants have to remit, no general theory of 
remittances exists, as Stark (1991) highlights. The studies that analyze this topic 
provide descriptive evidence and empirical results that are limited to a certain 
geographical, socio-cultural and temporal context. The literature usually distin-
guishes between pure altruism, pure self-interest  and informal  agreements 
with family members left in the home country and portfolio management de-
cisions. Pure altruism refers to the fact that migrants care about relatives left 
behind and derive utility from the welfare of his/her relatives. The altruistic 
model predicts that the amount of remittances should increase with the mi-
grant’s income8 and decrease with the domestic income of the family. Remit-
tances should also decrease over time: the attachment to the family gradually 
weakens and migrants may decide to settle permanently in the host country 
followed by their family members.9
The second motive for remitting money may be pure self-interest. Mi-
grants may remit money to their parents driven by the aspiration to inherit, if 
it  is  assumed  that  bequests  are  conditioned  by  behavior.  Moreover, remit-
tances could ensure migrants that relatives left behind take care of the assets 
they still own there.10 The intention to return home may further promote re-
mittances for different types of investment (real estate, financial assets, public 
assets, social capital): migrants that experience a “return illusion” are shown to 
remit more than those experiencing a “permanent settlement syndrome”.11 
A  more  eclectic  model  labelled  “tempered  altruism” and  “enlightened 
self-interest” by Lucas and Stark (1985) sets remittances in a family framework 
of decision-making, as a component that is endogenous to the migration pro-
cess. At the household level, to allocate certain members as migrants might 
well represent a Pareto-superior strategy, and remittances represent the mech-
anism for redistributing the gains in terms of both risk-spreading (“implicit co-
7 Munshi (2003).
8 Lucas/Stark (1985).
9 Lowell/de la Garza (2000).
10 Brown (1997).
11 Glytsos (1988, 1997).
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insurance  agreement”)  and  investment  in  the  education  of  young  family 
members (“implicit family loan agreement”).
In the implicit co-insurance model, at the beginning the migrant plays 
the role of the insured while the insurer bears the initial costs of the migration 
project. The potential migrant is hardly expected to be able to cover all the ex-
penses alone. Later on, he might become an insurer for the family members 
back home when he finds secure employment, and has high enough earnings 
to remit.12 By receiving remittances, the family will then have the opportunity 
to improve its consumption, to undertake investment projects including much 
more risk and thus reach a higher level of utility. In the loan agreement model, 
remittances are assumed to be the repayment of an informal and implicit loan 
contracted by the migrant for investment in education and migration costs. In 
a second stage, remittances become loans made by migrants to young relatives 
in order to finance their education until they are themselves ready to migrate. 
Finally, in the third stage, before returning to the country of origin, migrants 
use remittances to invest in assets at home. Later, the next generation of emi-
grants repay the loan to the former emigrant lenders, who may have retired in 
the  home  country.  Given  the  nature  of  the  loan,  remittances  cannot  con-
sequently be reduced over time – as the co-insurance or altruistic theories pre-
dict – and are mainly used for consumption purposes. 
Migrants could also have a saving target; thus, they want to return home 
with a certain amount of savings. Remittances are part of a bargaining process 
between the migrant and the family left at home. The claim of the family on a 
migrants’ income can be considered as the demand side and the ability of the 
migrant to remit  (income and savings) represents the supply side for remit-
tances. The migrant wants  to  reach the saving target  and to minimize  the 
drain from his income, be it in the form of consumption expenses in the host 
country or remittances to the family. The family, on the other hand, wants its 
income to be larger than that of the neighbors in order to justify the decision 
to send some family members abroad. In this set-up, the amount of money re-
mitted depends on the migrant’s income, the per capita income in the home 
country and the bargaining power of the two sides. The remittance behavior 
might be different whether migrants move for permanent settlement or just 
temporarily. Incentives to remit could be higher for temporary migrants13 since 
12 Lucas/Stark (1985).
13 Galor/Stark (1990).
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the attachment to the home country declines over time.14 On the other hand, 
the longer the time spent in the host country, the higher the wages, so in prin-
ciple migrants could have the chance to remit more, if interested. Lucas points 
out that remittances may initially rise, and then decline with duration of stay, 
which “would suggest an optimal length of stay to maximize remittance flows, 
balancing greater earning power against diminishing attachment”.15
All the models mentioned so far refer to the individual motives to remit 
rather than to macroeconomic dynamics of these flows, which certainly reflect 
individual decisions at an aggregate level. Anyway, there might be some mac-
roeconomic factors, both in the host and home country, which may signifi-
cantly affect the size of remittances. Part of migrants’ savings may be remitted 
for reasons of relative profitability of savings/investing in the home country, 
and  can be  explained  in  the  framework  of  a  portfolio  management  choice 
where relative macroeconomic factors in the host and home country play a 
key role: among the others, interest rates, exchange rates, inflation and relative 
rates of return on different financial and real assets.
Taking this into account, governments of migrant-sending countries used 
to implement incentives schemes (i. e., premium exchange rates, foreign ex-
change deposits with higher returns, etc.) in order to attract remittances, but 
they were not really successful. As far as Turkey is considered, empirical ana-
lyses for the period 1963–1982 show that neither variations in exchange rates 
(reflecting the  will  to  attract  remittances  by  premium  exchange  rates), nor 
changes  in  the  real  interest  rates  (reflecting the  intention  to  attract  remit-
tances by foreign exchange deposits with higher interest rates) seemed to sig-
nificantly  affect  the  size  of  remittance  flows.  Remittances  towards  Turkey 
were much more affected by the prospect of political stability rather than actu-
al economic returns.16
It should be rather clear that these different hypotheses concerning re-
mittance behavior are not mutually exclusive since some or all of them could 
work at the same time and the predominant element might change between 
periods and individuals. A universal framework therefore is the challenging 
task to be reached.17
14 Merkle/Zimmermann (1992).
15 Lucas (2004, p. 13).
16 Straubhaar (1986).
17 El-Sakka/McNabb (1999).
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The different hypotheses attempting to explain remittance motivations – 
pure altruism, pure self-interest, implicit family agreements, the migrant’s sav-
ing  target  and  portfolio  management  decisions  –  complement  each  other. 
Some or all of these motives together may simultaneously drive remittances, 
each one explaining a part of the amount remitted or a period of remitting 
practice. One  motive  can  predominate  over  the  other  for  a  period  or  for  a 
sample of migrants with the same characteristics, and their roles can be inter-
changed. This illustrates that the remittance phenomenon is a very complex 
one, and explains the difficulty in developing a universal theory of remittance 
determination. A very important recent assumption regarding the contribu-
tion of remittances in compensating the human capital loss of migrant-send-
ing countries is that migrants’ propensity to remit diminishes with education. 
There is little empirical work regarding this issue (an exception is Faini [2002]), 
but if confirmed by future research, the results would be outstanding. It would 
imply that high-skilled workers do not compensate (or compensate less)  for 
the loss they induce to the economy they are leaving.
Which Effects from Remittance Inflows?
The literature about the impact of remittances in receiving countries is recent, 
but it has grown rapidly in the last years. Most of the analyses focus on three 
main issues. The first topic discussed is the direct impact of remittances on in-
come distribution, poverty alleviation and individual welfare. 
Migrant remittances unquestionably produce welfare effects in develop-
ing countries such as poverty alleviation, education and health improvements. 
At the national level, several studies18 show that even if the impact on poverty 
incidence is small, the reduction in the severity of poverty, measured by the 
poverty gap, is substantial. Many families that receive remittances are still be-
low the poverty line, but their income level is  much closer to the threshold 
than what it would be otherwise. Remittances contribute to increase house-
holds’ disposable income, relaxing liquidity constraints; this can sort positive 
effects on educational choices for children. Yang (2008) considers the increase 
in remittance flows received by Philippine households after the appreciation 
of foreign currencies against the Philippine peso due to the 1997 Asian finan-
cial crisis. These positive income shocks enhance human capital accumulation, 
raising schooling enrollment rates and reducing therefore child labor. Cox, Ed-
18 See Adams (2004) for Guatemala and Taylor et al. (2005) for Mexico.
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wards and Ureta (2003)  find that  remittances have a  significant  impact  on 
school retention while other studies on the Mexican case19 document that re-
mittances are associated with substantial  health improvements, namely re-
duction in infant mortality and increase in birth weight.
Empirical contributions on the income distribution effects of remittances 
mainly use the Gini index and results are mixed. Although some scholars20 
found confirmation that remittances have an equalizing effect on income dis-
tribution, other studies  show that remittances  increase inequality as meas-
ured by the  Gini  coefficient.21 As a matter  of  fact, wealthier  families, being 
more able to pay for the costs associated with international migration, may 
also be those who benefit the most from migrants’ remittances. By means of a 
dynamic model of rural  income distribution in two Mexican villages, Stark, 
Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986, 1988) similarly found that the distribution effect of 
remittances depends ultimately on the migration history, and on the degree to 
which migration opportunities are distributed across households. When the 
migration  process  begins, information  about  destinations  and  employment 
possibilities is still limited and only wealthier households can afford to send 
migrants abroad. Consequently, wealthier families are the first to benefit from 
remittances, causing income inequality to rise. Later, as the chance to migrate 
spreads over a greater range of income classes, poorer households can benefit 
from remittances, too, and there is an equalizing effect on income distribution. 
Clearly, to evaluate the overall effect of remittances on income distribu-
tion there are some factors to be taken into account: the level of  initial  in-
equality can vary according to the different environments, and disparities in 
results may be caused by differences in the empirical methods applied.22 
The  second  part of the literature discusses the effects of remittances on 
the  economy  as  a  whole, and  specifically  the  impact  on  employment, pro-
ductivity and growth.  While there is little doubt concerning the positive mi-
croeconomic effects  deriving from remittances, the mechanisms behind the 
macroeconomic consequences for the receiving countries are more complex. 
The magnitude of  the development impact of  remittances was assumed by 
19 Hildebrandt/McKenzie (2005), Duryea et al. (2005), Lopez Cordova (2005).
20 Taylor/Wyatt (1996), Taylor (1999).
21 Adams (1991), Rodriguez (1998), Adams (1998).
22 Rapoport/Docquier (2005).
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many scholars to crucially depend on how this money was spent: consump-
tion, housing, purchasing of land, financial saving or productive investment. 
To the extent that remittances are channelled into investments, they can 
directly affect employment and growth on a long-term basis. Inflows of work-
ers’ remittances add to domestic sources of income to finance capital accumu-
lation and, at the same time, they can contribute to lowering the cost of capital 
in developing economies via an improvement of the creditworthiness of do-
mestic investors (collateral function). Glytsos (2002) for example shows that in-
vestments rise thanks to remittances in six out of the seven Mediterranean 
countries in his sample. In the same line, Leon-Ledesma and Piracha (2001) find 
a positive effect of remittances (through investments again) on productivity 
and employment for eleven transition economies in the period 1990–1999.23 
When remittances are used to fund consumption expenditures, short-run 
effects  on  economic  output  depend  on  different  factors:  purchased  goods 
might be produced in the country, but also imported from abroad; moreover, 
an unexploited national productive capacity is needed to fulfill the increase in 
the internal demand of goods deriving from a higher household purchasing 
power.24 One remittance dollar spent on basic needs may stimulate retail sales, 
which stimulate further demand for goods and services, which then stimulates 
output and employment.25 In this line of reasoning, remittances might repre-
sent a possible offset to the decline in output as a result of emigration.26 In the 
case  of  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries,  Straubhaar  and  Wolburg 
(1999) showed that remittances do not compensate the welfare loss due to the 
emigration of the high-skilled workers to Germany. 
The short-run impact of remittances on aggregate output has been esti-
mated through a simple Keynesian multiplier effect. Glytsos (1993) calculates a 
remittance multiplier of around 1.77 in gross output for Greece,27 while the es-
23 See also Drinkwater et al. (2003).
24 When the demand deriving from remittances falls on non-tradable goods, and the economy cannot meet this demand, 
remittances may generate an inflationary effect. The price for agricultural land in Egypt rose by 600 % between 1980 and 
1986 due to remittances (Adams [1991]). 
25 Lowell/de la Garza (2000).
26 Quibria (1997) shows that if low-skilled migrants emigrate, and remittances are in excess of the domestic income loss, 
then the welfare of the source country rises. If, on the other hand, migrants are high-skilled workers and/or if emigration is  
accompanied by capital, remittances have a welfare-increasing effect for the non-migrants only when the capital/labor ra-
tio remains unchanged or rises in the country of origin. If the capital/labor ratio falls, the welfare effect is indeterminate or 
even negative.
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timated value is around 3.2 for Mexico.28 Ratha (2003) estimates that every re-
mittance dollar spent in Mexico increased GNP by 2.69 USD in the case of urban 
households and by 3.17 USD in the case of rural households. 
A further channel through which remittances may affect growth is the 
labor force participation of recipient households. Chami et al. (2005) underline 
that remittances take place in a context of asymmetric information due to the 
long distances between migrants and recipients. Therefore, remitters do not 
have the chance to monitor the final use remittances are destined to and mor-
al hazard problems could induce recipients to decrease either their labor effort 
or the participation in the labor force, diverting additional income to the con-
sumption of leisure.29 Using panel methods on a sample of 113 countries, they 
show that a change in the remittance/GDP ratio is negatively related to eco-
nomic growth confirming that the moral hazard problems in the use of remit-
tances are severe. Clearly, in this context higher growth rates in developing 
countries might stimulate more conspicuous remittance flows. Therefore, the 
endogeneity of remittances needs to be addressed and the subsequent literat-
ure dealt with this problem showing contrasting results. 
In two cross-section studies conducted by the IMF (2005) and Faini (2006) 
the coefficient on the remittance-to-GDP ratio in the growth regressions was 
positive but statistically insignificant. Acosta et al. (2008) instead analyzed a 
panel of 67 countries in the period 1991–2005 and found that remittances have 
a positive albeit modest influence on economic growth. These positive results 
were also confirmed through the studies on Latin American and Caribbean 
countries by Ramirez and Sharma (2008) and Mundaca (2009).
Other studies showed that, on average, remittances have either no signi-
ficant influence on growth or, when significant, their effects are positive but 
very limited in magnitude.30 However, things change when remittances are 
considered together with other determinants of economic growth: if interact-
ed with a measure for financial development31 or with indicators for the qual-
27 It is interesting to highlight the result that spending on consumption and investment produced similar multipliers of re-
spectively, 1.8 and 1.9 in Greece. And contrary to common opinion, expenditure on housing was found to be very productive,  
with a multiplier of 2.
28 Adelman/Taylor (1990).
29 Gapen et al. (2006) using a dynamic general equilibrium model with remittances show that these flows reduce labor 
supply and lead to greater output volatility.
30Giuliano/Ruiz Arranz (2009), Catrinescu et al. (2009).
31 Giuliano/Ruiz Arranz (2009), Mundaca (2009).
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ity of institutions32 in the second one, remittances prove to contribute signifi-
cantly and positively to economic growth.
The third part deals with the contribution of remittances to the balance 
of payments. If remittances are a further income for the receiving household at 
a microeconomic level, they also represent an addition to the receipt side of 
the balance of payments at an aggregate level, giving a substantial contribute 
to ease crucial restraints imposed on the economic growth of developing coun-
tries. Remittances might help to offset chronic deficits by reducing the short-
age of foreign exchange. When compared to other monetary inflows, i. e., fi-
nancial aids, direct investments or loans, they show numerous positive aspects 
because their use is not linked to specific investment projects with high-im-
port content, they bear no interest and do not have to be repaid. In addition, re-
mittances are more stable than other private capital flows as a source of for-
eign exchange and empirically it has been proven that in some specific cases 
they exhibit an anti-cyclical behavior.33
However, as mentioned before, this positive effect on the balance of pay-
ments may also come together with additional imports (and/or adverse infla-
tion effects), if the additional demand induced by remittances cannot be met 
by expanding domestic output. Thus, a “boomerang effect” might occur in the 
case that remittances induce an increase of imports and trade balance deficits 
in the receiving country. Evidence shows that in Southern European countries 
the effect was small and remittance-induced imports between 1960 and 1981 
accounted for 1 % in Spain and Italy, 4.9 % in Greece and 6.2 % in Portugal.34 
The demand for imported tradable goods stimulated by remittances can 
also  lead  to  an  appreciation of  the  real  exchange rate. This  latter  aspect  is 
linked to the so-called “Dutch Disease” effect. A large inflow of capital, be it in 
the form of foreign aid or remittances, might cause an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, with negative consequences for the tradable sector in terms of 
international competitiveness (exports on foreign markets become more ex-
pensive while imports on the domestic market become cheaper).35 Rajan and 
Subramanian  (2005),  however,  give  evidence  that  private-to-private  flows 
(hence remittances), unlike aid inflows, do not have systematic adverse effects 
32 Catrinescu et al. (2009), Calderón et al. (2008).
33 Straubhaar (1988), Buch et al. (2002), Buch/Kuckulenz (2004).
34 Glytsos (1993), Straubhaar (1988).
35 Amuedo-Dorantes/Pozo (2004), Lopez et al. (2007), Lartey et al. (2008).
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on external competitiveness and empirical evidence from Egypt, Portugal and 
Turkey, although supporting such fears showed that the “Dutch Disease” effect 
remained marginal in most of the cases.36
Some Empirical Evidence for Turkey
The existing empirical evidence for the determinants of migrants’ remittances 
to Turkey can be categorized into two groups. 
The  first  group  of studies is  focused on macroeconomic and microeco-
nomic determinants of remittances to Turkey. Van Delan et al. (2005) empiri-
cally examine the micro determinants of remittances and the effect of remit-
tances  on emigration intentions  in  a multi-country study including Turkey, 
Morocco and Egypt. It is shown in this 2005 study that, in all three countries, 
family ties and the net earnings potential of emigrants have stronger effects in 
the receipt of remittances than net earnings potential  of households in the 
country of origin. They also conclude that the receipt of remittances has a posi-
tive effect on emigration intentions of household members living in the coun-
try  of  origin. With  reference  to  the  motives  behind remittances, this  study 
states  that  altruism  and  self-interest  play  equally  crucial  roles  as  driving 
forces. Analyzing the determinants of emigrants’ remittances from Germany 
to Turkey over the period 1963–1982, Straubhaar (1986)  showed that flows of 
remittances towards Turkey have been attracted by the emigrants’ confidence 
in the stability of the Turkish government much more than by governmental 
incentives to attract remittances. It is argued that remittances towards Turkey 
are determined by the wage level in Germany and by the confidence the Turk-
ish emigrants felt in the safety and liquidity of their investments in the coun-
try of origin. According to this study, neither interest rate nor exchange rate 
differentials between the host and home countries have an effect on remit-
tances. Examining the macroeconomic determinants of remittances to Turkey 
by using time-series methods over the period 1992–2003,  Alper (2005) shows 
that interest rate, price level, income and exchange rate are the main macro-
economic variables behind remitting behavior. It is also presented in the same 
study that, in the long run, investment motive is effective whereas consump-
tion smoothing plays a role in the short run with respect to workers’ remitting 
behavior. Aydaş et al. (2004) assess the macroeconomic determinants of remit-
tances in the case of Turkey using an OLS estimate for two periods, 1965–1993 
36 McCormick/Wahba (2004), Straubhaar (1988).
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and 1979–1993, and conclude that black market premium, interest rate differ-
ential, inflation rate, growth, both home and host country incomes and periods 
of military regime significantly affect remittance flows. Köksal (2006) under-
lines the importance of Turkish commercial banks and the Central Bank of Re-
public of Turkey (CBRT) in attracting the remittances to Turkey in her paper 
analyzing the significance of financial infrastructure, which is rarely touched 
upon in the literature focusing on Turkey, as one of macro determinants of re-
mittance  behavior.  Akkoyunlu and  Siliverstovs  (2007) analyze  the influence 
that workers’ remittances might exert on migration decisions via co-integra-
tion analysis for the 1964–2004 period. Their study shows the significance of 
remittances in explaining migration in the short  and long run. In his  work 
analyzing the determinants of return migration of Turkish immigrants in Ger-
many, Kirdar (2005) finds that immigrants with a higher savings potential are 
more likely to return.
The second group  of studies is centered on the cyclical characteristics of 
remittances.  Sayan (2004) evaluates the business cycle properties of Turkish 
workers’ remittances. Based on the official data set provided by the CBRT, Say-
an (2004) constructs a data set based on several assumptions and weights and 
concludes that remittances are procyclical with the GDP in Turkey and acyclic-
al with the German GNI (Gross National Income). In a related paper, Erdem-Yiğit 
(2005) presents that the cycles of the Turkish workers’ remittances are pro-cy-
clical against Turkish business cycles and acyclical against German business 
cycles. Sayan (2006) analyzes the behavior of workers’ remittances flows over 
their respective business cycles. His study covers twelve developing countries 
over the period 1976–2003 and results for Turkey show acyclical behavior of 
aggregate inflows of remittances. When looking specifically at the remittances 
from Turkish workers in Germany, Sayan (2006) claims that remittances are 
countercyclical  from  1987  to  1994  and  then  they  become  procyclical.  This 
change in the author’s view is mainly due to the financial crisis that has nega-
tively affected the level of migrants’ confidence in the home country. In the work 
of  Sayan and Tekin-Koru (2007), it is shown again that  remittances sent from 
Germany appear to be procyclical  with the Turkish output. They follow the 
business cycle in Turkey by a lag of  one quarter. Remittances then amplify 
business cycle fluctuations rather than smoothing them. No significant corre-
lation  is  found  between  remittances  and  German  output.  Using  Deutsche 
Bundesbank data for the period 1962–2004,  Akkoyunlu and Khodolin (2006) 
provide contrasting results and state that the remittances of Turkish workers 
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in Germany positively respond to the changes in the German output and do 
not react at all to the changes in Turkish output. 
It can be said that remittances did not turn into employment-creating in-
vestments yet failed to create positive externalities in terms of productivity. 
The strong desire to do self-employed work and to become a kind of an inde-
pendent economic actor caused a considerable proportion of savings to be in-
vested in small  enterprises in the service sector in Turkey. Opening a small 
trading or service business, or buying a van or taxi, was expected to lay the 
foundation for an independent livelihood. The new service firms and work-
shops therefore began to compete with those already in existence, but this did 
not lead to a structural improvement in the sense of driving out inefficient 
firms. On the contrary, it fostered a kind of “bazaar capitalism” of barely viable, 
marginal firms condemned in the long run to incur debt or to go under.
Investment by workers’ societies was an exception. In 1966 Turks work-
ing in Germany had formed workers’ societies so that they could invest their 
savings jointly in industrialization projects rather than individually in the ser-
vice sector. As they were not motivated solely by expectations of short-term 
profits but looked more to the maximization of benefits over the long term 
(such as ensuring permanent jobs for their members upon their return to their 
native region), these societies invested their funds mainly in underdeveloped 
industries and regions (such as Central and Eastern Anatolia, where more than 
half of the societies invested). Their overall contribution to industrial develop-
ment was minor. The small plants producing only for regional needs were of 
limited  potential  and  their  orientation  towards  the  local  structural  set-up 
ruled out any expansion in their activities from the very outset.
Thus, the effects in terms of economic development remained rather lim-
ited. Instead, remittances financed Turkey’s current account deficit to a certain 
extent, while increasing the import capacity. Hence, most of the studies dis-
cuss these limited effects and prove the non-productive aspects of remittance 
flows. Karagöz (2006) applies a time series regression in order to empirically 
prove the negative impact of remittance flows on economic growth over the 
period  1970–2005.  Köksal  (2006)  highlights  the  inflationary  effects  and the 
negative influence of remittances on the exchange rate of the Turkish Lira in 
line with macroeconomic studies that analyze the so-called Dutch disease ef-
fect deriving from remittances.37 Among the incentives that the Turkish Gov-
37 Amuedo-Dorantes/Pozo (2004), Lopez et al. (2007), Lartey et al. (2008).
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ernment used to channel remittances to productive economic activities, one 
can list special import privileges, premium exchange rates and high interest 
rates for foreign currency accounts in the CBRT. Additionally, in the late 1960s, 
three development projects took place so as to channel remittances towards in-
vestment  and  employment, the  village-development  co-operatives, workers’ 
joint stock companies and the State Bank for Industry and Migrant Investment 
(DESIYAB). All of these attempts failed to be successful in the long term due to 
various reasons, which were deeply discussed in the literature.38 
However, one contribution departs from this dominant pessimistic view 
concerning economic consequences deriving from remittances.  Koç and Onan 
(2004) in their study on international migrants’ remittances and the welfare 
status of the left-behind families in Turkey, based on a 1996 Turkish Interna-
tional Migration Survey (TIMS-96), show that remittances are mainly used by 
households in order to improve their standard of living and to therefore con-
tribute to reduce poverty and inequality. This approach is along the same lines 
as de Haas (2005), who underlines the inaccuracy of the idea that remittances 
are predominantly spent on excessive consumption and criticizes the inclina-
tion to denote expenditure on housing, health care, food and schooling as un-
productive and non-developmental. De Haas (2005) argues that the impact of 
migration tends to be highly differentiated across time and space.
Finally, the ECORYS (2006) report on improving the efficiency of workers’ 
remittances devotes one of its sections to the transfers from Germany to Tur-
key. According to this report, the falling trend of remittances to Turkey can be 
explained by two factors: the declining number of Turkish migrants (the de-
clining number of remitters) and the weaker attachment of third- and fourth-
generation migrants to the homeland. For İçduygu (2005 b), the declining trend 
of remittances in the first years of the 2000s can be explained through the eco-
nomic downturn in host countries like Germany that has led to unemploy-
ment among Turkish emigrants and settlement of Turkish emigrants in the 
host  countries,  which  means  they  send  less  money  home.  According  to 
Karagöz (2006), a  decrease  in  the  workers’ remittance  flow  since  the  early 
2000s  can  be  explained  through  the  demographic  change  in  Turkish  emi-
grants’ sociological structure and their entrepreneurial skills (which cause the 
drop in investment-oriented remittances). Aydaş (2005) also analyzes the drop 
in the remittance flow in 1999 (the year of the earthquake) and sees it as evi-
38 See Yüksel (1982), Köksal (2006), Güven (1977), Tatar et al. (1989), Ersun et al. (1997), Martin (1991).
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dence showing the dominance of the investment motive (rather than the al-
truism motive) as the possible reason behind remitting. According to Avcı and 
Kirişçi (2008), falling emigration and the permanent settlement of migrants 
are  the  main  reasons  behind  the  shrinking  amount  of  remittances.  Erzan 
(2009) in his paper estimating the direction and magnitude of the global eco-
nomic crisis  on remittances (including Turkey), concludes that the EU slow-
down, which will reduce the financial capacity of immigrants, will dominate 
over the increased need for funds at home, curtailing the remittances received 
by developing countries. Erzan (2009) argues that the magnitude of this de-
cline may differ considerably across countries due to the fact that the impact 
of growth at home and in the host country on remittances had been changing 
over time.
The Dramatic Drop of Remittances to Turkey in the Post-1998 Era
Permanent Residency in the Host Country and Loss of “Return” Idea
The  change  in  the  demographical  structure  in  the  Turkish  population  in 
Europe is one the most important determinants of declining remittance flows 
to Turkey, according to ECORYS (2006) and Avcı and Kirişçi (2008). The rela-
tively declining pattern of a migrant population of Turkish origin may be ex-
plained by the increasing legal restrictions on migration flows generally con-
sidered, and specifically on flows from Turkey in some cases, i. e.,  Germany. 
These restrictions could force migrants to abandon their plans for temporary 
migration and to stay on a  long-term basis  because of  the increasing diffi-
culties in being readmitted in the host country. It is possible to observe that 
long-term migrants with a Turkish background gradually lose the dream of re-
turning eventually to their homeland. This automatically translates into weak-
er ties of the second and third generation of migrants with the country of ori-
gin. The link between the intention to return and the amount of money sent 
home is rather obvious. When planning to go back, migrants consider their 
home country as the center of their economic interests and are inclined to re-
mit instead of investing money in the host country. In our case, the remitting 
behavior of  first-generation migrants  backed up with the “return to  Turkey 
with the family” dream has lately dissolved and has not been pursued by the 
new generations that are progressively turning into permanent residents (and 
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in some case, citizens) of their host country. Reform in the German Nationality 
Law in 1999 (which came into force in 2000) also played an important role in 
the amount of remittances to Turkey due to the naturalization of Turkish mi-
grants. The new law, to a certain extent, made it easier for migrants residing in 
Germany on a long-term basis  (eight years with permanent  residence)  and 
also for the children of migrants to acquire German citizenship. 
Change in Socio-economic Status: the Second and Third Generations as 
Entrepreneurs Investing in Their Own Business
As migrant entrepreneurship literature showed us, the majority of Turkish mi-
grants are self-employed, and instead of remitting in Turkey, their savings are 
channeled  towards  local  business  in  the  host  country. According  to  Micro-
census 2007, among the self-employed persons with a migration background 
in Germany the largest group of the entrepreneurs is represented by Turks. In 
early 2000s, only in Germany, there were more than 50,000 businessmen of 
Turkish origin providing jobs to over 250,000 persons.
Invisible/Informal Channels: Islamic Foundations and the Corruption of 
Money Invested by Turkish Migrants
The 1990s were a scene of organizational grouping of Turkish migrants under 
various Islamic groups some of which with extreme religious tendencies. Dif-
ferently from the first two decades of Turkish migration to Europe, religion as a 
founding element of  migrant identity became politicized for  the first  time. 
This religious uprising was in parallel with the internal political developments 
of Turkey and most of these organized foundations were representatives or 
foreign branches of already-existing Turkish head offices. By the late 2000s, 
both German and Turkish governments increased supervision measures not 
only on the political activities of these foundations but also on their budgets. 
Due to  the lack of  data on the amount of  money siphoned away from the 
Muslim community in Europe, it  is  difficult  to judge its  role  in the general 
dropping tendency of post-1998 remittances behavior. However, it is acknowl-
edged that some parts of Muslim migrants’ savings were used and corrupted 
under the name of “donation” via these foundations. Hence, migrants who vo-
luntarily  supported  these  unions  financially  spared  some  percent  of  their 
money for “mutual aids/solidarity funds” instead of remitting. However, it is 
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important to keep in mind that these religious oriented migrant networks ex-
plain only some part of informal channeling.
Change in Calculations
Some parts of the decline in remittances, especially the sharp declines in the 
early 2000s, are due to the change in the calculation/classification of remit-
tances  by the CBRT. Before 2003, workers’ remittances  included three main 
items; namely, foreign exchange remittances converted into Turkish Lira, Turk-
ish Lira conversion from foreign exchange accounts of Turkish citizens living 
abroad and money they spent during their visit in Turkey. In 2003, the CBRT in-
troduced a new method and reclassified the last two items of workers’ remit-
tances under tourism revenues. However, under the new classification, these 
data do not allow us to see these two items separately under the tourism rev-
enues item. Hence, it is impossible to distinguish the real impact of the new 
calculation method in the drop of remittances.
In the case of Turkey, in which tourism is one of the leading economic 
sectors, receiving the tourism incentives from state is very crucial for entre-
preneurs. This new method of classification artificially shows a tourism hump, 
so that the political environment for lobbying for incentive-receiving for tour-
ism activities is eased. In 1992, remittances data became monthly. 
Drop in Interest Rate and Rise in Tax
Turkish commercial banks and the CBRT have been playing a crucial role for at-
tracting the remittances to Turkey.
There exist two types of foreign currency bank accounts in which Turkish 
workers living abroad can open with the CBRT so as to deposit their savings, 
namely the foreign currency deposit account with credit letter (FXA) and the 
super foreign currency account (SFXA).39 The crucial aspect of these accounts 
(introduced in 2011) for the scope of this study is the interest rate that is paid 
39 Individuals eligible for opening Foreign Currency Deposit Accounts with a Credit Letter and Super FX Accounts are real  
persons over eighteen years of age having residence or working permits abroad or the right thereto as Citizens of The Re-
public of Turkey (possessing The Republic of Turkey Identity Card/passports) or possessing “Certificates Regarding the Use 
of Rights Under the Law No. 5203”. Persons authorized to work abroad for a long term by the public agencies and those 
employed at the representative offices and bureaus abroad of the public and private sector organizations are also entitled 
to open these accounts. Citizens having a Credit Letter and Super FX Accounts may continue their accounts under the pre-
vailing legislation also after their final return to Turkey. Please visit http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/eng/ for detailed informa-
tion on these accounts.
152 Giulia Bettin, Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar
by the CBRT and the amount of tax that is deducted from the overall interest 
rate payment. Figure 3 presents three indicators; namely, the interest rate on 
FXA as a percentage, the interest rate in SFXA as a percentage and the amount 
of tax deducted from the interest payment on FXA and SFXA in total in million 
euro terms (one-year time deposit account).
As it is presented in Figure 3, there is a declining trend in the interest rate 
and an increasing trend in the volume of tax. These two opposing trends give 
us a hint about the dramatic drop of aggregate remittance flows by the end of 
1990s. With respect to FXA, the main drop in the interest rate after a steady 
state since 1994 is  in 2001, the year of the global financial crises. Following 
years witness a drop of almost 1 % each year. A similar trend is applied to the 
SFXA over the period 2001–2004, when the interest rate fell from 9 % to 3 %. 
Figure 3: Interest Rate (%) and Tax (Million Euro) for FXA and SFX40
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT.
Thus, Turkish migrant workers gradually faced lower interest rates and higher 
tax ratios, which contributed to the decrease in remittances. 
40 The reason behind the reaching of the blue line (Tax on FXA and SFX in million Euro) is the lack of data after 2005.
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Figure 4: Tax Applied to Remittances, 1987–2004, Percentage Change
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT.
These noticeable declines were not the sole determinants strengthening the 
negative incentive of workers’ remitting behavior. As it is clearly shown in Fig-
ure 4, the pattern of tax volume that is deducted from the total interest pay-
ments both to FX and SFX accounts has been an increasing trend since the 
early 1990s. The distinct vault right after the year 1998 is worth mentioning.
At this juncture, it is also crucial to ask whether the Turkish workers’ re-
mittances have shifted away from the accounts in the CBRT to German or re-
lated European financial institutions. In order to shed light on this question, 
Figure 5 compares the interest rates of the CBRT, Turkish banks, German gov-
ernment bonds, LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) and EURIBOR (Euro In-
terbank Offered Rate) – (one-year time deposit account). It can be easily fol-
lowed from Figure 5 that the CBRT interest rate on FXA and SFXA is above the 
other Turkish banks, German government bonds, LIBOR and EURIBOR in all 
periods. Hence, there was no interest rate advantage for workers to remit their 
savings  into  better  paying  options,  neither  in  Germany  nor  in  the  rest  of 
Europe. Yet, remittances still did fall and possibly shifted to non-financial in-
struments.41
41 It is crucial to underline the importance of the double taxation issue of Turkish workers’ remittances in the case of Ger-
many. Since the interest rate is considered as an income, at the end of fiscal year, migrants are obliged to declare the 
amount of income that they received due to remitting in Turkey and taxed according to German laws. 
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Figure 5: Comparison of Interest Rates Applied to Remittances, Percentage
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT.
Shift to the Euro in the EU and Crisis in Europe
By 2002, the shift of EU to the common currency, the Euro, had both positive 
and negative impacts on various macroeconomic indicators. It is agreed upon 
in the literature that for most of the cases, the impact of the new currency on 
the consumers’ purchasing power, especially of migrants as the most vulner-
able group, was negative. Particularly in the transition period (1999–2002), the 
impact on the cost of living was unbearable and this had a negative impact on 
the savings of migrants, which caused a decline in the remittances potential. 
This negative effect has been even more aggravated by the economic down-
turn in Germany and crisis in the EU area in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Crises in 1994, 2000/1 and 2008/09 
The crises that took place in 1994 and 2000/1 were deeply different from the 
one in 2008 due to their causes and characteristics. These differences are obvi-
ous and normal when one takes into account the different economic conjunc-
tures of  time periods. The 1994 and 2000/1  crises  were financial  in  nature, 
whereas the 2008 crisis hit the non-financial sector the most.
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The 1994 crisis was a result of a high-risk premium of private banks un-
der a lack of enough supervision of the financial sector. Yet, due to the high fra-
gility of the banking system, Turkish economy ended up with a liquidity and 
foreign exchange bottleneck.
Figure 6: Remitting Behavior in Crisis Periods, 1992–2009, Monthly Million USD
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT.
The 2000/1  crisis  were  the  financial  crises  that  originated  from the fragile 
structure of the Turkish banking system. In November 2000, the crisis dam-
aged state banks most due to the increasing size of “duty loss” accumulation 
and the necessity to finance them by short-term domestic bank liabilities. In 
February 2001, private banks were hit hardest because of their sensitivity to ex-
change rate risk.
In the post-2003 period, the Turkish economy followed a “high interest 
rate-low exchange rate-cheap import-high external indebtedness” policy. This 
policy carried the Turkish economy to a real economy crisis in 2008. Another 
major distinction between the 2008 crises and the previous two is about the 
duration of them. The 1994 and 2000/1 crises were one-time speculative col-
lapses (temporary) whereas in 2008, the crises are defined as long-term stag-
nation (permanent).
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In managing these three crises, the aim was to exploit remittances as a 
remedy to cushion the negative effects of the crisis on the Turkish economy 
but this consideration did not translate effectively enough into policies.
Comparing the patterns of remittance flows in the post-crisis eras gives 
us hints about the changing motivations of workers in remitting their savings 
in Turkey.
Figure 6 marks the three periods of consecutive crises from 1992 to 2009. 
In the post-1994 period, it is possible to observe a distinct increasing trend in 
the amount of remittance flows to Turkey. However, this trend is dramatically 
changing after the 2000–2001 crisis. The declining trend, which has already 
been observable since 1998, has become even stronger and reached its lowest 
level by the end of 2002. It is difficult to make observations about the post-
2008 crisis period, since it is very recent and its effects are still not completely 
over. However, for the year 2009, we can at least argue that the Turkish econo-
my did not experience any significant increase in the volume of remittances.
Reasons behind this dramatic change in trends are various. Firstly, it can 
be partly explained by the level of migrants’ trust in the future of the Turkish 
economy. Each crisis made the investment motives weaker due to the instabil-
ity and fragility of both banking and real sectors. Secondly, this pattern might 
be further strengthened by a more general shift in the motives to remit from 
altruism to strategic behavior, concerning the second and third generations of 
migrants investing in their own businesses in the host country. In the 1990s, 
Turkish migrants still showed strong family ties with their relatives left in the 
home country  and used to increase the scope of their family support during 
times of economic downturns. Yet in the 2000s, strategic motives seem to pre-
vail over the altruistic ones and since remittances are used to finance invest-
ments, the interest in investing in such an unstable country like Turkey de-
clined. 
Conclusion 
The results of this paper are not only of academic interest but also carry crucial 
policy implications. Looking at the early migration history of Turkey, it is pos-
sible to conclude that Turkey’s approach to the migration issues in the 1960s 
and 1970s were quite positive. In those years, migration had been considered as 
an  opportunity  and  there  was  a  common  belief  that  development  targets 
Causes and Consequences of the Downturn in Financial Remittances to Turkey 157
might be achieved thanks to labor migration to Europe via an efficient use of 
workers’ remittances. However, there occurred an imbalance between the wills 
and targets and the actual migration policies. Martin (1991) argues that it was 
not until the 1970s that the Turkish state recognized the importance of migra-
tion and began to implement policies about it. However, this recognition coin-
cided  with  the halting  of  the  recruitment  of  foreign workers  (in  Germany) 
from outside of Europe in 1973. In 1983, the “Voluntary Repatriation Encourage-
ment Act” was introduced through which migrants were provided with finan-
cial incentives to return home. Later on, labor migration was accused of failing 
to have positive effects on the Turkish economy. However, the role of the Turk-
ish state in this failure is rarely touched upon in the literature. Taking lessons 
from the past, Turkey ought to implement several policy measures in order to 
pull  the  amount  of  remittance  flows  back to  its  early  1990s  levels. Among 
them, sound economic stability has the priority since, together with a stable 
political atmosphere, it would encourage Turkish workers abroad to invest in 
their home country and plan to return there in the future. Maximization of 
gains from remittances should stand at the core of policy decisions. Maintain-
ing and advancing these gains will be the main policy challenge in the near fu-
ture. A necessity for a shift in perceiving remittances as an external finance for 
the Turkish economy is urgent. 
Put  together, our  analysis  suggests  that  the  decline  in  remittances 
might  be  due to  different  coexisting  reasons. New generations of  migrants 
have weaker ties with Turkey and they are progressively moving from the re-
turn idea to the willingness of settling permanently in the host country and 
investing in their own businesses there. At the same time, the contraction in 
remittance flows after the last two financial crises that hit Turkey in the 2000s 
shows that even if the investment motives could still play a role in determin-
ing remittance behavior, the instability of the Turkish economy and the con-
sequent loss of trustworthiness probably played a key role in negatively influ-
encing migrants’ attitude towards remittances. 
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Bordering the EU: Istanbul  as a Hotspot for  
Transnational  Migration
Barbara Pusch
Due to the large-scale migration from Turkey to Europe in general, and to Ger-
many in particular, since the 1960s, Turkey has primarily been regarded as a 
migrant-sending country. This  image of  Turkey characterizes, however, only 
one aspect of the reality of Turkish migration. From a very general perspective, 
we can distinguish two phases in Turkish migration history: migration into 
the Ottoman Empire and the young Turkish Republic, and current global mi-
gration movements to Turkey.
In  this  context,  it  has  to  be  stated  firstly  that  Turkey  received  over 
1,445,000 migrants  of  the Muslim religion and/or  Turkish descent between 
1870 and 1920. In addition to this, 836,826 migrants from the Balkans alone 
settled in Turkey in the first years of the Republic.1 This  migration flow in-
cluded the population exchange with Greece and Bulgaria and was used as a 
tool for the homogenization of the population in the young Republic during 
the nation-building process. Parallel to the settlement of migrants of Turkish 
descent, we can also observe resettlement, displacement and  annihilation of 
non-Muslims in Turkey.
Since the 1980s, the nature of migration flows to Turkey has changed dra-
matically. From the 1980s onwards, estimates put the numbers at up to 1 mil-
lion (transit-) migrants from Iran, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi (transit-) mi-
grants  and  refugees, three  hundred thousand  Turks  from Bulgaria, suitcase 
traders,  circular  migrants  and  clandestine  workers  from  Eastern  European 
countries and the former USSR, transit migrants and refugees from the Middle 
East and Africa as well as an increasing number of mainly regular migrants 
1 Kirişçi (1998, p. 63).
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from the Western world.2 All in all, we can say that the migration flows to-
wards Turkey have become much more diverse compared to their earlier coun-
terparts. We can characterize Turkey today as a migration-sending, receiving 
and transit state.
At the crossroads of Asia, Africa and the European Union (EU), Turkey de-
lineates the global rich from the global poor at the frontier of the EU. In migra-
tory terms, the line between the global rich and global poor is visualized by 
strict  EU migration regulations, spoken  of  literally as  “Fortress  Europe”. The 
geographical and political location of Turkey in general and Istanbul in particu-
lar is fundamental to Turkey’s migration reality.3
Istanbul as a global  city is  a hotspot for  all  the migration movements 
mentioned above.4 Istanbul is listed as an alpha-global city by the GaWC (Glob-
alization and World Cities) research group: a glance at the world map of GaWC 
shows Istanbul as one of the very few economic centers and global cities at the 
frontier of the EU. This location of Istanbul illustrates its great importance in 
the region as center of the global modern economy and its attraction for vari-
ous migrant groups.5
Figure 1: Map of Global Cities According to GaWC 2008
Source: Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network (2008).
2 İçduygu/Kirişçi (2009, pp. 1–179).
3 İçduygu (2008), Kirişçi (2008).
4 İçduygu (2004 a, 2006), Lordoğlu (2008).
5 In my article, "Vom Tellerwäscher zum Millionär: Arbeitsmarktpartizipation von AusländerInnen in der Türkei", I focus on 
the attractiveness of Istanbul for formal and informal labor migrants (Pusch 2010 a, pp. 119–138).
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In this article, I want to analyze various forms of transnational migration to 
Istanbul. After a short overview of recent migration movements to Turkey and 
clarification of the theoretical concepts used in the article, I will focus on Istan-
bul, which is  currently a  rising global  city. Istanbul’s  special  location at  the 
frontier of the EU has boosted this transformation process, which has also led 
to the construction of transnational social spaces in the city. Therefore, as a 
third step, I will focus on this transformation and analyze Istanbul as a hotspot 
for  transnational  migration  movements.  My  expositions  will  basically  be 
based on my own empirical research (Cultural Capital During Migration 2005–
2008)6 and the analysis of other studies published recently by various scholars. 
Migration Movements to Turkey/Istanbul
Migration to Turkey as such, as mentioned above, is not a new phenomenon.7 
The enormous variety of migrants coming to the county, however, is a relat-
ively new trend. According to Ahmet İçduygu and Kristen Biehl,8 we can state 
four main groups  of  foreign migrants  in  Turkey: regular  migrants,  irregular  
labor migrants, irregular transit migrants and asylum seekers and refugees.
Regular  migrants represent  only  a  small  minority  within  the  large 
variety of migrant types in Turkey. In 2008, only 174,926 foreigners – which is 
only 0.25 % of the whole population in the country – obtained a residence per-
mit. As we see in Table 1, residence permits are awarded for work, study or oth-
er reasons such as marriage or parentage. 
6 For the general outline of this project, see http://www.cultural-capital.net. For research results on the Turkish case, see 
Pusch (2010 a, 2010 b) and Weiß et al. (2010).
7 For a comparison between “old’’ and “new” migrants in Turkey, see Erder (2003). For the legal changes regarding foreig-
ners in Turkey, see Pusch (2008).
8 İçduygu/Biehl (2009, pp. 8–20).
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Table 1: Residence Permits in Turkey (2000–2008)
Residence 
Permits
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total 168,100 161.254 157,670 152,203 155,500 131,594 186,586 183,757 174,926
For work 24,200 22,414 22,556 21,650 27,500 22,130 22,805 25,475 18,900
For study 24,600 23,946 21,548 21,810 15,000 25,240 24,258 22,197 28,597
For other 
reasons 
119,300 114,894 113,566 108,743 113,000 84,224 139,523 135,365 127,429
Source: İçduygu/Biehl (2009, p. 10).
Students mainly come from countries such as Albania, Azerbaijan, Afghani-
stan, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Iraq, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Mongolia, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan  and  Turkmenistan.9 Residence  and 
work permit holders are however in general highly qualified professionals in 
prestige jobs and do not primarily come from the main countries of origin of 
migrants in Turkey but partly from the global North and other countries with 
transition economies. These migrants mainly represent the economic elite in 
Turkey. Turkey opens up its doors to this elite in the hope of profiting from 
their knowledge and/or their direct investments. The main regulations in the 
new Law on Foreigners’ Work Permits  from  2003  and  its  amendment10 are 
aimed at simplifying the bureaucratic procedure for obtaining working per-
mits  for  these highly qualified short-term professionals. Thus, in  all  official 
documents phrases such as “giving highly qualified foreigners the possibility 
to work” are used.11 
Irregular labor migrants12 can be mentioned as the second migrant group 
in Turkey. Their estimated number is much higher than the above-cited num-
ber of regular migrants with work permits and varies, according to different 
9 Ibid. (p. 13).
10 See Law No. 4817 (Yabancıların Çalışma İzini Hakkında Kanun) and Law No. 5665 (Yabancıların Çalışma İzinleri Hakkında 
Kanun ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun). 
11 Pusch (2010 a).
12 For more detailed information on irregular labor migrants in Turkey, see İçduygu (2006, 2004).
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researchers, between several hundred thousand and one million.13 This means 
that a share of up to 4.3 % of the active population in Turkey consists of a for-
eign work-force. Their exact number is, however, not known. Estimations are 
based on entry statistics for foreigners and statistics on apprehended irregular 
migrants.  Irregular  labor  migrants  mainly  come  from  Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.14 In 
general, they enter Turkey legally with tourist visas. However, they become ir-
regular by taking up work without work permit and/or overstaying their tour-
ist  visas or  without prolonging their  visas. The share of female migrants is 
much higher in this group than in other migrant groups in Turkey. Irregular 
labor migrants are often the subject of circular migration and repeatedly move 
between their home country and Turkey. Sectors such as domestic work, sex 
and entertainment,15 textiles, construction and some service  sectors  provide 
these migrants temporary jobs.16 In this context, it has to be stated that they do 
not plan to settle in Turkey but want to make some money to improve their 
lives in the country of origin. However, during their stay in Turkey they also set 
up various types of transnational spaces between Turkey and their country of 
origin. 
According to the financial aims of irregular labor migrants, the reasons 
for participating in the Turkish labor market differ enormously between them 
and the officially registered foreigners. While highly skilled professionals are 
generally sent by their global acting companies abroad, Turkey has become an 
attractive country for clandestine immigrant workers of the former Soviet Bloc. 
This rising attractiveness is inter alia related to Turkey’s relatively liberal visa 
policy for this group compared to the strict regulations in the EU and the fact 
that the Turkish economy offers more job possibilities and better wages than 
their countries of origin.17 
The third group of migrants in Turkey involves irregular transit migrants18 
who come to Turkey mainly from the Middle East (Iran and Iraq) and from 
13 İçduygu/Kirişçi (2009, p. 11).
14 Ibid. (p. 15).
15 In this context, it has to be mentioned that many women are trafficked. For a detailed report on this issue, see Erder/Kaş-
ka (2003).
16 İçduygu (2004 a, 2006).
17 Pusch (2010 a).
18 First studies on transit migrants were conducted by Ahmet İçduygu (1995, 2003). For a comparison of these two studies, 
see İçduygu/Biehl (2009).
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Asia and Africa. Many of them are smuggled into Turkey.19 Others arrive legally 
with tourist visas but drift into illegality by overstaying in Turkey without extend-
ing their visa or trying to enter a third country without proper papers. Unlike the 
informal labor migrants, these transit migrants use Turkey as a hub for further mi-
gration. In order to earn the money necessary for the onward migration, which, 
due to its clandestine nature, is often very expensive, transit migrants also parti-
cipate in various niches of the Turkish labor market. They primarily work in the 
construction, textile and agriculture sectors, as day or seasonal workers.20
The fourth group of migrants are asylum seekers and refugees. Until 2000, 
most asylum seekers were from Iran and Iraq. Although the majority of asylum 
seekers in Turkey are still from these two countries, the countries of origin of 
asylum seekers in Turkey today have much diversified. As Table 2 indicates, the 
number of asylum seekers was about 4,000 between 2000 and 2006 and has 
tripled in the last years. 
Table 2: Asylum Applications in Turkey (1997−2008)
Source: UNHCR Ankara Office, cited in İçduygu/Biehl (2009, p. 46).
19 İçduygu (2004 b).
20 İçduygu (2004 a, 2006).
Year Iranians Iraqis Other Total
Cases Persons Cases Persons Cases Persons Cases Persons
1997 746 1,392 1,275 2,939 83 117 2,104 4,448
1998 1,169 1,979 2,350 4,672 124 187 3,643 6,838
1999 2,069 3,843 1,148 2,472 184 290 3,401 6,605
2000 2,125 3,926 791 1,671 108 180 3,024 5,777
2001 1,841 3,485 497 998 372 709 2,710 5,177
2002 1,456 2,505 402 974 219 315 2,077 3,794
2003 1,715 3,092 159 342 373 514 2,247 3,948
2004 1,225 2,030 472 956 540 912 2,237 3,898
2005 1,021 1,716 490 1,047 753 1,151 2,264 3,914
2006 1,343 2,297 364 722 1,094 1,534 2,801 4,553
2007 1,024 1,668 1,738 3,470 1,651 2,502 4,413 7,640
2008 2,116 6,904 3,960 12,980
Total 15,734 27,933 9,732 20,265 5,501 8,414 30,921 56,561
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Turkey has signed the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol and thus 
has to grant asylum, protection and rights to refugees on its territory. Never-
theless, Turkey is one of the few countries left that sticks to the “geographical 
limitation” clause. This means that Turkey provides asylum only to European 
refugees, whereas non-European refugees are only allowed to stay in Turkey 
temporarily. They are provided protection under the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) extended mandate. Due to the geographical 
limitations, non-European refugees can apply for asylum at the UNHCR and 
are  resettled to  a  third  country if  they are  recognized  as  having a  right  of 
asylum by the UNHCR. When their application for asylum is rejected, most of 
them try informal ways to reach the West. Therefore, it can be argued that Tur-
key is for most of the non-European asylum seekers – like for transit migrants – 
a stop-over. Only very few rejected asylum seekers return to their country of 
origin and only some remain in Turkey irregularly.21 
During the procedure for gaining the right of asylum, non-Europeans are 
placed under control in 30 satellite cities in Turkey, where local authorities and 
humanitarian associations are assigned to provide a minimum of their eco-
nomic needs.22 However, as this assistance is very limited, social networks are 
lacking and informal working opportunities are rare in these cities, asylum 
seekers often leave these cities for Istanbul and thereby fall into irregularity 
even during the formal waiting process. 
Apart from the above-mentioned examples, we can also state  migrants  
with “Turkish backgrounds” from abroad. This heterogeneous group of migrants 
consists  on  the  one  hand  of  ethnic  Turks  such  as  members  of  the  Turkish 
minority  from Bulgaria, who fled to  Turkey in  1989 and have obtained the 
Turkish citizenship easily after settling in Turkey due to specific regulations.23 
On  the  other  hand,  so-called  return-migrants  or  (grand-)children  of  re-
turn-migrants from Europe have to be mentioned in this category. While some 
of these returnees are Turkish citizens, others obtain a double-citizenship or 
are in possession of a foreign citizenship. Both of these groups are generally 
not reflected in the typology of migrants in Turkey because of their Turkish 
21 Kirişçi (2002, 2005), Danış et al. (2009).
22 Özgür-Baklacıoğlu (2011).
23 For the regulations, see the Citizenship Laws (Law No. 403 [Vatandaşlık Kanunu] and its amendment Law No. 5901 [Türk 
Vatandaşlığı Kanunu]) and the Settlement Laws (Law No. 2510 [İskan Kanunu] and its amendment Law No. 5543 [İskan Ka-
nunu]). The practice of neutralization has, however, changed in the last years. The legislative authority progressively refrains 
from the positive discrimination of migrants with a Turkish background (Parla 2007, Danış/Parla 2009).
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background and their legal (Turkish citizenship or  mavi kart) status.24 In this 
context, it has to be stated that “Turkish background” refers to “Turkish citizen-
ship” for  the  second  group  and  points  out  “Turkish  ethnicity” for  the  first 
group. However, as I will show later both of these groups that have to be taken 
into consideration within an article on transnational social spaces in Turkey.   
The short overview above shows that the four groups of migrants are not 
mutually exclusive and the lines between the different types of migrants are 
blurred as the legal status of migrants can easily change within their migra-
tion biographies. Regular  migrants, for  instance, can  fall  into  irregularity  if 
they  cannot  renew  their  permits.  Or  asylum  seekers  can  become  irregular 
transit migrants if their application is rejected and they do not intend to return 
to their country of origin but stay in Turkey for a while and then try to enter a 
EU-country illegally. 
In addition, it has to be stated that irregularity of residence and/or work-
ing status characterizes the life of the vast majority of migrants in Turkey.25 
Contrary to migrants in the EU, however, irregularity does not only mark the 
life of migrants in precarious and poor working and living conditions but also 
migrants in relatively well-paid and prestigious jobs and fairly stable circum-
stances. In  my  empirical  work,  I  exemplify  this  with  three  impressive  ex-
amples: a German business woman, who set up a textile  business and em-
ployed up to 300 workers while having no work permit herself; an Austrian 
academic, who was employed and paid by a Turkish state university for more 
than a year without having legal working papers and a biologist with EU-citi-
zenship who had a good position in a Turkish pharmaceutical/chemical com-
pany.26 Thus, we can regard irregularity in the words of Fragues (2009) as nor-
mality among migrants in Turkey. 
Since ambivalent relationships to the country of origin and the country 
of migration, sequential or ambivalent time frames for migration and religious, 
political, economic or organizational reasons for migration are for Pries27 the 
main characteristics of transnational migrants, we can include transnational 
24 The mavi kart is a Turkish ID-card, which guarantees holders all the rights of Turkish citizens except the right to active 
and passive voting. Thus, they do not face the juridical limitations foreigners face and they do not need any work or resi-
dence permits.
25 Pusch (2010 a, 2011).
26 Pusch (2010 b, 2011).
27 Pries (2010, p. 59).
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migrants in all the above-mentioned groups.28 As a result of their ambiguous 
view-points and practices, the above-mentioned migrants groups in Istanbul 
can be included socially and spatially in various ways. 
Last but not least, it has to be stated that Istanbul has become the hot 
spot of all these various migration movements. While Istanbul provides the ex-
clusive  cultural, economic and social  infrastructure  for  the formal  migrants 
who mainly belong to the socio-economic global elite, it also offers a variety of 
informal networks and working possibilities for their informal counterparts. 
Other areas and cities such as the Black Sea region, Antalya or the South Coast 
of Turkey are characterized as primarily seasonal centers of migration in the 
specific literature.
Istanbul: A Global City at the Frontier of the EU
Global cities are important urban nodes in the global economic system. Ac-
cording to Sassen,29 global cities function in four ways: “as highly concentrated 
command points in organization of the world economy; … as key locations for 
finance and for special service firms, which have replaced manufacturing as 
the leading economic sectors; … as sites of production, including the production 
of innovations, in these leading industries; and … as markets for products and 
innovations produced”.
For  the  integration  of  a  city  into  the  global  world  economy, however, 
competitiveness is of high importance. According to Eraydın (2008), the com-
petitiveness of a city lies in the intersection of different types of global net-
works, global command functions, capital accumulation and concentration of 
specialized producer services. In particular, these main aspects of competitive-
ness are the increasing attraction of cities due to increasing global functions, 
the increasing knowledge and innovation and production for external markets, 
the technological capabilities and innovation in high-tech activities, the inte-
gration  in  the  global  economy  by  mixed  strategies  (both  traditional  and 
new/high-technology economic activities).  In  this  context, Eraydın connects 
competitiveness with the cheap labor resources to the labor market. She ar-
gues that the competitiveness of a city leads to massive migration and employ-
28 For a general classification of various migrant types, see the chapter “Istanbul as Hot Spot for Transnational Migration” in 
this article.
29 Sassen (2001, pp. 3–4).
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ment opportunities for both skilled and unskilled workers. Parallel to this de-
velopment, she states that both the increasing opportunities for skilled man-
power and people with talents in formal work positions and various employ-
ment  opportunities  in  low-wage  and  informal  work,  leads  to  social 
pluralization  and  ethnic  segregation, as  well  as  increasing  flexibility  of  the 
available work-force.30 Sassen (1988) also observes a close connection between 
the expansion of the global economy and the expanding number of interna-
tional  labor  migrants  and stresses the often precarious legal  and socio-eco-
nomic status of migrants, which pulls them towards low-status, labor-inten-
sive and often informal  jobs. According to  her, many of  these international 
labor migrants serve as an “auxiliary army” and buffer the economic situation 
within the modern global economy, which, among other factors, is based on 
the flexibility of labor. As such, she sees immigrant workers as an essential ele-
ment of the modern global economy. 
A glance at the development of Istanbul indicates very well that Istanbul 
has become a global competitive city: with its 13.2 million31 inhabitants and its 
fast-growing economy, Istanbul is listed as a global city by the GaWC research 
group today. Although Istanbul has been the center of  the national  Turkish 
economy for most of its history, the global economic functions have increased 
enormously during the last years. This phenomenon can be explained by the 
increasing service sector as well as the import and export shares: in 2006, for 
instance, 56.4 % of the people in Istanbul were employed in the service sector, 
which is a very high share compared to Turkey’s average of 48.2 %;32 and the 
export volume of Istanbul grew from 8,000 million USD in 1994 to 35,042 in 
2006.33 This increase is also reflected in the international ranking of Istanbul. 
The city Istanbul alone would be the 17th highest on the list of export incomes 
of all EU-countries34 and was considered as the 34th richest city in the world in 
2005.35 According to  the forecast of  Price  Waterhouse Coopers, Istanbul  will 
even become the 27th richest city in the world in 2020.36 
30 Eraydın (2008, pp. 1668–1691).
31 These are the official numbers published by the Turkish Statistical Institute recently.
32 IDO (2008, p. 46).
33 Ibid. (p. 52).
34 ITO (2008 b, p. 40).
35 Ibid. (p. 45).
36 Ibid. (p. 44).
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In addition, Istanbul’s unique location and the huge hinterland extending 
from Eastern Europe to the Black Sea region and from the Middle East to Cen-
tral Asia has to be mentioned, as it provides Istanbul a large market. Proximity 
to the EU is, however, not only important in terms of an easily reachable hot 
spot for goods and producer services but also in terms of an attractive location 
for  foreign  direct  investment  and  an  out-sourcing  location  for  production, 
since the work-force is cheaper and environmental rules are less strictly imple-
mented than in the EU. 
Figure 2: Foreign Direct Investments in Turkey in Million USD (1995–2009)
Source: T. C. Başbakanlık Hazine Müsteşarlığı (2010, p. 12).
Particularly, since Turkey and the EU started full membership negotiations in 
2005, we can state an enormous increase in foreign direct investments. While 
there were 8,192 foreign direct investments set up between 1954 and 2004 the 
number of all foreign direct investments in Turkey grew up to 23,620 in the 
year 2009.37 More than half (55 %) of all these foreign direct investments are 
located in Istanbul today.38 Anyhow, a glance at the newly set up foreign direct 
investments in the year 2009 emphasizes the growing importance of Istanbul 
even more: 89.58 % of all new foreign direct investments in Turkey were set up 
37 T. C. Başbakanlık Hazine Müsteşarlığı (2010, p. 24).
38 Ibid. (p. 35).
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in Istanbul in 2009.39 As illustrated in Figure 2, there was also an enormous in-
crease in foreign capital until the global crises. While the foreign direct invest-
ment was only 1,082 million USD in 2002 it rose to 22,047 million USD at its 
peak in 2007. Although these figures are still low compared to the amount of 
investments in the top-tier global cities, the enormous increase in foreign dir-
ect investments must be noted. This increase points out Istanbul’s new attrac-
tiveness for the global economy and indicates its potential for further develop-
ment. 
Over recent decades, Istanbul’s population has exploded from 5.8 million 
in 198540 to 13.2 million in 2010. Although this population increase is mainly re-
lated to internal migration movements in Turkey, the high share of foreign mi-
grants in Istanbul should not be ignored either. All these newcomers contrib-
ute to the global labor market in Istanbul, which is marked by the demand of 
the all-embracing labor flexibility, cost reduction and informalization.41 
The fact that about 45 % of the whole and 30 % of the non-agrarian work-
force in Turkey is informal (TUİK 2009) indicates the cheap and flexible labor. 
In this context, Ahmet İçduygu42 argues that “the informalization of labor has 
flourished and has been adopted by many small and medium-sized enterprises 
as  a  survival  strategy  to  cope  with  economic  crisis, fierce  competition  and 
heavy tax burdens on employers. The insertion of irregular foreign labor into 
the informal economy is neither entirely hidden nor entirely in line with the 
legal requirements of a formal economy, but an integral part of the Turkish 
economy”. Nevertheless, according to Ahmet İçduygu,43 migrants do not create 
the informal conditions but they come into this picture after these conditions 
are created. They do less desirable jobs generated by informalization, and this 
leads to a decline in the costs of production of formal industries. In doing so, 
they facilitate informal production and engage in the distribution of certain 
activities. 
39 Ibid. (p. 22).
40 ITO (2008, p. 13).
41 The new Labour Law (Law No. 4857) from 2003 and its recent amendments within the "Torba Yasası" (literally:  "Bag 
Law") illustrates that increasing flexibility is also demanded in formal working conditions. For the liberal developments in 
Turkey in general, see Mültevellioğlu and Sönmez (2009); for the impacts of the liberal developments on the Turkish labor 
market, see Mültevellioğlu and Işık (2009); for the effects of Turkish neo-liberalism on the foreign work-force, see Toksöz 
(2007).
42 İçduygu (2006, p. 13).
43 Ibid. (p. 11).
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The  global  economy  does  not  only  demand  flexible  workers  but  also 
cheap skilled and unskilled labor. While the majority of the internal migrants 
from the rural areas compose, in general, the unskilled local masses, big cities 
like Istanbul also have a skilled workforce with foreign language skills avail-
able.44 In addition to this, international migrants (often with higher skills than 
their Turkish counterparts) from different countries of origin are seeking work 
opportunities in Istanbul.45 So-called “highly skilled return-migrants” from the 
EU, especially Germany, can be mentioned as a rising transnational labor po-
tential. As they do not need work permits due to their Turkish descent, they oc-
cupy a special place in the international labor migration to Istanbul.46
Last but not least, Istanbul’s changing image from an oriental to a “cool” 
city47 offers the global elites an attractive place to live, where they can fulfill 
their often quite sophisticated cultural and social ambitions. For the bottom of 
the local and foreign workforce, Istanbul – like all other global cities – offers vari-
ous  opportunities  for  informal  lives  such  as  informal  jobs, networking  and 
housing possibilities. 
Istanbul as Hotspot for Transnational Migration
Global  cities  are  the  centers  of  the  global  economy  and  accommodate  the 
whole range of actors in the global modern economy from the very top to the 
very bottom. They are therefore places of extremes and encompass not only 
various groups of natives but also of migrants.48 Within this setting global cities 
are not only centers of the global economy but also provide various spaces for 
transnational  identities,  life-styles  and  formal  and  informal  organizations. 
Istanbul is the center of the global economy in Turkey. Thus, transnational so-
cial spaces in Turkey are predominantly set up in Istanbul. 
Transnational migration is defined as a “process by which immigrants 
forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social  relations that link to-
gether their societies of origin and settlement”.49 Accordingly, “transnational 





49 Schiller et al. (1997, p. 121).
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migration emphasizes the on-going and continuing ways in which current-day 
immigrants construct and reconstitute their simultaneous embeddedness in 
more than one society”.50 By doing so they set up pluri-local and cross-border 
practices, which are referred to as “transnational  social  spaces”. As  a result, 
transnational  social  spaces  differ  from  national  container-space  concepts, 
which are based on the assumption that social and territorial spaces overlap. 
Although transnational spaces are strongly determined by national structures, 
they are not constructed by them, but by economically, politically and cultur-
ally acting people – it is thus also labelled as “transnationalism from below”.51
However, over  recent  years  the  term  “transnational” has  become  very 
popular. For this reason, Ludger Pries points out that this term has become a 
trendy catch-all.52 In order to overcome this pitfall of popularity, he suggests a 
conceptual precision and more explicit empirical research. Yet, transnational 
social spaces are not simply set up by people’s frequent border crossing but 
also by relatively immobile persons who, for instance, use modern communi-
cation technologies to contract their families abroad or send remittances to 
their country of origin.53 Correspondingly Ludger Pries54 differentiates between 
transnational relations (e.g., internet-based music communities), transnational 
networks (e.g., internet-based alumni networks or transnational women’s or-
ganizations)  and  transnational  social  spaces  (e.g.,  periodic  contract  through 
visits of transnational families) according to the density of contacts. In other 
words, we can say that transnational social spaces differ from transnational re-
lations and networks in their denseness and durability. 
Furthermore, Ludger Pries (2010) notes three ideal types of social spaces 
for transnational studies: everyday life, organizations and institutions. In this 
context, he remarks that everyday life focuses on the micro-level, organizations 
on the meso-level and institutions on the macro-level of transnational social 
spaces. In his explorations, he enumerates, for example, transnational families 
and aging in transnational networks for the micro-level, border-crossing mi-
grants’ organizations for the meso-level and transnational labor markets and 
transnational institutions for the macro-level. 
50 Ibid.
51 Pries (2008), Smith/Guarnizo (1999).
52 Pries (2007, p. 2010).
53 Faist (2000, pp. 9–56).
54 Pries (2010, pp. 29–31).
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Pries also distinguishes four types of migration (emigration/immigration, 
return migration, diaspora-migration and transit-migration) in his typology of 
migration. These four types, which are essential for the following evaluation of 
transnational social spaces in Istanbul, are based on the following four dimen-
sions: relation to the country/region of origin, relation to the country/region of 
settlement, typical migration context and time frame of migration. Table 3 il-
lustrates these dimensions for each type of migration very clearly. 
Table 3: Four Ideal Types of Migration
Ideal Type Relation to region 
of origin
Relation region of 
settlement
Typical context of 
migration 






























Source: Pries (2010, p. 59).
Along with Sema Erder and Deniz Yükseker (2009) a lack of theoretical debate 
has to be stated in studies about in-migration to Turkey. In accordance with 
this, a general lack of transnational phenomena has also been highlighted only 
casually. Due to this shortage of specific studies, I will exemplify some transna-
tional social spaces in Istanbul according to various indicators of their exist-
ence among the four ideal types of migrant groups (regular and irregular labor 
and  transit  migrants  as  well  as  refugees  and  asylum  seekers)  mentioned 
above. 
Aspects of Regular Migrants’ Transnationality in Istanbul
Although regular transnational migrants constitute the clear minority of for-
eigners  in Turkey or  Istanbul  respectively, the  category of  regular  migrants 
consists of a huge range of different foreigners. Foreigners, who live with legal 
residence (and work) permits in Turkey, consist of various groups such as dip-
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lomats, posted personnel and foreign spouses of Turkish citizens, etc. However, 
as  many  of  those  foreigners  can  be  considered  as  diaspora-migrants,55 the 
number of regular transit  migrants is  even smaller. To the group of regular 
transnational  migrants  belong, for  example, foreign spouses of  Turkish citi-
zens, labor migrants and businessmen with official working papers who have 
come to Turkey individually and were not posted by international firms, etc. 
However, despite the small number of transnational migrants in Turkey, we 
can observe that they have set up various transnational everyday lives, organi-
zations and institutions. 
The studies on EU-citizens in Turkey56 in general and German citizens in 
particular indicate this phenomenon very well.57 Their transnational everyday 
lives are mainly dominated by their transnational families and/or their jobs. In 
this context, for instance, visits to and from their family of origin, support of 
and from the family of origin in exceptional circumstances (illness, birth, etc.) 
for  transnational  family  networking,  transnational  working  conditions  or 
transnational-acting small  businesses can exemplify transnational  labor  as-
pects for this group. On the meso-level, organizations such as the Network of 
Foreign  Spouses,  the  IWI  (International  Women  of  Istanbul)  and  the  asso-
ciation Die Brücke can be mentioned. For the lives of regular transnational Ger-
man migrants in Istanbul, the association Die Brücke can be cited as most im-
portant  organization58 since  this  association  not  only  networks  between 
different German-speaking groups (preliminary women) in Turkey and Ger-
many and lobbies for better legal status of Germans in Turkey, but was also 
one of the main initiators of a transnational institution – the Avrupa Koleji – 
Europa Kolleg.59 The Avrupa Koleji specifically aims to enroll children from bi-
national Turkish and German speaking families as well as re-migrant Turkish 
families in Istanbul and wants to facilitate access to both the German and the 
Turkish cultures and societies. Thus, we may conclude, in line with Pries, that 
55 Pries (2007, 2010).
56 Kaiser (2001, p. 2003).
57 Erbaş (2006), Kaiser (2003, 2004, 2008), Saksak (2003), Radt (2006), Özbek (2008), Pusch (2006).
58 Die Brücke (2011). For analysis of this association, see in particular Radt (2006) and Kaiser (2003).
59 Avrupa Koleji – Europa Kolleg (2011). For a short analysis of the school, see also Kaiser (2004). Interestingly, the two Ger-
man schools in Istanbul, the Botschaftsschule and the Deutsches Gymanisum, reject these growing target groups of re-mi-
grants and bi-national families, which is leading to various conflicts in the German community in Istanbul in general and 
the schools in particular (for an insight in this problematic see, Pusch [forthcoming b]). 
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this  school  is  one  of  the  few  transnational  German-Turkish  institutions  in 
Istanbul. 
Another example of a transnational set-up by regular migrants resident 
in Turkey is  the newspaper  Tur Press Panorama, which was formally estab-
lished in 2004 by a Ukrainian engineer in Istanbul. This paper provides an in-
teresting example of such organizations because, although its founder is a reg-
ular  migrant, its  readership  is  primarily  informal  labor  migrants  from  the 
former USSR as well as Turkish citizens interested in those countries. The pa-
per is published bilingually in Turkish and Russian and provides its readers 
with a wide range of different information and advertisements. In this public-
ation, one can access  travel  information  to  various  countries  of  the  former 
USSR, missing person’s reports, news on changing laws for foreigners as well 
as “lonely heart” advertisements. As the owner of the paper puts it: “The paper 
is an independent medium with close ties to all embassies [of the countries of 
the former USSR; BP] and various small and big businessmen ...”. The paper ad-
dresses all Russian-speaking people in Turkey and is distributed free of charge 
in embassies, airplanes and various places in Turkey and the countries of the 
former USSR. Although the owner does not describe his newspaper as transna-
tional, we can clearly define it as such since it primarily distributes informa-
tion to people operating in transnational circumstances.
Characteristics of Irregular Labor Migrants’ Transnationality
As mentioned above, irregular  labor migrants  in Turkey are mainly female. 
They come primarily from the countries of the former USSR and Central Asia 
and work in sectors such as domestic work, sex and entertainment. The scien-
tific  literature, however, predominantly  focuses  on  women  in the  domestic 
sector.60 Although  the  authors  discuss  various  transnational  dimensions  in 
their lives and family, they do not label them as transnational. 
In my empirical work on the usage of cultural capital during migration, I 
also interviewed a domestic worker, who was working as a care nurse for the 
elderly  in  a  private  upper-middle  class  household  in  Istanbul. She  came  to 
Istanbul approximately six years ago. The reason for her decision to come Tur-
key was related to her bad financial situation in her country of origin: Ukraine. 
After the death of her husband, she had to care for her two daughters alone. 
60 Güler (2011), Kaşka (2006, 2007), Akalın (2007, 2008), Eder (2007), Kümbetoğlu (2005).
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Due to the economic situation in Ukraine, she was not able to find a job where 
she could earn enough money to finance her daughters’ education in her home 
country and thus decided to take up a job as domestic worker abroad. Since it 
was too difficult to go to the EU because of the strict visa regulations, she came 
to  Turkey/Istanbul.  In  Istanbul,  she  has  been  working  as  domestic  worker 
without any work permit or social insurance. Her residence status is irregular, 
as well, since she always overstays her two-month tourist visa. Because the 
travel costs and the fines she has to pay for overstaying when she leaves the 
country are, compared to her earnings, rather high, she travels to Ukraine only 
sporadically to see her daughters. Thus, we may conclude that the main bonds 
to her daughters are based on her sense of responsibility, which she expresses 
materially with the remittances. Although this woman has to be characterized 
as  return-migrant  in  terms of  Ludger  Pries, her  family  relations  are  clearly 
transnational.
Biographies of other irregular labor migrants feature, however, even more 
transnational aspects. A Bulgarian engineer, interviewed by the author during 
the above-mentioned research project, can be cited in this context. This man 
came to Istanbul in order to work in a small-scale manufacturing company. 
Unlike many other Bulgarian migrants in Turkey, he is not of Turkish descent 
and thus did not interpret his step to Turkey as “return to the motherland”. Un-
employment, economic  crisis  and  lack  of  hope  for  economic  improvement 
were the reasons for him coming to Turkey 14 years ago. His family (his wife, 
son and daughter) stayed in his home town in Bulgaria, which is about 480 km 
away from his work place in Istanbul. In order to see his family and provide 
them with money, he has been driving to his hometown approximately once a 
month. The subsequent migration of his family was never a serious issue of 
discussion since his wife has had a less-paid but permanent teacher position 
and would not be able to find a comparable job in Turkey. In addition, my in-
terviewee wanted his children to have a Bulgarian education. Now, many years 
after coming to Turkey, the children are nearly finishing school and the Bul-
garian economy has improved – but he is not thinking of going back. He ex-
plains this temporary decision to stay with arguments such as “I have gotten 
used to my working environment in Turkey”, “when I go back to Bulgaria, I 
may find a similar paid job, but again I will not be able to stay with my family 
because in our region there is no productive industry” and “it is not so far to 
visit my family”. In addition to this, he wants his son to come to Istanbul for a 
university education. His answer to my question about future plans was am-
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biguous. He likes Istanbul, although he is not able to participate in the cultural 
life there, but wants to give his son the taste of city air. On the other hand, he 
also likes his home in Bulgaria. However, he can imagine neither going back 
to Bulgaria permanently, nor setting up a life with his family in Istanbul. Dur-
ing the whole interview, he seemed to feel no pressure to make a decision yet 
and seemed to be happy to have rational reasons for delaying a decision and 
continuing his life in his transnational Bulgarian-Turkish space. 
Although we can observe transnational social  spaces of irregular labor 
migrants mainly on the family level, there are also examples at the organiza-
tional and institutional level. The Armenian “school” in the Kumkapı district of 
Istanbul may be mentioned in this context. In addition to the long-established 
Armenian minority  with  Turkish citizenship  in  Turkey, Armenian migrants 
from Armenia have come to Istanbul in the last decades. Similar to their coun-
terparts from other countries, they generally enter Turkey with a one-month 
tourist visa. By overstaying their visas and taking up employment in the in-
formal sector, their status becomes, however, irregular.61 Many Armenian in-
formal workers have come to Istanbul with their  children, or  their  children 
were  born  in  Turkey.  Thus,  their  children  also  have  an  irregular  residence 
status in Turkey, which prevents them from participating in the formal school 
system. In order to guarantee these children some primary education as well 
as provide for childcare and care for the children while their mothers are work-
ing, a former teacher from Armenia began to informally teach seven children 
in the basement of a Protestant Church. Today, seven teachers instruct 70 pu-
pils from grade one to five. Since this “school” is neither officially recognized in 
Turkey nor in Armenia, the children do not receive any certificates.62 In general 
terms, this “school” can be described as an informal educational establishment 
for Armenian children with informal residence status in Turkey. However, a 
closer look at this informal institution shows us that it is a transnational or-
ganization. While the Turkish language is the lingua franca among Armenian 
children in Istanbul, one of the general aims of this initiative is to prepare the 
children for a possible return to Armenia. In other words, this “school” does not 
clearly prepare the children for a permanent residency in Turkey, but for a pos-
sible (re-)  migration and (re-)  integration into Armenia. In this context, this 
“school” reflects not simply the irregularity of its pupils, but also their ambigu-
61 Rutishauser (2008), Salamoni (2010).
62 For an interview with the teacher, who sets up this “school”, see Ozinian (2011). 
186 Barbara Pusch
ous relation with Armenia and Turkey and the unclear time frame of their dur-
ation in Turkey. This characteristic distinguishes this “school” from other edu-
cational establishments, such as the German Embassy School in Istanbul for 
diaspora-migrants or the above-mentioned Avrupa Koleji. 
Transnational Social Spaces for Transit Migrants and 
Asylum Seekers in Istanbul?
As I have already pointed out above, the lines between regular migrants, irreg-
ular labor migrants, transit migrants and asylum seekers in Turkey are gener-
ally fluid. However, since not all refugees apply in a regular way for asylum, 
and many rejected asylum seekers do not return to their home countries but 
try to enter a EU-country irregularly, the distinction between transit migrants 
and asylum seekers is even more complex. This difficulty is also indirectly re-
flected in various empirical works, in which asylum seekers and transit mi-
grants are often represented in one sample.63
Furthermore,  a  glimpse  at  the  available  studies  also  shows  that  the 
transnational social spaces of transit migrants and asylum seekers have not 
been researched in Turkey yet. As Turkey is for most of them simply a “waiting 
room” for further migration, this lack of research might not be surprising. On 
the  other  hand, transit  migrants  and  asylum  seekers  often  stay  in  Turkey 
longer than they initially have planned, leading to, out of necessity, a variety of 
survival strategies and practices, including the creation of extensive socio-eco-
nomic networks. In this context, Didem Danış states for her research group:64 
“The networks that Iranians mobilize in Istanbul are mostly familial and eth-
nic-religious ones. Familial tries provide a crucial resource for Iranians, as for 
other migrant groups. They utilize and mobilize contacts with family mem-
bers, who are in Istanbul or relatives abroad and at home. Relatives furnish so-
cial, mental, as well as economic assistance that relieve some extent migrants’ 
vulnerability and thus facilitate their survival in Istanbul”. The importance of 
tight family ties is also reflected in other studies: for instance, Ahmet İcduygu 
underlines the importance of relatives in Iranian and Iraqi migrants’ motiva-
63 Yükseker/Brewer (2009, pp. 637–718), Danış et al. (2009, pp. 443–636), İçduygu (2003).
64 Danış (2009, p. 620).
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tion to come to Istanbul.65 In another study,66 he points out that 10 % of inter-
viewed transit migrants were sending money to their families and relatives in 
their home country, 30 % were receiving money from family members abroad 
and 20 % from their families or relatives in their home country. However, a 
simple stroll through districts like Kumkapı or Tarlabaşi in Istanbul, which are 
densely inhabited by irregular migrants, will  turn the visitor’s  attention to-
wards the enormous number of internet-cafes and call-shops with special tele-
phone-fees for the main country of origin of irregular migrants. 
These tight family ties of transit migrants and asylum seekers can be ex-
emplified by an Iranian woman doctor, whom I  interviewed during the re-
search project “Cultural Capital Migration”. This young woman fled Iran with 
her daughter because of spousal abuse and the lack of resources in Iran. In Tur-
key, she applied for asylum at the UNHCR. During the time of my interview 
with her, she had been in Turkey for one and a half years, but her application 
for asylum was pending. Since she did not receive enough financial support 
from the UNHCR and foreign doctors are not allowed to work in Turkey, her 
family sent her 500 USD every month. Besides financial support she received 
much-needed emotional support from her parents who were concerned about 
their daughters’ well-being abroad. Once, when my interviewee had a mental 
break-down, her mother even travelled to Istanbul to care for her daughter and 
grand-daughter. Visits like that are certainly rather unusual among transit mi-
grants and asylum seekers. In this case, it was only possible because of the fin-
ancial means of the interviewee’s family and because of the liberal entry regu-
lations between Turkey and Iran. However, this example illustrates very well 
the  functionality  of  transnational  families: transnational  families  not  only 
manage to stay in contact with one another, but they also cultivate their rela-
tionships at an intimate level. The geographical distance between them poses 
no obstacle for participating in each others’ lives and for providing financial 
and emotional support. 
This and all the other examples in this section indicate intensive contact 
between the transit migrants and asylum seekers in Istanbul and their family 
members who are being left behind. Hence, we may conclude that there is a lot 
of transnational evidence on the micro-level for transit migrants and asylum 
65 İçduygu (2003, p. 33).
66 İçduygu (1995, p. 30).
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seekers in Istanbul. Further research, however, has to be conducted in order to 
specify their transnational social space in more detail.
Transnational Social Spaces of Migrants with a Turkish Background in 
Istanbul
Migrants  with  Turkish  backgrounds  have  also  set  up  transnational  social 
spaces in Istanbul. On the micro-level, transnational family structures of mi-
grants with Turkish backgrounds are remarkably similar to those migrants be-
ing mentioned above. Remittances, regular visits and close emotional relation-
ships  mutual  support  when  needed  should  be  mentioned  in  this  context. 
However, as a result of their legal inclusion in Turkey as well as in their former 
country of residence, they have various possibilities to act and live transna-
tionally. This is illustrated best in their professional lives and their ambivalent 
plans for the future. In my research on international labor migration to Turkey, 
I interviewed a woman of Turkish origin from Bulgaria who came with her 
husband and sons to  Turkey in  1989. Although  she never  considered going 
back to Bulgaria after settling in Istanbul, she ended up working for her son’s 
transnational Turkish-Bulgarian business.67 Another example of ambivalent fu-
ture  plans  characteristic  of  transnational  migrants  are  my  highly  qualified 
“German-Turk” interviewees.  For  example, a  Turkish-German  man  came  to 
Istanbul  because  the  internationally  acting  company  he  was  working  for 
promised him career advancement within a new position in Istanbul. He ac-
cepted the offer and came to Istanbul with his wife and two children approxi-
mately four years ago. After a year of working in this position, he found a bet-
ter job in another company. Although he originally planned to stay in Istanbul 
for only two years, he continued to prolong/expand his stay. When I asked him 
about  his  future  plans  and  his  attitude  about  going  back  to  Germany  he 
answered ironically: “Of course, we often talk about that [re-migration to Ger-
many; B. P.], but we do not have a time frame … We do not say anymore, in two 
years we will go back. I guess we have become like our parents. They also al-
ways said: ‘We will go back’. But they have been in Germany for 40 years now. I 
guess it will be the same with us”. 
However, typical of transnational migrants, he remains ambivalent about 
living in Turkey or Germany. Migrants like him express rational pro and cons 
67 For a detailed analysis of her case, see Pusch (forthcoming a).
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for staying or leaving for a certain period in their life. As a result, they never 
come  to  a  final  decision  but  constantly  have to  re-evaluate  their  situation, 
which leads to periodical decision-making. Their legal inclusion in both societies 
allows them to base their decisions purely on their perception of their current 
situation without regarding any legal constraints. 
Conclusions: Global Istanbul as Hotspot for Transnational Migrants
Although there are very few scientific analyses focusing on transnationality in 
Istanbul, a glance at the available studies on international migration move-
ments to Turkey in general and Istanbul in particular indicates the emergence 
of transnational lives and practices very clearly.  However, the analysis above 
shows very evidently that global Istanbul provides its inhabitants various pos-
sibilities for transnational lives and set-ups. In conjunction with the current 
state of research, we can maintain that transnationality is predominantly set 
up on the micro-level. The comparatively lower intensity of transnationality on 
the meso- and macro-level may be related to the fact that transnational migra-
tion to Turkey is a relatively new phenomenon and the establishment of or-
ganizations and institutions is, in comparison with the development of every-
day life routines, more time-consuming. 
The high share of informal migrants in Istanbul is another reason for the 
relatively poor transnationality on the meso-level and the macro-level. As in-
formal migrants avoid attracting attention to their illegal status, this low visib-
ility on the meso- and macro-level is easy to comprehend.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned examples have 
an important similarity: all migrants live and work in global Istanbul. Thus, we 
may conclude that global Istanbul provides a range of transnational lives and 
social spaces for various migrant groups. Istanbul’s nearby border with the EU – 
albeit for very different reasons – makes Istanbul attractive for most migrants. 
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Emigration of  Highly  Qualif ied Turks
A Critical Review of the Societal Discourses and Social Scientific Research
Yaşar Aydın
Introduction: Background and Relevance of the Problem
The emigration of in Germany educated highly qualified Turks1 from Germany 
to Turkey has attracted the attention of the media, politics and social sciences, 
and triggered controversial debates on a possible “brain drain”.2 In this discus-
sion, not only economic and scientific considerations, but also political concerns 
such as the involvement of highly qualified Turks in the social system and their 
identification with the cultural value system in Germany were included. 
Three recent developments initiate to deal with the emigration of highly 
qualified Turks from Germany to Turkey.3 Firstly, trade associations, experts 
and political actors have been complaining since at least the late 1990s that 
more and more top-executives, academics and other highly qualified persons 
emigrate from Germany.4 This can also be verified by existing statistical data. 
1 Initially, it needs to be emphasized that the term “Turk” does not refer to ethnicity, but to the territory of the Turkish Republic. In this 
contribution, the term “Turk” refers to a person who is (a) either a citizen of the Turkish Republic, (b) was once a Turkish citizen, but 
then has been naturalized and became a German citizen or (c) who is a natural-born German citizen with Turkish parent/s.
2 See Jacobsen (2009), Flocke (2008).
3 Here it needs to be emphasized that this contribution is not a final work, but a work in progress. It is part of a more com-
prehensive research project which is currently carried out at the HWWI (Hamburg Institute of International Economics) on 
behalf of the foundation Hans Böckler Stiftung. This research project aims at investigating empirically the causes and rea-
sons of migration intentions and the actual migration of highly qualified Turks from Germany to Turkey. It focuses mainly 
on two questions: Are these highly qualified Turks “participating in two societies”? Does the emigration of highly qualified 
Turks mean “brain drain” (“waste of resources”) or “failure of integration”? For this purpose, semi-structured interviews are 
conducted. In this contribution, however, the focus is rather on the existing social scientific literature and the available data.
4 Kinast et al. (2007), Heise-Online (2007).
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The number of the emigrants from Germany has almost increased three-fold 
in the first decade of the 21st century compared to the 1970s (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Emigration of Germans from Germany
Source: Migrationsbericht 2007 and 2008.
Figure 2: Emigration of Medical Doctors from Germany
Source: Migrationsbericht 2008.
Today, more and more Germans are willing to live and work abroad. The avail-
able data show that German emigrants are a well-educated and a positively se-
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lected group compared to the total population. Besides, in recent years there 
has also been a slight increase in the proportion of highly qualified emigrants. 
Highly  qualified  persons  are  indeed  not  the  biggest  group  among  German 
emigrants, but they make an over proportional amount. A comparison of the 
years between 1990 and 2000 shows that the percentage of the highly quali-
fied emigrants has increased by 10 % in these ten years.5 The emigration of 
doctors of medicine is also on the increase (Figure 2).
In business and politics, this development is regarded as problematic for 
two reasons. On the one hand, it is suggested in the social scientific literature 
that technical revolutions and economic developments benefit from immigra-
tion movements notably of highly qualified persons or specialists, while mass  
emigration of highly qualified persons and specialists results quite often in eco-
nomic downfalls. On the other hand, in media discourses this increasing emigra-
tion is interpreted as an indication for the fact that Germany does not benefit 
enough from the international competition for highly qualified persons respect-
ively specialists.6 
Secondly, experts, employers’ associations and trade unions predict that, 
in some sectors in the medium term and in other sectors even in the short 
term, there will  be a growing shortage of  skilled workers. Due to the rapid 
aging population and the growing importance of a knowledge-based economy, 
the qualified or skilled labor shortage will worsen notably in the sectors like 
health and engineering as well as in various service sectors.7
Finally, the emigration of highly qualified Turks is also interpreted as an 
indication for a mental “turning away” of this group from the host society and 
for  a  “failure  of  integration”.8 It  is  frequently  suggested  that  in  the  light  of 
demographic trends, shortages of skilled workers and the lack of success in the 
recruitment of highly qualified professionals from abroad, it would be critical 
5 Sauer/Ette (2000, p. 70).
6 Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (2009, Editorial). This volume refers to the aging of the population and the “considerable 
shortage of skilled labor” and projects that Germany could lose “the international competition for the ‛best minds’”, APuZ 
(2009, p. 2).
7 Heise-Online (2007), Fellmer/Kolb (2009). The shortage of skilled labor and the need for skilled immigration is also declar-
ed in the International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2009 of the OECD. In this survey, it is argued that the “economic down-
turn did not change the necessity of managing labor migration in general”. According to this survey, it is likely that in the 
wake of economic recovery “a stronger migration flow” will resume (SOPEMI [2009, p. 3]). It is also predicted that in 2015 in 
OECD countries “the number of retiring from the labor force will exceed the number those who will enter the labor mar-
ket” and that this development “will continue over many years” (Ibid. [p. 1]).
8 Leibold (2006).
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from economic and political points of view if Germany still had to give up on a 
highly qualified workforce being trained in Germany.
In view of these developments and considerations, this book contribution 
focuses on the push factors that lead highly qualified Turks to emigrate from 
Germany as well as on the pull factors that lead them to migrate to Turkey. 
Thus, it aims at elucidating the reasons and causes of this emigration move-
ment on the basis of existing research findings and statistical data. In the first 
part of this contribution, firstly classical and then more recent explanations on 
the migration of highly qualified workers will be presented systematically and 
discussed critically. In the second part, then, the extent and the causes of emig-
ration of highly qualified Turks will be addressed.
Theoretical Explanations for the Highly Qualified Migration 
Since the end of World War II, the emigration of highly qualified workers, inter-
preted as “brain drain”, and their motives for emigration have attracted the at-
tention not only of social scientists, but also of economists and politicians. The 
debate was triggered by a study conducted in Great Britain, which raised a 
public awareness for the weaknesses of the British education and academic 
system. The study called for an increase in funding.9
In the following discussions about the emigration of highly qualified per-
sons,  developing  countries  have  been  problematized  as  the  main  sending 
countries. At that time, the most important receiving country was the U.S., fol-
lowed by Canada and Great Britain. Sending countries were India and other 
Asian, African and South American countries. Subsequently, the phenomenon 
was taken up also by development studies, problematized as “brain drain” and 
used for explaining the problem of underdevelopment. Having said that, now 
the question is: what is meant by “brain drain”?
Brain Drain and High Qualification
Literally, “brain  drain”  means  emigration  of  intelligentsia. In  economic  dis-
courses,  the  term  refers  to  economic  losses  caused  by  the  emigration  of 
trained, skilled and especially highly qualified workers, specialists or other tal-
ented people such as academics from a country or a region to another country 
9 Great Britain 1968, Hilmann/Rudolph (1996, p. 2).
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or region. In scientific literature, there is no exact definition for highly quali-
fied persons. It mostly remains unclear whether the term “high qualification” 
means the formal qualification or the present professional activity. In this con-
tribution, the adjective “highly qualified” is based on the definition, which is 
found in the Law on Residence, Employment and the Integration of Foreigners 
in Germany.10 According to Article 19(2) of this law, highly qualified people are
- Scientists with special professional knowledge,
- Teaching personnel and research assistants in high positions, and
-  Specialists or executive personnel with special professional knowl-
edge who get a salary at least more than the income threshold of the 
general pension system.11
Among the negative consequences or socioeconomic losses of “brain drain”, a 
number of historic examples could be given. In the first place, the migration of 
academics from the  German Democratic Republic (East Germany) to the Ger-
man  Federal  Republic (West  Germany)  should be mentioned. This  situation 
turned out to be an economical and political problem for the German Demo-
cratic Republic. Previous examples consisted of, for example, the forced migra-
tion of Huguenots from France to Prussia, which brought many disadvantages 
for France and advantages for Prussia. The omission of Jewish bankers, which 
was caused by the expulsions during the high Middle Ages and early modern 
period, cost Spain its position as Great Power in the 16th century. Germany and 
Austria lost many prominent scientists and entrepreneurs with Jewish origin 
due to the expulsion, extermination and forced emigration of Jews and Nazi 
opponents in the 1930s and 1940s under Nazism.
In a nutshell, “brain drain” can be considered as either a voluntary or a 
forced permanent emigration of highly qualified persons. “Brain exchange” on 
the contrary refers to the mutual flow of highly qualified workers between a 
sending and a receiving country. “Brain circulation” again refers to a process of 
circulation like this: studying abroad – gaining professional work experience – 
returning to the home country.12
10 Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet (AufenthG).
11 This presently amounts approximately 64,800 EUR per year.
12 Diehl (2005, p. 1), Ladame (1970). The French migration researcher has criticized definitive assessments of migrations as a 
“brain drain” and pointed out the possibilities and benefits of the mobility of highly qualified elites. He argued that one day  
these people would return and that the “brain drain” would turn out to be a “brain gain”.  To conceptualize this theoretically and  
describe it empirically he proposed the concept “circulation of the elite”. This term was received with great attention in social 
scientific discourse and is used by migration researchers with a slight modification as “brain circulation” (Hunger [2003, p. 14]).
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Theories on the Mobility of Highly Qualified Workers
In social  research, the mobility of  highly qualified workers  was initially ex-
plained by two opposite grand theories. Representatives of the dependence theo-
ry, on the one hand, explained the mobility of highly qualified workers by the 
global market structures and assessed it as a form of exploitation. Representa-
tives of the modernization theory, on the other hand, assessed the mobility of 
highly qualified workers more positively from the perspective of a “free” global 
labor market.
The dependency theorists  argued that  the “Western” dominated world 
market  structures  are  responsible  for  the  underdevelopment  because  they 
keep the poor developing countries in the position of economic and political 
dependence.13 In this regard, the active “recruiting” of qualified professionals 
from developing countries by the rich industrialized countries was taken as 
the evidence of the poor “South’s” exploitation by the rich “North”. Industrial-
ized countries would take advantage of the skilled labor pool of poor countries 
without making a contribution to the training costs. They argued that the loss 
of “the brightest minds” would produce and reproduce a vicious circle of under-
development and poverty. As a consequence, supporters of dependency theory 
called for an international regulation of the mobility of highly qualified work-
ers and for, at  least, an enforcement of  financial  compensation for sending 
countries.14 The Indian economist Bhagwati proposed a brain drain tax, which 
should be paid either by receiving host countries to the sending developing 
countries or by the highly qualified immigrants themselves, once they are cap-
able of payment.15 
Modernization  theorists  evaluated  the  emigration  of  the  elites  rather 
positively. On the basis of the neoclassical theory, they assumed that the mi-
gration of intellectuals and technical elites should be seen more in terms of a 
free global labor market, which follows the law of supply and demand. People 
should use their different skills and abilities where they are used most effi-
ciently and where they find the best competition.16 In this sense, the emigra-
tion of elites from developing to industrialized countries is logical and would 
create not only negative results. Government interventions like regulating of 
13 Senghaas (1974).
14 Ghosh (1982), Thirwani (1989), Galeano (1988).
15 Bhagwati (1976 a/1983 b).
16 Ethier (1987).
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the mobility of highly qualified workers and financial compensation for sending 
countries would, according to the supporters of modernization theory, produce 
distortions in international competition and thus global welfare losses.17 
In contrast to the representatives of dependency theory, the emigration 
of highly qualified workers was by the supporters of modernization theory not 
explained by the politics of receiving or respectively recruiting countries, but 
rather by the conditions in sending countries. From the perspective of mod-
ernization theory, the emigration of the highly qualified workers turned out to 
be a consequence of the lack of operational and developmental opportunities 
in their country of origin. Firstly, in developing countries the job opportunities 
were not sufficient for the trained workforce. Second, the migration of the highly 
qualified workforce was also a result of the overproduction of especially scien-
tific elites. In order to support the second thesis, India is cited.18
In both grand theories, namely in the modernization and dependence theo-
ry, large imbalances in wage levels, vast differences in living standards and 
specific attracting factors such as immigration programs as well as political 
circumstances in sending countries were considered responsible for the migra-
tion of highly qualified people. Subjective motives such as the desire for self-
realization, broadening one’s own horizon, emancipation from traditional con-
straints and gaining individual autonomy were hardly regarded in these  two 
grand theories. Beside a brain drain tax and emigration control bans, no useful 
strategies were developed.
Discussing the mobility of the highly qualified persons only in terms of 
“brain drain” deserves criticism because of different reasons. Firstly, it deserves 
criticism because the focus is mainly on the economic aspects. The focal point 
of these considerations was the benefits and disadvantages that arise from the 
mobility of highly qualified people for the economy of a country or a region. 
This meant that politological and sociological aspects are obscured. Secondly, 
in such considerations both the “society” and “national economies” are under-
stood as “close entities” in the sense of the “container model” of the society. This 
includes the risk of succumbing to “methodological nationalism”.19 Thirdly, the 
17 Körner (1999).
18 Mount/Ford (1997).
19 Ulrich Beck describes the idea of the society as a cohesive, coherent and clear-cut unity as “container theory of society”  
(1997, p. 49). Following Smith (1979, p. 191), Beck characterizes the “understanding of society of the first modernity as me-
thodological nationalism”. One characteristic for this perspective is the assumption of a “congruency between the society 
and the nation-state” (Beck [1997, p. 115]).
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term “brain drain” is often an expression of fears of not being able to benefit 
from the international competition of highly qualified persons. Fourth, in those 
discussions  on  the  mobility  of  highly  qualified  persons  in  terms  of  “brain 
drain”, emancipatory potentials and socio-economic advantages for the emi-
grants which arise from voluntary emigration were absent. Furthermore, in 
such theoretical approaches and discourses, migration is understood as a uni-
directional change of residence.
These aspects and issues raised in last two points are addressed system-
atically in research on  transnationality in which a new form of migration is 
stated  and  termed  as  “transnational  migration”.  Recent  migration  research 
based  on  the  “transnationalism”  perspective  substantiate  empirically  that, 
today, international migration does not occur as a single unidirectional change 
of residence, but rather as a permanent mobility and as a new reality of life for 
a growing number of people. Transnational migration results in “transnational  
spaces” characterized  as  a  “hybrid  product  combining  identificatory  and  so-
cio-structural elements of the region of origin and the region of arrival”.20 Based 
on this perspective, international processes of deterritorialization can be inter-
preted as a  major  driving force  of  the mobility of  highly  qualified persons. 
Between Germany and Turkey, similar transnational social spaces may be pre-
sumed, but until now this has not been studied systematically. The concept 
and research approach of transnational social spaces stated that through cur-
rent migration movements something new, namely a “third space”, emerges: 
interrelation of social  life and activities which are characterized by a “here-
and-there” and a “both … and”. Between the “clear-structured” world of national, 
cultural and religious boundaries, “social landscapes”21 are emerging which con-
nect and change regions of origin and regions of arrival. The question to what 
extent  the emigration  of  highly  qualified  Turks  gives  rise  to  similar  “social  
landscapes” or “transnational spaces” between Germany and Turkey has been 
left open in the contemporary migration research.22
Since the 1990s, following the migration researcher Ladame (1970) a third 
strand has been increased alongside the modernization and dependency theo-
ries which considers the positive effects of migration of highly qualified work-
20 Pries (1998, p. 136).
21 Albrow (1998).
22 Although the transnational aspects of the Turkish migrants in Germany are highlighted in recent contributions and Tho-
mas Faist (2000) edited a book on transnational social spaces between Germany and Turkey, empirical analysis which fo-
cus on highly qualified Turks and transnational social spaces in Turkey are still rare.
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ers for both the sending and the receiving countries. Contemporary research, 
for example, points out the emergence of diaspora-like networks,23 the return 
of migrants or the combination of both phenomena, from which many possibil-
ities and innovations result.24
Other studies deal with networks of scientists that were built by emig-
rated scientists who bring positive effects for the sending and receiving coun-
tries.25 Further publications deal with corporate networks, which emerge as a 
consequence of globalization. These include, for example, the development of 
internal labor markets which are of great importance for the mobility of highly 
qualified workers. The importance of these internal labor markets varies de-
pending on profession and the existing competitive situation in the respective 
international labor markets.26
In this respect, the following question is of great interest for this contri-
bution as well  as  for migration research in general: does the emigration of 
highly qualified Turks from Germany mean a “failure of integration” as it is fre-
quently stated, or does it mean rather “participating in two societies”?
Mobility of Highly Qualified Persons with Turkish Origin
In the second half of the 1980s, the topic of the mobility of highly qualified per-
sons in the migration research enjoyed a worldwide renaissance. The focus 
was directed on the emigration of highly qualified persons from developing 
countries or from one industrialized to another industrialized country. In re-
cent years, another group attracts the interest of the media, social sciences and 
economics: in Germany, educated and highly qualified Turks emigrate from 
Germany to Turkey, namely from a highly developed industrial  society to a 
prospering industrial society. Questions that interest the scientific community 
and the public focus on the causes of the mobility of this group as well as on 
possible indications for a return tendency among them. In such debates, the 
focus is on concerns and fears about a possible “waste of human resources”27 
and “failure of integration” which is frequently insinuated especially by conser-
23 Meyer (2001), Meyer et al. (2001).
24 Iredale (2001).
25 Brown (2000).
26 Beaverstock (1991), Straubhaar/Wolter (1997). For the role of international personnel consultancies, see Gould (1988), 
Findlay (1993).
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vative politicians and the media. Prior to a further discussion of these, it is use-
ful to present some key data on the life situation of highly qualified Turks in 
Germany.
Basic Data for Life Situation of Highly Qualified Turks in Germany
Available data on highly qualified Turks in Germany is due to two reasons in-
adequate. On the one hand, in social scientific debates the term “highly quali-
fied person” is used in a different way so that it is not always clear whether it 
refers to the formal qualification or to present professional activity. On the other 
hand, the existing statistical data are often imperfect due to several reasons: 
the statistics of the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (federal employment agency), 
for example, do not consider the “migration background” so that we are not 
able to find out the number of active Turkish employees who are subject to so-
cial  security insurance.28 Nevertheless, from available empirical data and re-
search results,29 we can extract a general view about the life situation and the 
degree of  integration of  and  return tendencies among highly  qualified Turks 
with a permanent residence in Germany.
To begin with, it was to be mentioned that 10 % of the 1.74 million Turkish 
citizens were in 2006 in possession of an academic diploma. Altogether, 15 % of 
the immigrants with a Turkish background were employed as medial and up-
per white-collar professionals or even as officials.30 However, we cannot de-
termine exactly how many of these medial and upper white-collar profession-
als could be categorized as highly qualified.
According to a study, carried out within the European Migration Network 
(Europäisches Migrationsnetzwerk), a total of 23,908 highly qualified Turkish 
citizens were residing in Germany (on June 30, 2005). In relation to the total 
number of Turkish employees subject to social security insurance (458,243), it 
makes 5.21 %, while in relation to total number of all highly qualified employees 
subject to social security insurance (5,579,752), it makes only 0.41 %. The major-
27 “Waste of resources” is also an issue of migration from non-OECD countries. Qualifications and work experiences of im-
migrants are frequently regarded by employers as inferior which leads to waste of resources as well as to frustrations by 
the immigrants (SOPEMI 2009).
28 See Straubhaar (2006) on the problem of the reliability of statistics .
29 There are only a few studies which give information on the socio-economic background, motivations for migration and 
return intentions of highly qualified Turks. To be mentioned are the TASD-survey and the studies of Heß (2009), Jahr et al. 
(2001) and Enders/Bormann (2001).
30 Tucci (2008, p. 202, 204).
Emigration of Highly Qualified Turks 209
ity of highly qualified Turkish employees were occupied in the health sector 
(11,197), followed by technicians (3,496), entrepreneurs, businessmen and sys-
tems analysts accountants (1,932) and engineers (1,709).31
However, this study does not give information about the proportion of 
those who were educated in Germany (Bildungsinländer)32 or abroad. Moreover, 
these figures refer not to formal education, but to present professional activity. 
It  can be expected that the number of  highly qualified persons in terms of 
formal  education  is  possibly  higher than in terms  of  current  professionally 
activities. In the TASD-survey, the number of Turkish academics was estimated 
between 45,000 and 70,000 persons.33 It  should also be mentioned that we 
also do not have exact figures on the unemployment of highly qualified per-
sons with Turkish backgrounds. According to an OECD-survey (2007), the pro-
portion of unemployed highly qualified persons with a migration background 
amounts to 12.5 %, while the unemployment rate of highly qualified persons 
without a migration background amounts to 4.4 %. In short, the unemploy-
ment rate of highly qualified persons without a migration background is ap-
proximately three times lower than by highly qualified persons with a migra-
tion background.
Migration of Turks
Prior to an overview about migration movements between Germany and Tur-
key, some basic data on migration in general should be presented. It is worth 
pointing out that from 1991 to 2006 approximately 15.1 people moved in to Ger-
many. In the same period 10.9 million people migrated from  Germany. This 
makes a net immigration of 4.2 million. However, since the beginning of the 
21st century the migration movements are on the decrease. In 2005 the lowest 
immigration (707,352) since the year 1987 was registered. In 2006 immigration 
to Germany dropped to 661,855 (558,467 of them were persons with foreign cit-
izenship).  In  contrast  to  that,  the  number  of  emigrants  rose  by  1.7  %  (to 
639,064; 483,774 of  them were foreigners)  in comparison with the previous 
year. In recent years, the net migration balance was on the decrease, too; in 
2008 there was a negative net migration balance (Figure 3).
31 Heß/Sauer (2006, p. 46).
32 “Bildungsinländer” are students or persons with foreign citizenship who have the same university entrance conditions 
as nationals because they completed their education in Germany.
33 Sezer/Dağlar (2008).
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Figure 3: Net Migration from Germany
Source: Migrationsbericht 2008.
Figure 4: Immigration from Germany to Turkey
Source: Migrationsbericht 2007 and 2008.
It needs also to be emphasized that the immigration from Turkey to Germany 
has been reduced since 1991 by more than half. In 1991, 82,818 persons emi-
grated from Turkey to Germany, while in 2006 there were only 31,449 immi-
grants from Turkey. A great part of the emigration from Turkey to Germany 
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was due to spousal immigration or family unions as well as to asylum applica-
tions, which are for couple of years on the decrease, too. The migration from 
Germany to Turkey, in contrast, does not increase dramatically, as data for the 
years from 1991 to 2006 show, but remains relatively constant (Figure 4).
Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that, from these data the pro-
portion of immigrants with a Turkish background or citizenship or German expa-
triates, who immigrate to Turkey for the short term, is not apparent. The Migra-
tionsbericht 2007 (migration survey of 2007) breaks down migration outflows 
according to citizenship, so that we can gain a general overview about the ex-
tent of emigration of Turks. According to this, there are no dramatic develop-
ments: the figure of the emigrants with Turkish citizenship remained between 
1991 and 2006 constant, too. However, it must be taken into account that the 
citizenship of an emigrant need not coincide with the destination. That is to 
say, we cannot suggest that, for example, a person with Turkish citizenship 
who leaves Germany immigrates necessarily to Turkey. It remains therefore 
unclear whether these emigrants with Turkish citizenship migrate to Turkey 
or to another country when they leave Germany. Besides, the extent of highly 
qualified Turks in proportion to the total number of immigrants to Turkey is 
not apparent, too.  
Figure 5: Emigration of Turkish Citizens from Germany
Source: Migrationsbericht 2007 and 2008.
It is possible that a great part of those who immigrate to Turkey has German 
citizenship. The readiness to emigrate from Germany could be higher by highly 
qualified persons with German Citizenship since they can return to Germany 
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whenever they want without any difficulties. Furthermore, German citizens 
with a Turkish background can make use of all rights in Turkey except the act-
ive and passive right to vote. This is guaranteed by the blue card (mavi kart).
According to the official statistics in Turkey, in 2000 all in all 73,736 per-
sons migrated from Germany to Turkey (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu). Noticeable 
is first of all a big deviation between the number of Turkish official statistics 
and the data of the German official migration survey.34 According to the Ger-
man migration survey in 2007, migration from Germany to Turkey amounted 
40,369 in the year 2000. A possible explanation for this deviation is the fact 
that a part of the emigration from Germany to Turkey is not registered as such 
by German authorities for various reasons. It is possible that many emigrants 
with Turkish citizenship remain registered in Germany even when they live in 
Turkey because they do not want to affect their insurance rights (claims) or 
pension entitlements. However, this is  an issue that requires systematic re-
search. 
Relevant statistical data are also insufficient because they do not reflect 
the citizenship of those who migrate from Germany to Turkey. The extent of 
the highly qualified person in relation to the total number of emigrants is not 
calculated,  too.  In  summary,  the  existing  data  on  migration  movements 
between Germany and Turkey do not provide clear statements on the emigra-
tion of highly qualified persons with a Turkish background from Germany to 
Turkey.
Research About the Mobility of Highly Qualified People of Turkish Origin
The interest of scientists, business organizations and the public in statistical 
data and other empirical scientific insights on the residence of highly qualified 
people  in  Germany  and  on  the  immigration  of  them  to  Germany  have in-
creased  considerably.  The  study  “Migration  of  Highly  Skilled  Workers  from 
Third Countries to Germany”35 conducted by the Research Group of the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) 
provided important insights. In this research, highly qualified individuals who 
possess a residence permit according to Article 19 of the Law on Residence, Em-
ployment and the Integration of Foreigners in Germany (AufenthG) are inter-
34 Migrationsbericht (2007).
35 Hess (2009).
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viewed.36 The study attempted to gather information about the socio-economic 
background, the motives for migration and intentions of return-emigration of 
highly qualified migrants in Germany. 959 highly qualified individuals (statisti-
cal  population), recruited via  the  Central  Foreigners Register  (Ausländerzen-
tralregister), are from different countries: 51 people are from Turkey, 193 from 
the USA, 161 from the Russian Federation and 55 from China.
However, it has to be argued against this study critically that the results 
for the question about the satisfaction with Germany, the income and the job 
situation, as well as the reasons for leaving the country of origin (push factors) 
or  for  deciding  in  favor  of  Germany  as  a  destination  (pull  factors), are  not 
broken down by country of origin. Regarding the future prospects of highly 
qualified workers from Turkey, the study states that 73.3 % of them plan to stay 
for more than ten years or forever in Germany.37 However, since this study sur-
veys newly arrived, high-skilled workers, the articulated intentions of remain-
ing in Germany can hardly be transmitted to the rest of high-skilled workers of 
Turkish origin in Germany. Questions about the factors and causes of migra-
tion intentions and the actual emigration of Turkish origin are not addressed 
in this study.
“Return intentions” of Turkish migrants have engaged migration research 
for a long time. In the 1970s or even in the 1980s, many migrants have ex-
pressed their return intention during several interviews, which was evaluated 
as an indication of “lack of desire for integration”. Such results led to the conclu-
sion that the stay of Turkish migrants has a temporary character and, thus, 
those comprehensive efforts for their socio-political integration would be un-
necessary. Only gradually, has migration research come to the conclusion that 
the declaration of return intentions could rather be interpreted as a psycho-so-
cial strategy, on which migrants rely in order to undermine the experienced 
discrimination respectively to compensate it.38
36 It is about a clearly defined group (as defined in Article 19 AufenthG), i.e. ,“about scientists with special technical know-
ledge, teaching individuals with exceptional capabilities as well as specialists or managers, whose residence is in a special 
economic and social interest” (Hess [2009, p. 22]). For this survey, those people were interviewed who possessed a perma-
nent residence permit according to Article 19 AufenthG on 30.6.2007. The interviewees were determined from the Central 
Aliens' Register (AZR). “These are new immigrants who entered after 2005 and who immediately received a residence per-
mit according to § 19 AufenthG as well as people who previously have lived with another type of residence permit in Ger-
many” (Ibid.).
37 Ibid. (p. 72).
38 The central thesis of Pagenstecher, which addressed this paradox, is: “Even the return orientation will not be realised it  
has important social, cultural and psychological functions” (1996, p. 167). He interprets the articulation of return intentions 
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In these discussions on the “return intentions”, the “failure of integration” 
or the degree of integration of Turkish migrants, the focus was initially put on 
people with lower skills, lower education and poor language skills. Today, the 
media cares about the “return” intentions of highly qualified people. However, 
there is a lack of systematic study on the living conditions, attitudes, “return”, 
or to be more precise, migration intentions and self-assessment of highly qual-
ified Turks.39
However, the TASD study, which has explored the issues just mentioned 
through online interviews, can be seen as an exception.40 The main objective of 
this study was to determine the extent to which  Turkish academics and stu-
dents in Germany (hereafter TASD) identify themselves with Germany or how 
strongly they feel connected emotionally to Germany – the return intention 
served here as an indicator. The study comes to the conclusion that the vast 
majority of Turkish academics – men were clearly in the majority – want to 
leave Germany.41 Nevertheless, the study restrictively underlines that the de-
clared return intention would rather display the discontent of the TASD with 
the professional world and everyday life in Germany than determine the read-
iness to emigrate. The TASD study states that the strong will to emigrate and 
the  “Turkey-orientation” among Turkish  academics  and  students  can be  ex-
plained by the failures of the German integration policy.42
Factors of Mobility of Highly Qualified Turkish Origin
What are the main factors which motivate highly qualified Turks to emigrate 
from Germany? In social scientific discourse three factors are discussed.
(1) Disadvantageous career prospects: the TASD study arrived at the conclu-
sion that a significant proportion of Turkish university graduates and the ma-
jority of Turkish students want to migrate from Germany to Turkey due to 
not only as a “defensive strategy and uncertainty” but also as a “statement of loyalty to the own minority group and to the 
country of origin” (Ibid. [p. 168]).
39 For the state of integration of the Turks in Germany, see Goldberg (2000) and Tucci (2008).
40 The TASD study is considered as the “most comprehensive social study” carried out until now, which for the first time ex-
amines the attitudes, habits and return intentions of the Turkish “educational elite” in Germany. However, this is not a re-
presentative study, because there are hardly any data about the total population of Turkish academics and students in Ger-
many. This is also admitted self-critically by Kamuran Sezer, who worked on this study with the organization “future.org” 
(see Focus-Online [2008]).
41 Sezer/Dağlar (2009).
42 Ibid. (p. 8).
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“professional  reasons”.43 “Disadvantageous  professional  perspectives”  is  also 
highlighted as a central motive by highly skilled Turkish migrants who already 
moved to Turkey.44 The respondents referred to their own negative experiences 
during  their  searches  for  job  or  in  job  interviews.45 High  unemployment 
among academics  with a migration background (12.5  %, almost three times 
higher than among academics without migration background, 4.4 %) could be 
read as a clear evidence for this interpretation (see OECD study, 2007). In addi-
tion, the TASD study found out that migration-readiness by academics and stu-
dents, who estimate their personal and the general economic situation of Ger-
many as  unfavorable  and  who are  correspondingly  more pessimistic  about 
their future is higher in comparison to those who have a more optimistic as-
sessment. In this sense, “bad economic situation” and “pessimistic estimate” of 
the own economic prospects can be considered as two important push factors.46
(2) Lack of feeling at home or lack of identification: an additional finding of 
the TASD study is that a lack of “feeling at home” or “reluctance” to identify one-
self with Germany is a major factor related to the return intentions as well as 
to the actual return. To the question “Because of what reasons do you intend to  
move to Turkey”, 41.3 % of the online respondents answered with “lack of feel-
ing at home”.47 The TASDs who express their return intention, rather see Turkey 
as their true home country than  Germany. Among those who perceive  Ger-
many as their homeland, the extent of migration intention is correspondingly 
low. Crucial in regard to return intentions are also family ties: with an increas-
ing intensity of family or other social ties, the readiness to return decreases.48 
However, this finding of the TASD study is worthy of criticism for three rea-
sons. Firstly, it is not representative, since there are hardly any reliable figures 
about  German-Turkish  high-qualified  workers  for  a  representative  sample. 
Secondly, the survey questionnaire (“Do you intend to move to Turkey in the fu-
ture?”)  is not precise enough.  Thirdly, the diagnoses “lack of feeling at home” 
and “lack of identification” are still in dispute among social scientists. Another 
study about attitudes of Turks towards the state and the society comes to the 
conclusion that Turkish migrants see the German social system as “very posi-
43 Ibid.
44 Pusch/Aydın (2011), Aydın/Pusch (2011).
45 Jacobsen (2009), Flake (2008), Ludwig (2009), Kaas/Manger (2010).
46 Sezer/Dağlar (2009, p. 23).
47 Ibid. (p. 17).
48 Ibid. (p. 7).
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tive” and believe “to live in a righteous or partially just society”.49 49 % of the re-
spondents would show a stronger relationship with Germany and a “high pro-
portion” has “built up stable emotional bonds with Germany”.50 In another study 
conducted by Martina Sauer, 60 % of Turkish migrants answered the question 
of whether they have any return intentions with  “No”. Only 33 % of the  re-
spondents imagine a return to Turkey.51
(3)  Disadvantage  and  discrimination:  previously  “unfavourable  job  pro-
spects” were referred to as a key motivation for both the return, or, to be more 
precise, emigration intentions, as well as the actual emigration. It can be stated 
that a large proportion of highly qualified Turks see their  own professional 
perspective as  “unfavorable” due to the restrictions caused by discrimination 
on the German labor market and the structural disadvantages in many areas 
of society. 73 % of the respondents of a study have experienced discrimination 
in everyday life and in the professional world.52 A face-to-face survey conduc-
ted by Ulrich Wilamowitz-Moellendorf showed that the majority (60 %) of the 
Turkish respondents claim “to have experienced often the feeling of discrimina-
tion as a foreigner”.53 There are other research findings according to which a 
large part of discrimination against immigrants goes back to negative attitudes 
of  employers  and  to  discrimination  during  the  recruitment  period. Andrea 
Janßen and Ayça Polat54 referred to  gatekeepers (decision-makers), who would 
decide during the employment-mediation period at the  Federal Employment 
Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) as well as during the interview period for 
companies according to non-functional criteria such as by ethnicity or “cultur-
al characteristics”. They wrote in this regard that “the selectivity of the stereo-
types by gatekeepers about Turks” is often more crucial than professional crite-
ria.55 Michael Blohm and Martina Wasmer pointed out in their contribution 
49 Wilamovitz-Moellendorf (2001, p. 7).
50 Ibid. (p. 16).
51 Sauer (2007); see also Kaya (2005).
52 Sauer (2007 f, p. 139).
53 Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (2001, p. 9).
54 Janßen/Polat (2005).
55 Ibid. (p. 2001). For a study on discrimination against migrants in general as well as against Turks in particular, see also Ay -
dın (2009), Granato/Kalter (2001). The study by Leo Kaas and Christian Manger (2010) can be seen as an exemplary case in 
this context. They send 528 applications of the fictional, equally well-qualified students with the names Serkan Sezer, Fatih 
Yıldız, Tobias Hartmann and Dennis Langer. The internship-applications with German names achieved a higher response 
rate as well as much more positive responses. The results of the study showed that even if a job applicant has nearly per -
fect references s/he is discriminated against during the job-search period if the employer suspects a Turkish origin.
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about attitudes and contacts towards foreigners that “the social  distance to-
wards Turks” is far greater than the social distance towards other immigrant 
groups.56 However, it must be noted here that experiences of discrimination or 
the subjective perception of a conflict as a rejection on the ground of ethnicity 
may not always have to match with objectively verifiable circumstances or ex-
periences, but can also be influenced by expectations as well as general and in-
dividual moods.
What are the key factors that lead to the emigration of high-skilled Turks 
to Turkey? These can be broadly summarized into two points.
(4) Social networks: the social networks, which cover family bonds as well 
as the circle of acquaintance and other dense relations, are largely neglected in 
the research literature as possible  factors  of  migration. Many highly skilled 
Turks  living in  Germany  maintain relationships  with  various organizations 
and friends in Turkey, whereby they receive information about possible inter-
nal  job postings. In addition to exchange programs and the friendship net-
works, family relationships and partnerships count as key factors, which have 
a relevant influence on mobility decisions and experiences. As demonstrated 
in many other studies on migration, the family influences the mobility of scien-
tists significantly because family and kinship networks provide emotional sup-
port and necessary assistance in everyday life (eg., child care or other supports).
(5) High economic growth: during the recent years, Turkey has succeeded 
in achieving a sustainable economic growth averaging around 7 %. As a result, 
the Turkish economy was able to overcome serious consequences of the eco-
nomic crisis of 2001; besides, the high inflation rate could significantly be re-
duced, as well. In 2001, the average inflation rate was still 68.5 %; however, in 
September 2009, the rate could be lowered to 5.3 %. Moreover, once the new 
direct investment law was passed (June 17, 2003), the number of newly estab-
lished foreign companies increased significantly. At the end of 2007, the cumu-
lative number of foreign companies reached around 18,308. The number of for-
eign  company  formations,  participations  and  subsidiaries  increases  with  a 
growing tendency. The number of  German companies in Turkey is strongly 
growing, too (cp. SWR International 2009), which in turn promotes the immi-
gration of highly qualified Turks to Turkey. German companies in Turkey, for 
example, increasingly fill  in key positions with young, German-Turkish aca-
demics. They have an advantage over their German competitors due to their 
56 Blohm/Wasmer (2008, p. 210).
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bicultural background and bilingual skills. In addition to this, German citizens 
of Turkish origin possess the Blue Card (mavi kart), and thus avoid the restrict-
ive Turkish residence and work law.57
Summary and Outlook
The aim of this contribution was approaching the emigration of highly quali-
fied Turks and identifying the push-factors, which lead them to emigrate from 
Germany as well as the pull-factors, which lead them to immigrate to Turkey. 
Another important question was whether or to what extent there is a current 
emigration tendency among the highly qualified Turks living in Germany. In 
contrast to conventional grand theories (dependency and modernization theory), 
this contribution arrived at the conclusion that it is highly problematic to ex-
plain the mobility of highly qualified people only in terms of “brain drain”. Re-
garding  highly  qualified  Turks  in  Germany  we  can  talk  of  “brain  drain” or 
“waste of human resources” only insofar that a part of the émigrés decide for 
emigration due to the experience of disadvantage and subjective perception of 
discrimination. However, for a significant part of the émigrés the immigration 
into Turkey meant  personal autonomy, upgrading of personal freedom and so-
cial status advancement. However, we know such examples only from the me-
dia; scientific analyses (studies) have not existed hitherto. There is an exten-
sive scientific literature, which highlights a number of positive effects of the 
emigration of highly qualified Turks from Germany to Turkey. There are stud-
ies, which  describe  how  the  emigration  of  highly  qualified  people  leads  to 
“transnational social spaces”, but they take other countries and other national 
groups  as  examples.  A  consideration  of  the  emigration  of  highly  qualified 
Turks in terms of “brain drain” implicates the risk of losing sight of the positive 
aspects of this process.
It must be pointed out that the question about the emigration intentions 
of highly qualified Turks cannot be answered exactly on the ground of existing 
statistical data or scientific insights. First, the number of the highly qualified 
Turks residing in Germany cannot be determined because statistical surveys 
meanwhile cover the immigration background, but they do not consider the 
country of origin, ethnic or national background. Data about the highly quali-
fied Turks do not distinguish between those who posses the German citizen-
57 Ludwig (2009, p. 43).
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ship from Turkish citizens. Second, available statistics do not show the profes-
sion and education level of Turkish persons who emigrate from Germany, so 
that the proportion of highly qualified persons is not detectable.  Third, there 
are no systematic studies about the  life conditions,  attitudes and  emigration  
tendencies of  highly  qualified Turks  in  Germany. Therefore, the  question  of 
emigration intentions refers to a desideratum in current research and data.
Further questions which also have to be left open are these: To what ex-
tent is the  emigration of highly qualified Turks from Germany a result  of a 
“failure of integration” or a “lack of integration”? Are we dealing here with “par-
ticipation in two societies”, with the emergence of “transnational social spaces” 
or “transnational lifestyles”? These questions cannot be answered exactly on 
the ground of existing research and statistical data. For this purpose, relevant 
qualitative  empirical  studies  such  as  interviews  and  group  discussions  are 
needed. These interviews then ought to be interpreted systematically from a 
multidisciplinary perspective and with the means of depth-hermeneutics in or-
der to understand them in their latent significance.
In  conclusion, mobility  of  highly  qualified  Turks  cannot  only  be  con-
sidered from an economic perspective; caution has to be exercised particularly 
on account of the subjective point of views of the émigrés. Three questions 
would be crucial  for a critical  review from a subject perspective: (1)  Are we 
dealing with a voluntary mobility? (2) Is the emigration possibly due to social 
discrimination or juridical political marginalization? (3) Does it result in waste 
of human resources? 
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Continuity  and Change:  Immigration Policies  in  
Germany from the Sixties  to the Present  
Mehmet Okyayuz
Preliminary Remarks
The following text is not by far intended to provide a detailed political and le-
gal analysis of developments and priority shifts of immigration policies in Ger-
many since the recruitment period of the 1960s. Rather than that, special at-
tention  will  be  given  to  the  historic-social  context  (e.g.,  in  the  sense  of 
attitudes of official political actors towards the “foreigner question”) in whose 
framework debates concerning migration/migrants have been (or are still) on-
going. Hereby perceptions of  integration and participation of foreigners, to-
gether with perceptions of socio-political order and multiculturalism underly-
ing and steering the flow of the debates will be of interest. Formulated in an 
ideology-critical way, it shall be read “between” the lines of written and oral 
statements in order to show tendencies within the process of the relation(s) 
between the foreigners and the political sphere (reflected in the wide scope of 
responsibility and action of the bourgeois state) on the one hand, and the so-
cial sphere (reflected in the wide scope of action of social actors) on the other 
hand. A special emphasis shall be hereby given to the structural dimension of 
immigration policies best seen within the context of their possible functionali-
zation as a mechanism to solve social tensions. The topic of this article is by no 
way  specific  for  Germany  because  an  important  aspect  of  the  above-men-
tioned structural dimension is the increasingly promoted global cross-linkage 
of politics and policy-making. Immigration policies, especially in their form as 
asylum procedures and practices, are currently carried on as part of Europe-
wide coordination activities including countries at the periphery of Europe. A 
concrete example for this development is an attempt to build up at least seven 
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refugee  reception  and  removal  centers  in  Turkey  within  the  framework  of 
measures for the EU integration process. Despite this global dimension of im-
migration policies in a narrow sense and migration movements in a broader 
sense, there are still some important historic-social and theoretical reasons re-
maining for employing the “German case”, as it is done in this text.
Firstly, the experience of organized mass labor migration having started 
in  the  midst  of  the 1950s of  the  last  century to  the industrialized Western 
European countries was factually a Turkish-German one. The number of Turk-
ish citizens and/or people having a Turkish background living and working in 
Germany is higher than in all other Western European receiving countries to-
gether. Besides this quantitative dimension, we can state ongoing controver-
sial  debates on integration, identity, multiculturalism, freedom and security 
hard to find elsewhere in such an intensity. Starting with the German reunifi-
cation in 1991, a lot of political actors saw the necessity to (re-) construct a new 
(or a new-old) German identity thought to be “lost” within the framework of 
developments after World War II having resulted in the establishment of two 
“Germanies”. For those actors the migrants are somehow the counter-image of 
such a “new” identity.1
Secondly, the mass recruitment of a foreign labor force on the basis of bi-
lateral agreements was a relatively new experience for Germany. This migra-
tion  movement  resulted  in  social  dynamics  (such  as  family  reunification), 
which should be “conducted” via political and legal means. Hereby, the long 
tradition of thought emphasizing the uniqueness of the state as an idealized 
sphere of distributing justice and balancing out social conflicts, as we can see 
it in the conservative attitude of Adam Müller’s “political romanticism” of the 
early 19th century, and in the extensive philosophical and theoretical research 
on state law2 finding its most comprehensive expression by Hegel in his Philo-
sophy of  Law, and under German fascism in Carl Schmitt’s relocation of the 
state as the main agent of the political, enabled a very fast establishment of 
political and legal regulations later being incorporated into the Immigration 
Law of 1965, which was the first systematically formulated and in itself closed 
legal  framework in Germany regulating the relation between the foreigner 
and the bourgeois state. Having mentioned above historico-social experience 
1 Penitsch (2003, p. 17).
2 Jann (1989, p. 39).
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and the tradition of state law, it seems plausible to evaluate Germany as one, if 
not the main actor, of Europe-wide coordinated immigration policies.3
The Recruitment Period of the 1960s: 
Immigration Policies in the Form of Labor Market Policies
After  its  integration  into  the  political-institutional  framework  of  a  “free” 
Europe evaluated as the “antithesis” of the Eastern European socialist states 
under the leadership of the Soviet Union, Federal Germany’s primary aim was 
to rebuild its traditional industrial sectors. Until the mid-1950s, this aim could 
be realized to a broad extent by employing a labor force from its former East-
ern territories and from those coming from Eastern Germany. The canalizing of 
this  “national” labor force mentioned above, industrial  sectors  were accom-
panied by an extensive capital and technology transfer from the USA to the 
Western  European  countries,4 altogether  resulting  in  an  increase  of  con-
sumptive needs enabling the establishment of new industrial sectors. Thus, in 
the mid-1950s, the demand for a labor force could no longer be supplied via the 
mentioned labor markets. A short-term solution could be provided by transfer-
ring the labor force from the agricultural to the industrial sector due to the rel-
atively higher wages in the industrial sector compared to agricultural produc-
tion.5 This time a lack of labor force occurred in the agricultural  sector and 
consequently demands for a stately organized recruitment and employment of 
foreign labor force – concretely “the temporary employment of Italian agricul-
tural workers”6 – were articulated for the first time in 1955 by parts of the pro-
fessional  organization of  the  Farmers’ Union of  Baden-Wurttemberg Province 
(Bauernverband Baden-Württemberg). 
In addition to the above-mentioned, economic preconditions for opening 
the labor market and providing access to a foreign labor force with the recruit-
ment  and  employment  of  Italian  workers  in  the  agricultural  sector, demo-
graphic changes such as the increase of the older population (of an age of 65 
3 Niblett (2005, p. 43). 
4 According to Mandel (1982, p. 11), this transfer of resources increased from approximately 7.2 billion USD to an amount of 
60 billion USD in 1967.
5 Dohse (1981, p. 148).
6 Meier-Braun (1979, p. 18).
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and above)7 and the decrease of the working population (of an age between 15 
and  65)  as  a  result  of  World  War  II,  and  furthermore  social  and  political 
changes such as the reduction of the weekly working time to 45 hours in 19568 
and the re-organization of a Federal German army in the mid-1950s9 paved the 
way for  the  later  bi-lateral  recruitment  agreements  between  Germany and 
countries like Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco 
(1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and (the former) Yugoslavia (1968).10 
The foundations of the first legal regulations in the field of immigra-
tion policies  were laid under above-mentioned conditions, which were to a 
great extent (if not solely) determined by the economic needs of a “new” Ger-
many  trying to  compete  with  the  other  traditional  industrialized countries 
such as Great Britain and France. In the mid-1950s, the wide-spread term “eco-
nomic miracle” did reflect Federal Germany’s attempt to organize its economy 
in a framework of free competitive market mechanisms under the guidance of 
Ludwig Ehrhard, who started his career as Minister of Economics in the Bavari-
an cabinet, later in the federal government in the same position, and who fi-
nally became Chancellor between the years 1963 and 1966.
Despite the mentioned liberal economic priorities of the economic struc-
turization of Germany, favoring the state remained important for “conserva-
tive” politicians like Ehrhard. In this context, the emphasis on a “Social Market 
Economy” accentuating differences from a “pure” competitive economy may 
be understandable. The orientation towards a market economy was one of the 
steps that Germany did undergo to break with the past having culminated into 
fascist dictatorship. But, improvements on the level of living and working con-
7 The estimations concerning the number of people having been killed during World War II is – on the lowest level – around 
30 million. According to Borrie, the regional distribution is as follows: Western Europe – 7.8 million, Eastern Europe (without 
the consideration of the Soviet Union) – 5.6 million and the Soviet Union – 17 million. Not included is the number  
of persons killed in the concentration camps of the German fascist  dictatorship.  Borrie (1970),  Spanier (1969, 
pp. 93–94).
8 Hammer (1976, p. 14).
9 The re-organization of the army (Bundeswehr) cannot be underestimated in terms of partially draining out the labor  
market. Thus, the number of persons being employed there increased from 125,000 in 1957 to 450,000 in 1965. So, having 
this precondition for the opening of the German labor market in mind (among others), it is in no sense coincidental that, in 
the time period of the early 1960s up to the recruitment stop in 1973, recruitment of a foreign labor force determined by the 
needs of the entrepreneurs was very fast and without any decisive “disturbance” coming from possible interventions from 
social actors such as labor unions.
10 In the short-lasting recession period of 1966/67, the number of foreign laborers surpassed one million, reaching a climax 
of 2.6 million in 1973, the year when a recruitment stop was planned and executed. (Spies 1982, pp. 6–7), O’Brien (1988, 
p. 115).
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ditions for the native population, which honestly have to be stated, went not 
parallel with developments concerning legal regulations determining the rela-
tion between the foreigners and the state. Here, a radical “break” with the past, 
as it was often articulated in the public and expressed in the Basic Law of Ger-
many  formulating  basic  and  individual  rights  against  an  overwhelming 
powerful state cannot be stated. 
Rather than being an extension of individual rights the legal regulations 
in the early 1950s until the passing of the first systematic Aliens’ Law of 1965 
did inherit continuities both on an administrative and political level, which 
can be moderately named “authoritarian” in the sense of prioritizing the in-
terests of the main political actor (which is the state) and the economic actors 
by – at the same time – evaluating the interests of the foreigners as secondary. 
Thus, the social aspects of migration, such as integration, is factually not a top-
ic of these recruitment years. The power of bureaucracy continued in the form 
of delegating extensive responsibilities to the Immigration Bureaus, which can 
be most clearly seen in the field of residence permits. According to the regulat-
ory contents of the Foreigner Police Decree of August 8, 1938, which continued 
to be valid until  1965, foreigners who applied for a residence permit had to 
prove that they were “worthy of the hospitality shown them”. Later, in the Al-
iens’ Law of 1965, this term was replaced by the formulation of the “interests of 
the Federal Republic of Germany”.11 This change which can be evaluated as a 
(little)  step in disfavor  towards an idealized organic state conceptualization 
was nevertheless not a step in favor of the foreigner in the sense of a qualita-
tive improvement of a relocation of the relation between the foreigner and the 
state.
Thus, the Aliens’ Law of 1965 did continue to prioritize the interests of the 
state in accordance with the economic needs formulated by the entrepreneurs. 
The rotation principle was the key word for a temporary and economically de-
termined functionalization of immigration policies during the 1960s. Foreign 
workers should be employed and sent back according to the necessities of the 
labor market. This was clearly stated as the backbone of recruitment policies in 
a meeting organized by the  Federal National Association of German Employers 
(Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände) in 1966.12 In the center of 
such an economically determined approach the temporary character  of  im-
11 Franz (1984, p. 82).
12 Okyayuz (1999, p. 32).
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migration policies was emphasized, and the contents of  the bilateral  agree-
ments  did  also  not  include  any  social  notions, because  both  receiving  and 
sending countries evaluated the employment of the recruited labor force as a 
sort  of  developmental  model  aiming at  wiping out socio-economical  differ-
ences  between developing and developed countries. The workers  should be 
ideally  skilled in  the receiving countries  and after  their  return they should 
function as “human capital” in the sense of contributing innovatively to their 
home economies. The precondition of such a developmental approach to labor 
migration would have been a consequent handling of the above-mentioned ro-
tation model in addition to possibilities provided for the foreign laborers in or-
der to improve professional skills. None of these preconditions were realized in 
practice; what happened was the emergence of social dynamics such as family 
reunification starting to a great extent during the mid- and late 1960s. Thus, 
the basis for implementing social immigration policies was already prepared 
during these times, but the contents of immigration policies in this recruit-
ment period (which was in fact no longer a pure recruitment period) did re-
main economically determined.
The  most  important  obstacle  in  implementing  a  social  immigration 
policy was the insistence on the rotation model and the unwillingness to ac-
cept that more and more labor migrants began to see Germany as their coun-
try of  residence, that  they had begun to become settlers. Thus, the right of 
family reunification, maybe the most important factor of integration during 
this period, being under the protection of the Basic Law,13 was handled in such 
a bureaucratic manner that it was difficult to provide a feeling to the foreign-
ers that they were accepted by the German state and society. In 1966, Ulrich 
Freiherr von Gienanth, the chairman of a working group called Foreign Workers 
organized  under  the  umbrella  of  the  Union  of  German  Employers (Bund 
Deutscher Arbeitgeber) formulated the wide-spread understanding of integra-
tion (in a broader sense) and family reunification (in a narrow sense) in the 
context of immigration policies with these words: “The great advantage of em-
ploying foreigners lies in the fact that they constitute a highly mobile labor 
force  potential.  It  can  have  very  dangerous  results  to  limit  this  mobility 
through  an  extensive  settlement  policy” (Der  Arbeitgeber  1966). The  politi-
cal-legal foundations for such an understanding were laid in the formulations 
13 This can be derived from two parts of the Basic Law. In a general sense from Article 20c, Clause 1, where Germany is 
defined via its social state principle, and concretely from Article 6, where the marriage institution and the protection of the 
family is mentioned. 
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of the Principles Concerning Foreigners Policy (Grundsätze zur Ausländerpolitik), 
whose aim was to “prevent the harmful impacts of an increasing number of 
family  relatives  of  foreign  workers  moving  in  an  disorganized  way  to 
Germany”.14 With  the  speech  of  “harmful  impacts”,  the  possible  increasing 
amount of expenditures of the local institutions for the foreigners resulting 
from demands for bigger housing facilities, for more kindergarden and school 
locations and expanded health and transportation opportunities were meant.15 
The “social  costs” of  foreign labor  force employment was something which 
was not foreseen during the 1960s, and consequently political  actors  on all 
levels  had  difficulties  to  adapt  their  immigration-theoretical  conceptualiza-
tions to this factual situation resulting from uncontrollable social dynamics.
The political-legal framework and the surrounding “official” discourse on 
immigration and integration was mainly carried out by political and economic 
actors locating immigration policies around the possibility of functionalizing 
them in the sense of solving internal problems and providing the best possible 
efficiency  for  the  economic  sphere. Social  actors  (such  as  labor  unions)  re-
mained in general outside these processes of policy-making until the 1970s. It 
is not astonishing that under these circumstances the opinions and strategies 
of the foreigners themselves were not considered as worthwhile to constitute 
guidelines within the process of establishing policy contents, or to be sincerely 
discussed in public. The fact that there was no need for any legitimation of 
political decision due to the exclusion of foreigners from public participation 
played another important role besides above-mentioned economic priorities 
for the lack of social  notions during these years. Until  the beginning of the 
1970s – setting political elections on local, regional and federal levels aside – 
foreigners were even excluded from elections to labor union committees.16
Another point significant for enabling/disabling and/or easing/harden-
ing processes of integration is the educational aspect. Rather than providing 
support based on the different socio-cultural backgrounds of the school chil-
dren, which was later tried to be done through the establishment of research 
areas such as Migrantenpädagogik, a fast absorption “of foreigners into normal 
German classes as quickly as possible” was demanded by the Standing Confer-
ence of State Ministers of Educations (Ständige Bildungsminisiterkonferenz) in 
14 AstA-Auslandsreferat der Universität und Evangelische Studentengemeinde Stuttgart (1972, p. 141).
15 Bech/Faust (1981, pp. 112–113).
16 Geiger (1982, pp. 169–189).
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1964. Under these circumstances, it does not astonish that the failure rate of 
foreign  pupils  until  and  throughout  the  1970s  was  very  high  compared  to 
those of  the German children.17 The highly selective German school system, 
which could and can be observed in general for the whole generation of school 
children, became one of the most significant integrational barriers for migrant 
children in the past and continues to be one in the present.
Germany’s attempt to make a radical break with its past based on the 
trauma of the socio-historical experience with fascism may be considered suc-
cessful for a lot of spheres of state and society. The expansion of basic rights 
formulations within legal texts, a continuing transparency within the relation 
of the citizen and the state, the democratization (that means the de-hierarchi-
zation) of the universities as a result of critical approaches coming in particular 
from the students, the consideration of social rights … this list of developments 
within the framework of a “new” Germany can be without doubt continued. 
However, developments in the sense of a positive legalization and in the sense 
of an increasing importance of a civil understanding of state and society con-
stituting a qualitative break from an authoritarian past did not include the for-
eigners during this period. They remained part of continuing traditions most 
significantly expressed in the above-mentioned prioritization of the interests 
of the state in accordance with the economic needs of the economic actors. 
Emphasis on the Social Dimension in the 1970s 
Starting with the mid-1970s, one can state demands for a step-by-step return 
to the rotation policies of the 1960s, whose realization would have factually 
meant nothing else than “immigration policies in the form of labor market 
policies”.18 In this context the Memorandum of the State Government of Baden-
Wuerttemberg (Denkschrift  der  Baden-Württembergischen Landesregierung), 
published at the beginning of 1975, should be mentioned, in which – among 
others – policies aiming at promoting the return of foreigners to their native 
countries through purposeful material, legal and ideal measures, and the limi-
tation of  the  duration  of  stay of  foreigners  planned to  be  prospectively  re-
cruited to a maximum of five years was demanded. Thus, the catchphrase of 
the  “guest-worker”  (Gastarbeiter)  being  used  a  long  time  in  the  immigra-
17 Boos-Nünning et al. (1976).
18 Okyayuz (1993, pp. 119–121).
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tion-political  debate,  which  can  be  taken  as  the  reflection  of  the  rotation 
policies of the 1960s were somehow backed politically. It was not earlier than 
in the beginning of the 1990s that a turning away from this term took place; it 
was  then replaced  with  the  commonly used  term “persons  with  migration 
background”.
Despite  above-mentioned demands  for  a  rigid  practice  concerning  the 
treatment of foreigners, the 1970s do nevertheless mark a period after World 
War II in which for the first time the social dimension of (labor) migration was 
openly debated in public. The living and working conditions of the (labor) mi-
grants were – maybe for the first time in such an intensity – debated in public. 
Thus, the important and unique thing was the inclusion of the future perspec-
tives  of  the  migrants  themselves.  The  discourse  “about” the  foreigner  was 
gradually replaced through the debate “with” him.19 In these years, the problem 
of integration made its appearance as a non-preventable social dynamic be-
cause of the far-reaching influx of family members to their relatives abroad; 
rather than being seen in a very limited sense as the “problem” of specific so-
cial groups, it was increasingly perceived and evaluated within the framework 
of the whole society.
The relatively high organizational grade of the foreigners in the labor unions 
is one of the most significant manifestations of the mentioned/underlined so-
cial dimension of those years. In 1974, 25 % of all foreign laborers were organ-
ized in the labor unions, whereby this share increased to 33.6 % by 1981. The 
share in the total organizational grade was 8.1 %.20 These data can be inter-
preted  as  the  “material”  reflection  of  this  socialization  process  within  the 
framework of the problem of integration.
Another significant indication for the social dimension is the “interven-
tion” of the “second generation” migrants in debates concerning their own fu-
ture perspectives, which have been increasingly observed since the mid-1970s. 
This generation developed a sense for their own environment that the genera-
tion of their mothers and fathers was still not able to do because of structural 
reasons (such as missing knowledge of the language and the socio-cultural and 
political conditions of the receiving countries). This development, which took 
place parallel to and in union with the situation in the labor unions, forced the 
policy actors to react. One of the gains of these developments was the mul-
19 Barth (2007).
20 Frey (1982, p. 393).
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ti-layered  use  of  the  term  “integration”,  nowadays  being  often  interpreted 
solely in its cultural and ethnic dimension. The problem of integration touched 
upon in the preliminary remark is hereby part of such a mono-factorial per-
ception of what integration might be.
Finally, the debates about possibilities of social and political participation 
of  the foreign population at  local  and regional  level  should be pointed out. 
Even if the conditions of such a participation are currently realized to a limited 
extent  solely  in a  few countries, the debates  in the 1970s  nevertheless  had 
severe impacts on the establishment of political and legal instruments such as 
immigrants’ councils (Ausländerbeirate) starting to work in the beginning of 
the 1980s. The importance of these councils does not consist of their mere ex-
istence due to the fact that they are and always have been “powerless and mar-
ginal” and are in no way “institutionalized channels of access to the political 
process”.21 But, they are (or may hopefully be) initial instruments of a process 
leading to social  participation forms independent from a formal citizenship 
status enabling the foreigners to be the determining parts of political decision-
making processes in matters of their own concern. The focus hereby should be 
on processuality rather than on stating certain time periods and/or “events” as 
negative or positive, the more so because Germany’s effort is not only to imple-
ment “new” immigration policies as a sort of political-technical practice but 
also to overcome deep-rooted approaches as mentioned in the part of this text 
dealing with Germany’s conceptualization of the “state”.
The last point refers to the interactive relationship between social com-
mitment  and  politics,  which  was  expressed  by  the  content  of  the  memo-
randum of the Federal Official in charge of Immigrants, Heinz Kühn, published 
in September 1979. In this text the social dimension of (im)migration reflected 
in all  above-mentioned forms with the special  emphasis on the integration 
topic was taken into account for the first time at an official level. This can be 
clearly seen through the demands for the acknowledgement of a factual im-
migration process having taken place since the late 1960s within the context 
of family reunification, for the naturalization option of foreigners and for giv-
ing (active) electoral rights on local level.22 The basic essence of these demands 
consisted in dismantling the state’s disposition over the foreigners resulting 
from the contents of the Aliens’ Law by accepting them as a minority actively 
21 Koopmans/Statham (1999, p. 666).
22 Kühn (1979).
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participating in the social life of the host countries. Furthermore, for the first 
time in the German post-war period, the “instrument” of double citizenship, 
which is currently (again) not part of the official immigration-political agenda, 
was introduced as an important integral part of immigration policies in the de-
bates on legal policy.23 The demands of the Kühn-Memorandum were also ar-
ticulated  by  social  actors  such  as  the  mentioned  labor  unions;  but  also 
churches, certain groups within political  parties, the German Lawyers  Asso-
ciation,  student  groups,  initiatives,  platforms  and  discussion  groups  “dis-
covered” the issue of migration and migrants. Refugees having fled from con-
servative-military dictatorships such as the one in Chile played an important 
role in this process of social mobilization, attempting to promote public de-
bates concerning the underlying reasons forcing people to leave their home 
countries. The “socialization” of the issue was somehow completed by “histo-
rizing” it, whereby both aspects draw attention from the “political” to the “so-
cial” sphere. In concrete terms – before and after the contents of the Kühn-
Memorandum were published – these social actors raised the voice for con-
crete integration programs instead of assimilation “which works toward mak-
ing foreign workers and their families into Germans”.24 “[C]harging that the re-
cruitment policy to date has been structured nearly exclusively according to 
the political criteria of the labor market”,25 for programs promoting the living 
together of foreigners and Germans rather than living side-by-side, for the ac-
knowledgement of different national identities and finally for a sort of “positive 
discrimination” in favor of the foreigners in order to secure social equality.26
Since the Memorandum is one of the most important cornerstones and 
points of contentions of current developments in the sphere of immigration 
policies with special emphasis on integration, some remarks will be made in 
the following chapters of this text. 
Despite all these developments, which can be evaluated as quite positive 
for the integration process of the foreigners in the long run, the immigration 
law as the fundament of immigration policies remained still valid in the form 
of an “exceptional legal framework system”. If one measures its criteria with 
the standards of classical liberal legal norms, it is not possible to speak of a leg-
23 Okyayuz (1993, p. 200).
24 Christlich-Demokratische Union (1977, p. 3).
25 Arbeiterwohlfahrt (1973, p. 8), O’Brien (1988, p. 123).
26 Arbeiterwohlfahrt (1973, p. 13).
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alization process in favor of the migrants within the sphere concerning the re-
lation between foreigner and the bourgeois state. The three central categories 
of law and the administration of justice – legitimacy, commitment to norms and 
legal compliance – are essentially not present in the contents of immigration 
laws.27 In none of the legal regulations having emerged since the ratification of 
the “first” post-war immigration law of 1965, we can state qualitative improve-
ments concerning these categories; at best, partial quantitative corrections (such 
as the extension of legal compliance for the migrants or – formulated the other 
way round – the narrowing of the broad disposition permission of the immi-
gration bureaus over the foreigners) were made from time to time.28 But, nev-
ertheless, besides all above-mentioned critical points, these corrections should 
be indeed annotated positively to draw a preferably differentiated picture of 
the situation. The 1970s might be characterized as a period of continuity and 
change, in which we can state a parallel of two (categorically different) con-
flicting dynamics.
On the one hand, we can state the continuity of an understanding con-
cerning the relation between the “foreigner” and the state emphasizing and 
prioritizing issues such as the stabilization of the “system”, the preservation of 
“structures”  and  an  understanding  of  policy-making  as  an  autonomous 
“sphere in itself” that is quasi-untouchable by social actors. One of the main 
reasons for this continuing rigidity in implementing immigration policies was 
the fear of disorder resulting from “a wave of wild cat strikes” led in large part 
by foreigners”;29 Turkish workers in particular played an important role during 
the strikes taking place in the Ford factory in Cologne.30 These events of the 
early 1970s are – among others – are indicators of the fact that the image of the 
foreigners as obedient and quiescent did not match the realities.31 But rather 
than trying to handle this reality in the sense of embedding it into solution 
mechanisms aiming at evaluating the foreigners as an active part of the totality 
of the “social”, measurements such as a recruitment stop for foreign workers 
from non-EC countries in 1973 only weeks after the above mentioned strikes,32 
the “disclosure of illegal employment of foreigners” because of their blocking 
27 Okyayuz (1993, pp. 90–91).
28 Ibid. (pp. 150–152).
29 O’Brien (1988, p. 118).
30 Hildebrandt and Olle (1975).
31 Tsiakalos (1983, pp. 79–91).
32 O’Brien (1988, p. 118).
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of the jobs for Germans,33 the deportation of foreigners “who had fallen back 
on  unemployment  compensation  or  social  welfare” even  if  they  possessed 
work and residence permits34 or the reduction of “the maximum age at which 
children of foreigners could enter Germany from 20 to 17” in 1978 were under-
taken.35
On the other hand, demands for a comprehensive social integration of 
labor  migrants  could  no  longer  be  excluded  from  the  immigration-political 
agenda; and parts of this agenda were reflected in the sense of attempting to 
establish improvements within the sphere of aliens’ rights as reflected most 
concretely in the Kühn-Memorandum. But the increasing impacts of such de-
mands only represent one aspect in shaping immigration policies in the sense 
of introducing for the first time issues such as social integration. The other as-
pect, which should be taken into consideration, and which exceeds the limits 
of the responsibilities of the nation-state after World War II, was Germany’s in-
tegration into a network of international relations, emphasizing – among oth-
ers – the importance of human rights. The rigid treatment of foreigners did ba-
sically not suit this context. Reminiscences of a fascist past could easily harm 
or even destroy Germany’s new-gained reputation among the Western allies. 
The sensitivity of the issue can be most clearly “read” from the words of Chan-
cellor Helmut Schmidt reproaching “the cynical exploitation of certain latent 
hostilities toward foreigners” as irresponsible.36 It might be not too exagger-
ated  to  state  that  the  roots  of  an  in-togetherness  of  internal  and  external 
factors, and additionally – after the 1990s – the in-togetherness of migration 
movements and globalization,37 which are currently significantly shaping mi-
gration flows in general and immigration policies in particular, were laid in 
these years. 
33 Dohse (1981, p. 321).
34 Ibid. (pp. 336–341).
35 Bundesministerium für Arbeit (1977).
36 Thränhardt (1984, p. 124).
37 Okyayuz (2005, p. 241).
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The Turn of the 1980s: 
Limitation of Immigrant Influx and Return Promotion Instead of Integration? 
Starting with the 1980s the social dimension of migration, e.g., migration in its 
specificity as an expression of social  dynamics, was increasingly embedded 
into the framework of a debate on the “foreigner problem”. Perceptions and 
conceptions in the field of immigration policies brought into the debate from 
now on encompassed policy-steering instruments such as the prohibition of 
the moving in from children to their mothers or fathers living solitarily in Ger-
many, and the implementation of a compulsory residence permit even for chil-
dren younger than 16 years.38
Hereby, the fundamental  position of  such concepts  was the “efficient” 
limitation of the further immigration of foreigners to Germany and the pro-
motion of their willingness to return to the countries of their origin.39 Parallel 
to this, an improvement of the economic and social integration of the foreign-
ers having lived for years in Germany was also part of the debate.40
But even before, starting with the mid-1970s up to the early 1980s, the 
policy-steering instrument of influx suspensions to certain regions, cities and 
city quarters was enforced. The reasoning (of the Federal Ministry of Labor and 
Social Order in 1976) underlying this policy proceeded on the assumption that 
the number of foreigners exceeding a predefined percentage within the total 
population would  put  a  strain  on the  “social  infrastructure”.41 Obviously, as 
early as in those years, parts of the official political actors began to assume 
that the integration process had failed. In this context, solutions were sought 
at the administrative-political level. In the 1990s, we will again meet a similar 
understanding, which will be evaluated throughout this text.
The above-mentioned developments in conjunction with a steadily in-
creasing use of terms such as “foreigner control” and “immigration control”42 in 
the public migration debate show priority shifts within the sphere of the socio-
38 Staatsministerium Baden-Württemberg (1981).
39 With the Programme for Financial Return Aids (Programm für finanzielle Rückkehrhilfen) from 1.12.1983, which found its 
expression in the “Law for the Promotion of the Return Willingness of Foreigners (“Gesetz zur Förderung der Rückkehrbe-
reitschaft von Ausländern”), the willingness to return started to be sanctioned institutionally (BT [Bundestags]-Drucksache 
X/351).
40 Bundesministerium des Innern (1982, p. 73).
41 Rist (1980, p. 83).
42 Bojadzijev/Mulot/Tsianos (2007).
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political perception of migration/migrants and the implementation of immi-
gration policies. The migrants having begun to actively participate in planning 
strategies concerning social  and immigration policies since the 1970s, or – at 
least – having shown the will to do so, were somehow downgraded to “objects 
of policies”. Parallel to this development, one can state a Europe-wide develop-
ment of institutionalized migration/migrant research. What took place was a 
“scientification” of the “foreigner problem”. Of course, research based on an ob-
jective-scientific basis is to be appreciated by all means. The migration centers 
having been built up since the 1980s have currently been doing research in 
fields such as migrants’ pedagogics or multilingual education; and as such they 
account for a diversification of migration and the migrant population and fi-
nally for the social dimension of migration mentioned above. Nevertheless it 
should be noticed that the point of departure of this development, which can 
be evaluated as quite positive from the standpoint of the migrants themselves, 
is located within the framework of the above-mentioned premises of the im-
migration-political approaches of the 1980s. Since the migrant population is 
bound to the immigration law, whose standards are not or only partially sub-
ject to “normal” legal state norms, their living and working condition are al-
ways “exceptional”. Thus, a legalization process, of which the results are nor-
mally  positive  for  the  native  population,  can  mean  the  contrary  for  the 
migrants. In this context, also a “scientification” in the field of migration re-
search can have these negative results for the migrants. These remarks should 
be interpreted as an example for the “reading between the lines” as mentioned 
above.
The immigration-political priority shifts having taken place in the 1980s 
did  find their  expression also at  the level  of  political  statements. Thus, the 
former Prime Minister of Berlin, Richard von Weizsäcker, proclaimed the fol-
lowing commentary in June of 1981: “Either return to the home country … or 
stay in Berlin; this has to include the decision to become German on the long 
run. [....] Berlin must stand the wall. But our city cannot stand fences we build 
up by ourselves”.43
These  words  depict  a  drifting  away from  the  option  of  naturalization 
(and thus from the option of double citizenship), having been formulated in 
the Kühn Memorandum from 1979. They set the preference in favor of an in-
tegration model, where the foreigners are accepted as building stones of social-
43 Gesemann (2009, p. 315). 
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structure  formation  and  development  solely  under  exclusion  of  their  own 
identity.
Quite a few statements corresponding to that of von Weizsäcker from the 
point of meaning can be stated in that decade. Thus, in a statement to the 
press in November 11, 1981, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said that there is agree-
ment on the point “that Germany is not an immigration country and shall not 
be so”.44 Following up these words, the Federal government decided on its im-
migration-political tenets dated February 1982, that “only by means of a con-
sequent and efficient policy of migration influx limitation [...] an indispensable 
acceptance of the German population concerning the integration of foreign-
ers” could be ensured. And continuing: “This is of absolute necessity for the 
preservation of social harmony”.45 In such a manner the leitmotif of a non-im-
migration  country  “had  been  already  established  at  the  end  of  Helmut 
Schmidt’s chancellorship [...] and can be identified as the basic principle of Fed-
eral  German immigration policies until  the late  nineties”.46 Until  now, alto-
gether with the problem of double citizenship, the question of immigration 
(migrants’ influx) is the controversially conducted central topic of immigration 
policies in Germany.
By reading the following inventory of  developments  starting with the 
1990s, the fact shall be taken into consideration that meanwhile a third and 
even  forth  migrant  generation is  growing  up in  Germany, one made up  of 
people who hardly know anything about their home countries, and the majori-
ty of whom are even in possession of the German citizenship. Even if Germany 
factually has become an immigration country, the mainstream conceptualiza-
tion consisting of a denial of this fact is still determining the guiding principles 
of immigration policies today. First attempts to change this situation (after the 
hopeful Kühn Memorandum) can be seen in the contents of the first draft of the 
actual Immigration Law of 2005, which was formulated in 2002. The principles 
formulated under the overall control of Rita Süssmuth (Süssmuth Commission) 
allowed for the acknowledgement of the thesis of Germany being an immigra-
tion country and for the possibility of double citizenship.47 
44 Bundesministerium des Innern (1998, p. 10).
45 Bundesregierung (1982, p. 7). 
46 Hell (2005, p. 81).
47 This is the most far-reaching attempt to date to change immigration-political perceptions and concepts valid until now. 
So far, it is the last attempt in a series of similar ventures. For example, in March 1992, the former Federal Official in charge 
of Immigrants, Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, raised demands “whereupon children of labor migrants born in Germany 
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At  this  point,  it  might  be  useful  to  make  some  remarks  within  the 
European context. Some countries such the United Kingdom have been accept-
ing the instrument of double citizenship for a long time by evaluating it as a 
necessity for living together; additionally, their colonialist past had practical 
impacts in establishing forms of “multiculturalism” without necessarily using 
this term.48 Germany, on the other hand, together with countries like Austria 
and Luxemburg, “has taken a more restrictive view of dual nationality, espe-
cially when it arises during the naturalization of non-nationals”.49 Germany’s 
negative approach is in general located around four arguments, whereby cer-
tain continuities concerning the prioritization of the political over the social 
can be stated as the driving force. Firstly, a loyalty conflict between the indi-
vidual and his belongings to different countries is mentioned. Accordingly, this 
is claimed to be hardening a successful integration process of the foreigners. 
Secondly, legal uncertainties are mentioned concerning issues such as inherit-
ance law. Thirdly, an unequal situation between “normal” and naturalized cit-
izens  are  claimed  to  have  arisen. Fourthly, international  regulations, which 
Germany did sign in the past (such as the 1963 Council of Europe Convention 
on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality), are claimed to build up legal 
mechanisms against double or multiple citizenship.50
Germany represents an “ethnocultural  exclusionist citizenship regime”. 
As a result, a big number of the German-born people with a migration back-
ground have still the status of foreigners lacking full political rights whereas 
countries such as Great Britain and Sweden offer a much easier access to “full 
social and political rights”.51
Germany’s argumentative patterns are mainly politically motivated, but 
there are some sociological “facts” which could be used as counter-arguments. 
Nowadays, at least one fifth of the non-national  population is born in Ger-
many, and if speaking of issues such as loyalty to the country of nationality, it 
would be a mere hypothetical construction to start from such a loyalty conflict. 
The reality is that the big majority of these people would have no problems 
carrying two or more passports. Loyalty is not a theoretical issue but a result of 
should automatically receive the German citizenship without having to give up the own one” (Okyayuz [1993, p. 15]). For the 
detailed content of these demands, see Süddeutsche Zeitung (1992, p. 2).
48 Hansen (2002).
49 Green (2005, p. 921). 
50 Green (2005, p. 922). 
51 Koopmans/Statham (1999, p. 661).
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concrete living and working conditions, which are centered in concreteness 
around  Germany  as  the  factual  new  home for  future life. In  current  years, 
these aspects of an ongoing social reality going beyond political statements 
has increasingly become part of scientific research mostly supporting the idea 
that double citizenship would cause no danger for the interests of the state by – 
at the same time – being aware of the limits of such instruments. The debates 
on citizenship, naturalization and integration do more and more (and again) 
include debates on double citizenship as one of the possible instruments not to 
enable but to ease integration.52
The fact  that some important central  citizenship rights, such as social 
rights, are – by all the critiques throughout this text – more or less factually 
available for all inhabitants of Germany independent from the issue of citizen-
ship/nationality  has  led to  formulations such as  “post-national” citizenship, 
seeming  to  underestimate  formal  citizenship.53 But, the  rights  in  the  social 
state’s framework should be completed through the political and legal rights. 
Only within this totality can a real re-shift to the social be seen as a potential. 
A “re-socialization” of immigration policies through an active social participa-
tion of the foreigners themselves, touched upon in the previous chapter, can 
only be achieved by including legal rights. The discourse of a “post-national” 
citizenship should be enriched through/with the help of a political and legal 
framework giving the foreigners a secure status to be not only named as part 
of the society but to be it factually. 
The above-mentioned claim of the importance and significance of formal 
citizenship preferably in the form of double/multiple citizenship can be con-
cretized by emphasizing the fact that it is a precondition for gaining certain 
rights.  Having access to full voting rights and to civil servant positions as a 
Beamter (a special state employment status being somehow a prerequisite for 
middle- and high-ranking positions) are only some of the issues enabling a 
person to become “part” of the society. Evaluated from this standpoint, citizen-
ship/double  citizenship  is  strongly  related  to  the  issue  of  integration.  But 
rather than evaluating it as a step towards integration, by the political author-
ities it was seen as a final point of a successful integration process.
Shortly after the passing of the law at the beginning of 2003, the Consti-
tutional Court nullified it in December of the same year. Finally, on January 1, 
52 For a detailed view see, among others, Faist (2004), Hagedorn (2001), Koslowski (2000).
53 Soysal (1994), Joppke (1999).
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2005, the current Immigration Law came into effect though no longer contain-
ing  the  integration-political  suggestions  of  the  Süssmuth  Commission.  The 
concrete contents will be gone into below.
The  discourse  of  a  possible  “foreigner  and  immigration  control” does 
mark conceptualities, which refer to a process moving away from the social 
level to a political-administrative one. The reduction of the influx age from 18 
to 16 years concerning adolescents aiming at joining their parents is one ex-
ample for such a shift. Since the beginning of the controversies on the actual 
Immigration Law, there have been (and are still) also demands for a further re-
duction from 16 to ten years.54 One of the most important reasons why family 
(re-) unification has always played an important role in all immigration-polit-
ical  debates since the beginning of foreign labor recruitment policies in the 
mid-1950s consists of the fact that it was one of the social dynamics which – 
from the very beginning until now – could not be administered. The more it 
had been tried, countermeasures were taken against this dynamic since the 
end of the 1970s/the beginning of the 1980s by means of using nearly all legal 
and political instruments.
Consequently, not only, Europe or worldwide economic crisis symptoms 
of whom first signs can be detected in the context of the petrol crisis in 1973 
and of whom the preliminary culmination point of those years was reached at 
the beginning of  the 1980s, but also can similar  developments be stated in 
most of the other Western European receiving countries such as Austria, Belgium 
or Switzerland. 
These developments towards a more restrictive practice of legal regula-
tions concerning migrants were based on three premises, which are, to a big 
extent, still valid until now:
- The first  of  these premises started from the point that  (and this  is 
even more the case nowadays) the integration of the “foreign fellow 
citizens”  has  failed  to  a  big  extent.55 The  above-mentioned  mul-
tilayered approach of the 1970s attempting to anticipate a holistic per-
ception of integration was replaced by a one-sidedly cultural- and eth-
nical-defined integration debate. It seemed (and seems) to be forgotten 
in the flow of this debate that integration always means disintegration 
at the same time. Disintegration in the sense that only somehow “integ-
54 Welt-Online (2003).
55 In this context the sensational heading of the weekly journal Der Spiegel (1997) shall be remembered: “Dangerously Ali-
en, The Failure of the Multicultural Society (Gefährlich fremd, Das Scheitern der multikulturellen Gesellschaft)”.
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rated” persons can understand the society in which they live to the ex-
tent that  they again can disintegrate themselves. The first  migrant 
generation  was, evaluated from such a  point  of  view, neither  inte-
grated nor disintegrated. They “solely” lived and worked.
- The second premise was based on the more or less openly articulated 
hypothesis  that  the  receiving  countries  were  still  “not  prepared” 
enough to cope with social tensions and conflicts resulting from the 
influx of new immigrants.
- The third hypothesis was based on a discourse of identity and culture 
as factors of difference, not unity. As a result of this premise (altogether 
with changes in  the global  agenda such as the renaissance of  new 
conservatisms, of nationalism, of the decline of the Soviet Union and 
furthermore of  the shifting away from egalitarian social  policies to 
neoliberal policy conceptualizations) the migrants were increasingly 
functionalized as a means for constructing something like a European 
identity. The counter model of such a European identity was located 
especially among the Muslim migrant community, independent from 
the fact of how these migrants themselves would define their own 
identity. 
From the 1990s to the Present: 
Political-Administrative Approaches to “Manage” the “Foreigner Problem”
Since the beginning of the 1990s, we can state attempts to “solve” the “foreign-
er problem” at a political and administrative level. Legal debates on citizenship, 
on the social and political participation of migrants and on regulations con-
cerning residence and work permits were held in order to solve the problems 
of persons evaluated as not capable of or willing to integrate themselves into 
the host societies. Whether with them or against them does not hereby play a 
significant role within the flow of the current debates.56 
Concerning the case of Germany lately, the main focus is on the Turkish 
migrant population being “registered” as non-European since the assault on 
the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and their destruction 
in  September  11,  2001.  This  situation  may  be  reflected  the  best  within  the 
framework of the process of Turkey’s EU access negotiations, and the hereby 
invoked debate on European basic values and cornerstones that Turkey, and as 
56 Barbieri (1998).
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such Turkey’s rooted population abroad, are accused of having nothing in com-
mon with. 
In  such  a  manner  the  former  SPD Member  of  the Federal  Parliament, 
Martin Neuffer, evaluated Turkey’s rooted population in Germany in 1986 as a 
group  of  persons  who  could  not  be  integrated:  “The  boat  is  full  and  he 
answered  the  question, whether  Germany  was  an  immigration  country  or 
not”.57 But even before, since the end of the 1970s, representatives – again of the 
SPD – had been articulating similar slogans.58
Starting with the beginning of the 1990s this sort (and similar sorts) of 
political conceptualizations concerning social order founded the headstone for 
the institutionalization and legalization of social dynamics of migration. The 
latest developments, such as the fact that persons from the former socialist 
countries after their decline immigrated to the Western European countries in 
general, those Russians of German ethnical origin (Aussiedler) immigrated to 
Germany  in  particular  and  furthermore  the  emerging  debate  on  asylum 
policies (having found first results in the latest regulations of the Refugee Law 
of 1993), altogether with attempts to differentiate between political and eco-
nomic asylum seekers and to predefine which countries could be stated as “se-
cure” and which could not, were added to the migration agenda.
Despite initiating a sincere and differentiated debate on the new (old) 
“global migration” issue, meaning the reasons for the emergence and the de-
velopment of a phenomenon, which actually is one of the determining factors 
within international relations, we have to state priority shifts towards a man-
agement of migration by means of political and legal instruments since the 
1970s. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the official policy actors there 
are in fact important reasons for such shifts. The most important ones can be 
listed as follows:
- Economic  and  demographic  changes  resulting  in  an  increased  de-
mand for qualified labor force;
- The inability of existing mechanisms and instruments (such as the 
former Immigration Law from 1991) to promote the integration pro-
cess of the migrants;
- Demands for an easing of naturalization; 
- The fight against illegal (im)migration;
57 For a comment of Neuffer from 1982 with similar meaning, see Neuffer (1982).
58 Fakten Fiktionen (2009).
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- Demands for a re-organization of the administrative responsibilities 
of the Immigration Bureaus;
- Demands for a harmonization of  immigration policies at the Euro-
pean level;
- Demands for a redefinition and reclassification of the different mi-
grants groups according to their political and legal status.
At this point, we have to note honestly that at the beginning of the period, 
where the above-mentioned priority shifts took place, legal improvements for 
the migrants were also demanded to be realized. Throughout the acting period 
of the Federal Government composed of social democrats and members of the 
“green” party from 1998 to 2005, the focus of prospective immigration policies 
was laid on the integration of the migrants living in Germany for a long time 
on the basis of extended political and legal rights. The beginning of this coali-
tion marks a – indeed short-lasting – renaissance to “socialize” the “foreigner 
problem” again rather than to “manage” or “solve” it solely on an administra-
tive level. Important evidence for this claim can be seen in the fact that the 
topic of double citizenship was also thrown into the debate again. 
But actually, after the failure of all these “social” attempts in the sense 
that the suggestions and demands of the Süssmuth Commission and later the 
contents of the law in 2003 were thrown out by the Constitutional Court, once 
more the priorities have changed meaning that the strand of the 1980s was re-
newed. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the composition of the 
actors as well as the focus on basic questions have changed. Additionally, new 
actors have “entered” the debate and are significantly determining the flow of 
the debates. Institutes claiming academic standards such as the “Institute for 
Economic Research“ in Berlin, as well as representatives of the Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, are drawing the main attention of their immigration-
political  perceptions and conceptions to  demographic  and economic points, 
and to the prevention of the immigration of a new unqualified foreign labor 
force manifesting itself, for example, in the – still unfinished – “green card” de-
bate. “Foreigner control” was replaced by the term “controlled” immigration, 
meaning lastly the extension of the disposition competence of the immigra-
tion bureaus over the migrants.
Throughout the publicly led debate on migration and integration, which 
is meanwhile dominated by the actors mentioned above, it seems not to be dif-
ficult to assess xenophobic and even racist notions focussing on the point that 
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persons of  non-European origin are  – first  and foremost –  a  threat  for  the 
European countries and societies, and as such have the duty to prove their suit-
ability for these locations.59 This seems to be also reflected in the new Immig-
ration Law (together with its latest modifications dated from July 2007). If all 
its contents would be practiced, Germany would become, according to a state-
ment of Pro Asyl, “less attractive, colder and hostile to integration”.60
With regard to this “coldness” raised by Pro Asyl, the fact that it is used to 
try to “solve” the issue of integration at the level of administrative measures is 
of determining significance. Obligatory language courses and the introduction 
of a points system measuring qualification are only a few of these measures.61 
We have to admit that the knowledge of the language of the society where 
people live is undoubtedly of great – more than this: of existential – impor-
tance for successful integration. Integration, however, is on the other hand a 
complex social  process whose “realization” is  determined by a multitude of 
factors. A reduction of this multitude to the administrative level is not by far 
enough to accommodate this complexity.
Conclusion: Changing Priorities and the Continuing Debate on 
Multiculturality and Integration
The course of the above-mentioned framework-conditions and their contentu-
al priority shifts since the 1970s in unity with a socio-political atmosphere of 
intolerance and a bad conjunctural situation established a political and ideolo-
gical context, in which nearly all attempts to “socialize” the “foreigner prob-
lem” have failed. The thesis of a “failed integration” brought into debate in Ger-
many  in  the  1990s,  widespread  by  the  media,  seems  to  be  actually  also 
accepted in most of the other Western European receiving countries. Even in – 
evaluated from the point of immigration-political framework-conditions and 
their practice – “liberal” countries such as the Netherlands or in countries such 
as the United Kingdom, where practiced “multiculturality” seems to be part of 
the social reality until now, voices demanding more restrictive policies can be 
heard louder and more affirmative from day to day. 
59 Müller (2005).
60 ProAsyl (2007, p. 1).
61 Müller (2005).
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The (im)migrants themselves are criticizing these priority shifts. Hakkı 
Keskin from the Turkish Community in Hamburg is summarizing this critique 
under four main points:62
- The actual regulations of the Immigration Law and their repressive 
practical character are cementing the Immigration Law in the form of 
a defensive law (directed towards the migrants).
- The priorities of the contents of the Immigration Law are determined 
in favor of the economic interests of the German entrepreneurs. 
- The migrants are classified as “good”, “useful” or “less useful”. In this 
context for the migrants classified as “less useful” it will be more dif-
ficult from day to day to secure their residential status.63 
- Factually, it will be more difficult to get an unlimited/residence per-
mit or German citizenship. Formerly, a “basic knowledge of the Ger-
man language” was sufficient for getting citizenship; whereas nowa-
days an “adequate“ one is demanded.
But not solely the living and working conditions of the “long-established” labor 
migrants will have worth according to this critique; also the conditions of the 
qualified ones which are planned to be recruited will be similarly bad as a res-
ult of the unequal relation between migrants and the bourgeois state based on 
the broad disposition competence of the immigration bureaus over the foreign-
ers. They will continue to miss equal rights as compared to the German popu-
lation. Their stay will continue to be temporary. Furthermore, the fact that a 
possible “green card” procedure is only planned to temporarily crack the re-
cruitment stop of 1973 rather than having stringency in itself can be evaluated 
in the sense that a principally new immigration policy is not on the agenda. 
Thus, the cornerstones of a “guest-worker policy” of the 1960s based on a rota-
tional system with timely limited working contracts did not change in principle.
The discourse about an aspired “multicultural society”, having been pro-
claimed in the 1970s by social scientists, pedagogues, representatives of social 
institutions, as well as by parts of the political elite in order to constitute an in-
tegration process of the whole society, is nowadays mainly done at the level of 
the self-identity building of specific social groups. In this context, we can speak 
of  an ethnification of  structural  problems, finally resulting in  similar  coun-
62 Keskin (2003).
63 In times where the “green card“ debate, dealing with a highly qualified foreign labor force, is ongoing, one can state that 
these “less useful“ groups of persons will consist mainly of “classical“ labor migrants having lived for years in Germany.
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ter-reactions from the migrants themselves; a vicious circle disabling real in-
tegration.64
Since the 1980s, a time period in which the social dimension of migration 
was neglected step-by-step in favor of administrative legal measures, the main 
focus within the context of immigration-political debates was on the integra-
tion of the migrants into the host countries. Hereby, integration was more and 
more evaluated in the sense of being a predefined and statical category by em-
phasizing a one-sided active and willful orientation of the migrants towards 
the host countries in the sense of a total acceptance of these host countries’ 
norms and values. As a precondition for such an acceptance, the knowledge of 
culture and language of the host countries is seen to be essential. Undoubtedly, 
such knowledge – as mentioned above – is necessary for the social and politi-
cal participation of the migrants, as well as for their possible success in eco-
nomic affairs. On the other hand, one should consider that such knowledge 
does not “automatically“ create something like sympathy or empathy of the 
migrants for the host countries, or even something like a social “nearness” of 
German citizens with a migration background with their new home countries. 
That means, this knowledge can ease social integration and political identifica-
tion, and maybe it can even create such things to a certain extent; but it can 
never deliver a “guarantee” for this.
However, integration being understood in a holistic sense should not be 
limited to demands directed toward the foreigners to learn certain languages, 
to be useful in economic life, to act socially peaceful and to live according to 
legal norms.
The migrants, who – despite all structural difficulties – begin to develop 
their own integration strategies, accept this one-sided debate on integration 
less and less. They demand changes in the perception and attitudes of receiv-
ing countries towards migration and migrants. Not least their calls for a new 
debate on integration are growing ever louder. 
The portrayed priority shifts of immigration-political contents since the 
1970s found their results in a paradigmatic change from a critical perception 
and conceptualization of integration (with associated debates concerning the 
question of what culture is or might even be) to an administrative-technical 
one. Until  now, questions on the preconditions and methodological practice 
for, and the social carriers of, “right” integration are not answered. These and 
64 Bienfait (2006).
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other – similar – questions, which can be solely answered within the frame-
work  and  in  due  consideration  of  historico-social  processes,  are  currently 
pressed  into  the  context  of  administrative-legal  procedures.  This  approach 
does in no way encourage the migrants to put their own experiences in the 
center of everyday living and working conditions. And the other way round; 
they will not be encouraged to perceive their factual living and working condi-
tions as such from the point of view of their consciousness. But, this is the only 
way “real” integration can work.
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Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar
Turkey is an important actor in terms of migratory regimes and migration man-
agement, as it stands at the junctions of Europe, Asia and Africa. Due to its geo-
political  significance and closeness  both to the EU Area and MENA (Middle 
East and North Africa), Turkey became the nexus of emigration, immigration 
and transit migration. Turkey has been a country of emigration for the last 
fifty  years  since  World  War  II.  The  movement  of  Turkish  guest-workers  to 
Western Europe and especially to Germany has been in the focus of interest. 
However, other countries of destination have become more important, as Turk-
ish firms have expanded their activities in the neighboring countries. In recent 
times, another phenomenon has become apparent. More and more, Turkey has 
also become a country of immigration. Especially migrants from MENA have 
moved to Turkey with its improving standard of living (in comparison to the 
region) and the increasing chances of getting a job (especially in informal sec-
tors). Furthermore, however, some of the immigrants see Turkey as a transit 
country of their long journey to (Western) Europe. This is of special impor-
tance for the EU, since the transit movement via Turkey directly affects the 
immigration control system from Turkey to the EU due to the common Turk-
ish-EU border.
In the context of Turkey’s accession to the EU, the issue of “potential mi-
gration” from Turkey and its impact upon European labor markets became one 
of the concerns of the EU, considering Turkey’s growing population and young 
labor force. In the light of the discussion about the deepening of the EU instead 
of enlargement, the relations between Turkey and the EU followed a stagnat-
ing pattern in the post-Lisbon Treaty period. Since the second half of 2008, un-
der  the  influence  of  conservative  leaders  of  Europe,  such  as  Merkel  and 
Sarkozy, relations between Turkey and the EU almost came to a standstill. Cur-
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rently, privileged partnership as an alternative form to Turkey’s membership is 
among the most controversial issues in the current agenda of EU.
Fears 
Among the fears of the EU with regard to Turkey’s membership, three points, 
which are elaborated below, play the most significant role. Firstly, due to the 
demographics of Turkey, the numbers of seats at the European Parliament will 
decrease, which is not for the sake of current members. Secondly, in terms of 
living standard and GDP per capita, Turkey is below the European average and 
considered as an outlier not fitting into the economic standards. Finally, due to 
the  Muslim  identity  of  Turkey,  there  are  concerns  about  the  disharmony 
between the Christian values of Europe and cultural impacts of Islam.
Too many 
The EU’s demographic trend is characterized by low fertility rates and longev-
ity. Thus, in demographic terms, Europe is facing the problems of an aging and 
shrinking  population  in  addition  to  the  low  labor  force  participation  rates. 
Demographic trends show that West Europe will  mostly rely on the foreign 
labor force in the future. Münz et al. (2007)1 underline the logical necessity of 
migration and postulate that on average a net flow of slightly less than one 
and half million labor migrants per year would be required to keep Europe’s 
economically active population at constant levels. 
With  regard  to  the  future  migration  potential  from  Turkey  to  Ger-
many, the demographic development might become crucial. In the mid-2000s, 
the size of the population was 82 million in Germany and 70 million in Turkey. 
In the last decade, the population grew by 0.1 in Germany and by 1.5 in Turkey. 
In the mid-2000s, 20 % of the total population in Germany was over 65 years of 
age. In Turkey, this ratio remained only at 6 %. Consequently, the population 
development might lead to an excess supply of labor in Turkey, while in Ger-
many it might lead to an excess demand for labor. Taken together that will 
stimulate  incentives  to  migrate  from Turkey to Germany. In comparison to 
Germany, Turkey’s population is increasing; however, this trend will be stabi-
lized as well in the long run.
1 Münz/Straubhaar/Vadean, F./Vadean, N. (2007).
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Too Poor2
Another crucial factor in determining the causes of migration is the contrast in 
the average standard of living among different countries. The choice of indi-
viduals to emigrate based on their increased income earning potentials does 
not follow a linear function, but instead a logarithmic one. This means that 
there is a stronger propensity for an individual to choose to migrate in the case 
of larger income gaps, which becomes weaker in the case of smaller income 
gaps. The propensity for an individual to emigrate may occur long before income 
generation between the host country and the country of origin have equalized be-
cause of a saturation point of migration. Thus, the speed of change is important. It 
makes a big difference whether the income gap is declining rapidly or not.
Figure 1: Per Capita GDP (in Purchasing Power Parities USD)* in Turkey and Germany, 1980 to 2008
* In this figure, Purchasing Power Parities USD have been used to reflect the standard of living and its difference   
between Turkey and Germany.
  Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators.
Figure 1 shows the rather wide gap in the average standard of living between 
Turkey and Germany by comparing the per capita GDP measured in purcha-
sing power parities USD. The gap has declined. In 1980, the GDP per capita in 
Turkey reached about 20 % of the German GDP per capita. Today, it reaches 
about 37 %.
2 Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2011, pp. 116–118).
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To illustrate how long it may take to catch up, Figure 2 reflects a simple 
simulation exercise. It is assumed that in the next decades Turkey’s GDP will 
grow faster than Germany’s GDP. (In the mid-2000s, the GDP per capita was 
around 30,000 USD in Germany and 10,000 USD in Turkey).
Figure 2: Simulation of the Gap in Per Capita GDP (in Purchasing Power Parities USD)* between 
Turkey and Germany, 2008 to 2050, under the Assumption of Different Annual Growth 
Rates for the GDP
* In this figure, Purchasing Power Parities USD have been used to reflect the standard of living and its differ-
ence between Turkey and Germany.
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators.
The simulation shows that  under  this  assumption, the German GDP grows 
with a constant rate of 2 % per year while the Turkish GDP has to grow by 3 % 
per  year to  keep the  existing gap of  the GDP per  capita  vis-à-vis  Germany 
stable. Turkey requires a more rapid growth of its GDP to compensate for its 
more rapid population growth. If the Turkish economy grows by 4 % per year 
and the German GDP stays at 2 % per year, the Turkish GDP per capita will 
reach half the size of the German GDP per capita by 2040. If it grows by 5 % per 
year, the 2:1 gap is reached by 2025. The simulation exercise is a simple esti-
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mate to illustrate how long the substantial gap of the average standard of liv-
ing will persist between Germany and Turkey. This would be the case even if 
the Turkish economy grows (much) faster than the German one.
Too Muslim
Within the last fifty years of Turkish migration to Western Europe, one dimen-
sion became gradually dominant in defining the image of “Turks” in Europe: 
religion. Turkish  migrants  increasingly  are  defined  and  perceived  as  being 
“Muslim” in the first place, in addition to all their specific characteristics. There 
are several reasons behind this shift. One is unarguably the events of Septem-
ber 11, which somehow increased fears of Muslim communities and contrib-
uted to the rise of Islamophobia. The second reason is the pattern within the 
Turkish diaspora towards conservatism, which reflects itself in the increasing 
number of ethnic and religious associations, in which Turkish migrants are or-
ganized. The internal politics in Turkey is in line with the religious tendencies 
of Turkish community in Europe. This brings the long-standing question under 
discussion one more time: the contradiction between the secular identity of 
Europe and the Islamic tradition of Turkey. The AKP (Justice and Development 
Party)’s victory in the latest political elections makes this question even more 
meaningful and it is worth discussing the challenges that Turkey will face in 
the near future in terms of religion, being the sole Muslim candidate of the 
union.
Too many fears?
Regarding the population developments in Turkey and in the EU – with a fast-
growing population in Turkey and a declining and aging population in the EU – 
and taking into account the gap in the average standard of living, there is a po-
tential for migration flows from Turkey to the EU indeed. This is one (and probably 
the most important) reason why some EU countries (especially Germany) are 
concerned about applying the right of free movement in the case of Turkish 
workers.3 Are  these  fears  justified  by  theoretical  expectations  or  empirical 
evidence? Several studies have attempted to answer these questions; however, 
“migration intention” is a complicated concept whose measurement is fairly 
complex.4 
3 Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2010 a, p. 8).
4 For a detailed review, see Paçacı Elitok (2010).
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The main methodological difficulty for most of these studies lies in the 
fundamental political and institutional change that goes along with a Turkish 
accession to the EU. Turkey becoming a member of the EU and being granted 
the right of free movement for Turkish workers means doubtlessly a unique 
experience with no historical blue-print at all. Thus, if there is a case where the 
famous Lucas-critique5 is well applied, it comes with the changes an EU mem-
bership for Turkey would generate. The methodological key questions are: how 
far can we (1) use experiences in the past to learn something for the future and 
(2) speculate about the migration potential from Turkey to the EU after such a 
fundamental change from strong to no restrictions has taken place? Briefly, 
summarizing the existing empirical evidence6 from all the different studies, 
one thing becomes very clear: the estimations present broadly varying num-
bers. Figures with respect to the volume of potential Turkish migrants from 
Turkey to the EU range between 0.5 to 4.4 million. It is sufficient to say that the 
literature lacks an agreement on a reasonable interval with a minimum and a 
maximum value. The wideness of the range is rather large and quite sensitive 
to the data sets and methodologies that are applied, which brings the reliabil-
ity of numbers into discussion. Forecasting the approximate volume of poten-
tial  migration is quite necessary, especially for policy makers; however, one 
should  be  cautious  when  approaching  the  estimation  literature,  since  the 
range is rather wide and the quality of the data is poor and the methodologies 
are unclear and inconsistent. Moreover, the focus of the debate should rather 
shift  to  the  profile,  the  structure,  the  dynamics,  the  regional  distribution, 
trends and mechanisms of potential migration flows and to the motivation of 
migrants to come to Europe. 
Actually, the question is not so much: how many Turkish workers would 
take use of the right to move freely? The right question is: how many more (or 
5 The Lucas-critique is “that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models. ... [This con-
clusion] is fundamental; for it implies that comparisons of the effects of alternative policy rules using current macro econo-
metric models are invalid regardless of the performance of these models over the sample period or in ex ante short-term 
forecasting” (Lucas [1976, p. 41]). The Lucas-critique refers to the level of consistency and invariance over time and space. It is 
about the correctness of an extrapolation from past migration patterns to expected migration behavior and it is about the 
possibilities of applying empirical migration experiences from one area to another. Some scholars try to overcome this fun-
damental methodological problem by the inclusion of so-called country-specific effects. In most econometric forecasts the 
country-specific aspects are captured by a country-specific intercept, which remains constant over time. However, it re-
mains more than crucial how the country-specific intercept is defined and applied to Turkey that has had no historical ex-
perience of free migration to Europe. 
6 Paçacı Elitok (2010).
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even less) would move compared to a situation with no right of free move-
ment? Erzan et  al. (2006)7 show that if  Turkey’s  membership process is  en-
dangered and high growth cannot be sustained, 2.7 million people may be pen-
etrating the EU-15 despite the restrictions on the labor mobility. This is more 
than in a scenario with a Turkish EU membership and free movement for Turk-
ish workers. Thus, it is not unrealistic to expect, that under the lack of full EU 
membership and free movement of labor, Turkish migration flows towards the 
EU will be even at higher levels. The migration experience after the Eastern en-
largement has shown that the actual migration flows are fairly below the ex-
pected levels, following the accession. It might be that something like a migra-
tion  hump  will  be  the most  realistic  scenario. There will  be  an increase  of 
migration flows firstly, just after the right of free movement is granted. But 
after a while, it will decrease.8
Potentials9
Migration flows from the EU to Turkey will be determined by various factors 
(income  differentials, unemployment, migrant  networks, migration  policies, 
religion, culture, etc.) in the future. European retirees will keep migrating to 
Turkey, particularly to the Aegean and Mediterranean Area, for their retire-
ment life. The return of people with a Turkish background and also the return 
of retiring Turkish migrants (e.g., first-generation German-Turks) will also be 
an increasing part of potential migration flows from the EU to Turkey. Yet, due 
to the entry requirement to the host country every six months, their move-
ments will be categorized under circular migration. As Istanbul becomes more 
and more attractive for international business, headquarters of multinational 
corporations will keep setting up there, which will motivate expatriate work-
ers and professionals to migrate to Turkey for work-related purposes. In addi-
tion to foreign professionals, the potential migration to Turkey of highly skilled 
migrants with a Turkish background who are educated in Germany is and will 
be significant. 
Istanbul will keep and even increase its attractiveness for migrants, espe-
cially highly skilled ones. Considering its development, Istanbul will be com-
7 Refik/Kuzubas/Yildiz (2006, pp. 33‒34).
8 Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2011, pp. 107‒128).
9 Ibid. (pp. 122‒123).
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peting with other global cities in attracting international migration flows. Stu-
dent migration will play a crucial role, as well. Due to the lack of cultural and 
language barriers, students from Turkish-speaking countries like Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, etc., will  prefer Turkey for educational  purposes. 
This temporary future potential of students may turn into permanent migra-
tion depending on the work opportunities. 
One can observe heterogeneity to  a great extent within the Black Sea 
Area and the Middle East. Economic forecasts on the future of the Turkish eco-
nomy and Turkey’s neighborhood postulate that this heterogeneous structure 
will continue and become even more intensified since the dynamics of each 
economy are quite diverse. The discrepancies among the countries in the re-
gion can be considered as a sign for a future divergent pattern. The probability 
of these countries to converge is fairly low. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the 
Turkish neighborhood has implications in terms of distribution of gains from 
trade as well as the migration potential.10 Due to the gaps among countries 
with respect to their main macroeconomic indicators, Turkey’s role in man-
aging the migration flows from Middle East and ex-Soviet Union countries is 
of considerable importance. Under this framework, it is possible to foresee that 
migration from the Middle East will keep its importance in the near future and 
may even increase due to the latest developments in the visa policy of Turkey. 
Male migrants will be motivated by the job opportunities in construction, tour-
ism  and  entertainment, whereas  female  migrants  will  be  preferred  for  do-
mestic services. Current migration forms, such as contract-dependent labor mi-
gration and marriage migration, will be persistent in the near future, where 
asylum seeking (in accordance with the possible solution of Kurdish dispute) 
may have a declining trend with the full membership to the EU. 
The migration potential from Turkey to the Middle Eastern countries is 
relatively weak due to the tendencies in the region to employ their own citi-
zens and encourage the young generation to work in the country. 
Challenges and Opportunities 
Push and pull factors behind the potential migration are of great importance. 
With  the  possible  membership  to  the  EU,  Turkey  should  consider  revising 
these factors in their historical context so as to find policy solutions for elimi-
nating the pushing factors and improving the pulling ones. Considering the 
10 Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2010 b).
Conclusion 267
low wages and high unemployment as the main pushing factors behind the 
potential for labor migration, Turkey can develop policy measures to deal with 
these issues. This, inevitably, requires structural and institutional reforms that 
stabilize the Turkish economy. Better living standards, which are closer to the 
EU  average,  would  decrease  the  motivation  of  Turks  to  migrate  towards 
Europe. EU membership helps to reach this goal. What we have learnt from the 
EU experience in the past is that if labor has the legal right to move freely, this 
makes people (especially in border areas) more mobile internationally, but it 
does not induce mass migration in itself from one country to another. People’s 
social and cultural ties with their local environment are an important obstacle 
for migration, and this factor has commonly been underestimated from the 
perspective of theoretical economics. Furthermore, it has not been taken into 
account  seriously  enough  in  light  of  the  structural  migration  (forecasting) 
models. Therefore, EU membership might provoke not more but rather less mi-
gration from Turkey to the EU.
The EU intends to control migration, to select migrants on a skill-basis, to 
avoid illegal migration and to sign bilateral agreements so as to correspond to 
the need for immigrating labor force. Turkey, a country, which has waited long 
for EU membership, alters its foreign policy and migration management in a 
manner that improves its relations with its neighbors, especially in the Middle 
East. With respect to visa restrictions, Turkey has been following a liberal visa 
policy since 2005. Several visa-free agreements were signed with neighboring 
countries including Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Russia. The main motivation of 
Turkey was mainly economic gains from more integration in the region, yet its 
liberal visa regime brought the “construction of a new Schengen area in the 
Middle East” under discussion. This alteration stands both as a challenge and 
an opportunity for Turkey and its future perspectives on migration. On the one 
hand, it can be read as a “political message” to the EU, which lately initiated the 
privileged membership as an alternative for Turkey, revealing that there are 
other options for Turkey in its neighborhood for various integration possibil-
ities and unions. On the other hand, within the EU, Turkey’s liberal visa policy 
increased the concerns about the security issues in relation to border manage-
ment, since the free entrance of immigrants both from Middle East and from 
Russia facilitates the potential for illegal and transit migration to Europe via 
Turkey.11 
11 Ibid. (p. 126).
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One of the most crucial challenges for Turkey in its relations with the EU 
is illegal migration. Due to its geographical location, Turkey will be under the 
risk of increasing irregular migration pressure. Potentials for irregular migra-
tion to Turkey (from the Middle East and from ex- Soviet Union countries) and 
the significance of female migration within this flow will continue to be of 
considerable  importance. Kirişçi  (2008)12 emphasizes  the  increasing  import-
ance of managing illegal migration, both as a challenge and as an opportunity, 
for Turkey in the near future, as it has become a transit country. Yet, he postu-
lates that the manner in which “migration” has become securitized by the EU 
has adversely affected the EU-Turkish relations and generated “mistrust” on 
both sides. According to Kirişçi, the EU feels that Turkey is not doing enough to 
combat and prevent illegal transit migration and suspects that Turkey has al-
lowed illegal migrants to use its territory to transit to the EU; and there is fear 
on the Turkish side that the EU intends to use Turkey as a buffer zone for irreg-
ular migrants in line with the EU regulations. Currently, Turkey altered its ap-
proach with respect to migration policy, namely: asylum law, visa regulations, 
illegal migration and human trafficking. In terms of asylum, the two main le-
gislations that are under consideration are the 1994 Asylum Regulation and 
the 2006 Circular stipulating asylum procedure and the rights and obligations 
of refugees and asylum seekers.  Even if Turkey is party to the UN Refugees 
Convention of 1951, it has still not lifted the geographical limitation, namely, 
non-Europeans are not granted refugee status. If it is well managed, the chal-
lenge of  illegal  migration can turn into  an opportunity for  Turkey so as  to 
freshen the negotiations with the EU. Cooperation and dialogue between Tur-
key and the EU with respect to illegal migration would be beneficial for the se-
curity of both sides.13
Turkey is under criticism because of its migration policies being weak, 
unsystematic and temporary. Taking the past as a reference point for the fu-
ture based on the lessons from migration history, Turkey has to re-evaluate its 
own interests and build up policy tools dismissing push factors, particularly in 
transition period, so as to transform migration from being a challenge to being 
an opportunity. There are risks and challenges for Turkey waiting at the gate of 
Europe. It is crucial to recognize the importance of policy-oriented questions 
regarding the push and pull factors and how they changed throughout history 
12 Kirişçi (2008).
13 Ibid. (p. 126).
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and how they influenced migration decisions. Turkey ought to conduct reforms 
on expected emigration and immigration flows as a structural grounding of le-
gislations and institutions in addition to the economic measures discarding 
the pushing factors, such as low wages, economic instability, unemployment 
and  inadequate  working  conditions. Yet, Turkey  must  recognize  the  impor-
tance of migration as a development tool for its own sake (with or without EU 
membership), and should get prepared for short- and long-term effects of ex-
pected migration. It is better for Turkey to realize the importance of immigra-
tion factors during the EU negotiations and restructure its position according 
to its potential benefits from migration flows. The approach of Turkey in the 
1960s, namely, considering migration as a remedy for unemployment and re-
mittances as a source of foreign currency, should be replaced by a more realist-
ic and contemporary future projection so as not to repeat the same mistakes. 
Turkey should seek routes for a transformation from a labor exporter country 
to a labor importer country.
The EU is being criticized due to the lack of common binding frame. Even 
if several steps have been taken so far, Europe is still lacking a common immi-
gration policy  and is  under  criticism due to the  lack  of  consistency among 
European members. The former policies were criticized because of being in-
flexible, non-adaptive, top-down, bureaucratic, too specific  and designed for 
the local needs. It is among the targets of the Lisbon Agenda for the post-2010 
period to create employment opportunities for the unemployed low skilled mi-
grants, to promote the integration of available migrants and to implement a 
shift to a more selective migration policy. Consequently, migration will keep its 
key role in relations of Turkey with the EU – not necessarily for the next fifty 
years but certainly for the next decade.
270 Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar
References
Kirişçi, K. (2008): Managing Irregular Migration in Turkey: A Political-Bur-
eaucratic Perspective, CARIM Analytical and Synthetic Notes, 61, Robert Schu-
man Centre for Advanced Studies, Fiesole/Florence (EUI).
Lucas, R. E. (1976): Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique, in: Brunner, 
K., Meltzer, A. H. (eds.): Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 1.
Münz,  R.,  Straubhaar,  T.,  Vadean,  F.,  Vadean,  N.(2007): What  are  the mi-
grants’  contributions  to  employment  and  growth?  A  European  Approach, 
HWWI-Hamburg Institute of International Economics, Policy Paper, 3(3).
Paçacı Elitok, S. (2010): Estimating the Potential Migration from Turkey to 
the European Union: A Literature Survey, HWWI Policy Paper, 3(11), Hamburg. 
Paçacı Elitok, S., Straubhaar, T. (2010 a): Is Turkey still an Emigration Coun-
try? HWWI Policy Paper 3(5), Hamburg.
Paçacı Elitok, S., Straubhaar, T. (2010 b): The Turkish Economy in a Regional 
Perspective, HWWI Policy Paper, 3(12), Hamburg.
Paçacı  Elitok,  S.,  Straubhaar,  T.  (2011):  Turkey as a  Migration Hub in the 
Middle East, Insight Turkey 13(2), pp. 107–128.
Refik, E., Kuzubas, U., Yildiz, N. (2006): Immigration Scenarios: Turkey-EU, 
Turkish Studies, 7(1), pp. 33–34.
List of Abbreviations
AKP Justice and Development Party
ASAM Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and 
Migrants
AZR Central Aliens’ Register
CBRT Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
DESIYAB State Bank for Industry and Migrant Investment
ECHR European Court of Human Rights
EHRC European Human Rights Convention
ENP European Neighborhood Policy
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro Interbank Offered Rate
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GaWC Globalization and World Cities
GDA The Solidarity Network for Migrants 
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDS General Directorate of Secretary
GNI Gross National Income
GNP Gross National Product
HCA Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly
HLWG The EU’s High Level Working Group
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICMC International Catholic Migration Commission 
ICT Independent Commission on Turkey
IHH The  Foundation  for  Human  Rights  and  Freedoms  and  
Humanitarian Relief 
IKV Economic Development Foundation
IMF International Monetary Fund
272 List of Abbreviations
IMILCO Network International Migration, Informal Labour and Community in  
Europe: Swedish-Turkish Initiative for Research and Policy
IOM International Organization for Migration
ITO Istanbul Chamber of Commerce
LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate 
MazlumDer The Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for 
Oppressed People 
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MOI Ministry of Interior
MoLSS Ministry of Labour and Social Security
Mülteci-Der Association for Solidarity with Refugees
MURCIR Marmara University Research Centre for International Relations
NAAP National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis 
NAP National Action Plan
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OECD Organization for Economic and Co-operation Development
UNCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
PKK The Kurdistan Worker’s Party – Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan
TIMS Turkish International Migration Survey
TÜİK Turkish Statistical Institute
TÜSİAD Turkish Industry and Business Association
UGINAR International Migration, Labour Force and Population Move-
ment
USA The United States of America
USSR    Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
International  Workshop on Migration Potentials  from and 
to  Turkey
Hamburg, January 12, 2010 
HWWI Hamburg Institute of International Economics  
 in cooperation with
CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research  




Monday, January 11, 2010
19.00 Opening reception/Welcoming Dinner
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
9.00 – 9.30 Thomas  Straubhaar  (HWWI  and  Transatlantic  Academy,  
Washington D. C.).
Welcome and Opening Remarks
9.30 – 10.30 Ahmet İçduygu (Migration Research Program [MiReKoc] and 
Department of International Relations, Koc University, Istanbul)
Keynote  speech:  The  Politics  of  International  Migration:  
A Debate over the EU-Turkey Relations
10:30 – 11.00 Coffee Break
11.00 – 12.00 Herbert  Brücker  (Institute  for  Employment  Research  [IAB]), 
Nuremberg)
EU Enlargement and Migration Potentials: CEE versus Turkey
274 International Workshop on Migration Potentials from and to Turkey 
12.00 – 13.00 Refik Erzan (Department of Economics and Center for Economics 
and Econometrics [CEE], Bogazici University, Istanbul)
Migration Scenarios, Turkey – EU
14.00 – 14.00 Lunch Break
14.00 – 15.00 Gülay  Toksöz  (Political  Science  Department  and  Women’s 
Studies Center, Ankara University, Ankara)
On the Crossroads of Migration: Turkey as a Sending and Receiv-
ing Country  ‒  Analysis  of  Labor  Markets  from a Gender  Per-
spective
15.00 – 16.00 Ahmet Evin (Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Department, 
Sabanci University/Istanbul Policy Center, Istanbul, and 
currently at the Transatlantic Academy, Washington D. C.)
Eastern Enlargement and Turkey’s contradictions
16.00 – 16.30 Coffee Break
16:30 – 18.00 Discussions and Concluding Remarks
Contributors
Thomas Straubhaar (Editor)
Prof. Dr. Thomas Straubhaar was born in Switzerland in 1957. He studied Eco-
nomics at the University of Berne, Switzerland, where he received his Master’s 
degree in Economics in 1981 and earned a Ph. D. in Economics in 1983. After-
wards,  he  worked  as  a  Postdoctoral  Fellow  at  the  University  of  California 
Berkeley, USA. In 1987, he obtained his habilitation at the University of Berne 
for a thesis on “The Economics of International Labor Migration”. His profes-
sional career started at the universities in Konstanz, Bern, Freiburg and Ham-
burg. Since 1999, Thomas Straubhaar has been working as Professor of Eco-
nomics at the University of Hamburg. Furthermore, he has been Director of the 
Hamburg Institute of  International  Economics (HWWI) since 2005. In 2009, 
Professor Straubhaar was awarded the Helmut Schmidt Fellowship of the ZEIT 
Foundation at the Transatlantic Academy in Washington, D. C. His research in-
terests are especially in the fields of economic policies, regulatory policy, wel-
fare and social policies.
Seçil Paçacı Elitok (Editor) 
In 2008, Dr. Seçil Paçacı Elitok received her Ph. D. in economics from the Univer-
sity of Utah (USA), where she specialized in economic growth, development 
economics and international trade. She worked as an instructor throughout 
her graduate studies in the Economics Department of the University of Utah 
before joining the Maltepe University, Istanbul (Turkey), in which she had the 
opportunity to participate in research projects  on migration and coordinate 
the Erasmus program as well as enriching her teaching portfolio. She received 
the Higher Education Teaching Specialist (HETS) designation from the Univer-
sity of Utah in December 2006. She joined the Hamburg Institute of Interna-
tional Economics (HWWI) in June 2009 as a Marie Curie research fellow in the 
context of the EU Marie Curie Research Training Network TOM (Transnational-
ity of Migrants) and worked as a senior researcher in the Migration Research 
Group (MRG). Her main research interests are international migration with a 
specific focus on migration from and to Turkey as well as high-skilled migra-
276 Contributors
tion and remittances. She is currently a post-doctoral research fellow at the 
University of Hamburg.
Şebnem Tuğçe Pala (Assistant Editor)
Şebnem Tuğçe Pala received her B. A. in English Language and Literature at Ege 
University in Izmir, Turkey, in 2009, and later received her Associate Degree in 
Public Relations and Publicity at Anadolu University in Turkey in 2010. She 
studied in the Department of European Cultures and Languages at the Univer-
sity of Modena and Reggio Emilia through the Erasmus Exchange Program, in 
Modena, Italy, in 2007, and she got a DAAD Summer School Scholarship for Ad-
vanced Level of German and she studied at Ludwig Maximilians University in 
Munich, Germany, in 2008. Afterwards, she completed her M. A. in International 
Political Economy at the University of Warwick in Coventry, United Kingdom, 
in January 2011. Her dissertation was on the critical  review of the financial 
crisis with reference to political and economic impacts on Turkey. After com-
pleting her M. A. program, she worked as a Research and Marketing Intern at 
the International Centre for Parliamentary Studies for two months in London 
in 2011. She is currently studying for her second M. A. in Development Studies 
at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva 
for the next two years as a full scholarship holder. Her particular research in-
terests are migration, development and democratization.
Ahmet İçduygu 
Ahmet İçduygu is Professor of International Relations and the Director of the 
Migration Research Program at Koc University, Istanbul, Turkey. He currently 
serves as the national correspondent of Turkey to the SOPEMI-OECD, Paris, and 
as a member of the International Advisory Board of Mediterranean Migratory 
Observatory, Athens. He  has  conducted  research  for  international  organiza-
tions such as IOM, UNHCR and ILO. He teaches on the theories and practices of 
citizenship, international  organizations, civil  society, nationalism and ethni-
city, migration and research methods. In addition to his numerous articles in 
scholarly journals, he has published a recent a book,  Migration and Transfor-
mation: Multi-Level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism, co-edited with Pirkko 
Pitkänen and Deniz Sert (Springer 2011).
Contributors 277
Ayşem Biriz Karaçay 
Dr. Ayşem Biriz Karaçay has recently received her Ph. D. degree in Political 
Science and International Relations from the Social Science Institute of Mar-
mara University. Her dissertation focused on the flows and general character-
istics of project-tied migration between Turkey and Russia. She is currently the 
Administrator of Migration Research Centre at Koç University (MiReKoc). Her 
interest areas include labor migration, irregular migration, human smuggling/ 
trafficking, border management and practices of citizenship. 
Juliette Tolay
Juliette Tolay is a Ph. D. doctoral candidate in political science and international 
relations at the University of Delaware. Her dissertation particularly focuses 
on Turkish approaches to immigration and she studies the historical and cul-
tural sources of these complex attitudes and policies. She is a former fellow at 
the Transatlantic Academy, where she conducted research on Turkish foreign 
policy and co-authored the book: Turkey and Its Neighbors: Foreign Relation in  
Transition (Lynne Rienner, 2011). She has also authored a number of articles on 
Turkey, asylum, migration and Turkey-EU relationships. A French and Turkish 
national, Juliette Tolay has also studied at Sciences Po in Paris, from which she 
has received her B. A. and her M. A. She is the 2010 recipient of the first prize of 
the Sakip Sabanci International Research Award for a paper on multicultural-
ism in Turkey. In January 2012, Juliette Tolay will be an assistant professor in 
the  Department  of  International  Relations  at  Bucknell  University  in  Penn-
sylvania. 
Kemal Kirişçi
Kemal Kirişçi is a Professor in the Department of Political Science and Interna-
tional Relations at Boğaziçi University, Istanbul. He holds a Jean Monnet Chair 
in European Integration and was also the director of the Center for European 
Studies at the university between 2002 and 2008. He received his Ph. D. at City 
University in London in 1986. His areas of research interest include European 
integration, asylum and immigration issues in the European Union, EU-Turkish 
relations, Turkish foreign policy, ethnic conflicts, and refugee movements. He 
has previously taught at universities in Britain, Canada, Switzerland and the 
278 Contributors
United States. His books include Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emi-
gration and Immigration in Turkey (co-edited with A. İçduygu) (Istanbul: Bilgi 
University Press, 2009), Turkish Immigrants in the European Union: Determin-
ants of Immigration and Integration (co-edited book with R. Erzan) (Routledge, 
London, 2007), Turkey In World Politics: An Emerging Multi-Regional Power (co-
edited with B. Rubin) (Lynne Reinner, Boulder, 2001), The Political Economy of  
Cooperation in the Middle East (co-authored) (Routledge, London, 1998), Turkey 
and  the  Kurdish  Question: An  Example  of  a  Trans-State  Ethnic  Conflict (co--
authored) (Frank Cass, London, 1997) and  The PLO and World Politics,  (Frances 
Pinters, London, 1986). Kirişçi is the co-editor of the special issue of  New Per-
spectives on Turkey on the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. The issue 
was published in May 2009. Kirişçi has written numerous reports on immigra-
tion issues in EU-Turkish relations that can be accessed from www.carim.org. 
He completed a fellowship at the Transatlantic Academy in Washington, D. C., 
in June 2010 and contributed to the report entitled Getting to Zero: Turkey, Its  
Neighbors and the West. In June 2011, he received the first prize of the Sakıp 
Sabancı International Research Award.
Gülay Toksöz 
Gülay Toksöz is Professor at Ankara University, in the Department of Labor Eco-
nomics and Industrial Relations. She received her B. Sc. and M. Sc. in the De-
partment of Economics and Statistics at the Middle East Technical University 
and Ph. D. in the Department of Political Sciences at the Free University Berlin. 
Her  interest  areas  are  gender  issues in labor  markets, development, female 
labor and international labor migration. She has various articles and books on 
these topics. She is a member of the group  Feminist Researchers on Female 
Labor (KEFA-KEİG).
Çağla Ünlütürk Ulutaş 
Çağla Ünlütürk Ulutaş is research assistant at University of Pamukkale in the 
Department  of  Labor  Economics  and  Industrial  Relations.  She  received  her 
B. Sc., M. Sc. and Ph. D. in the Department of Labor Economics and Industrial Re-
lations  at  Ankara  University. Her  main  research  interests  are  social  policy, 
labor  sociology  and  sociology  of  health. She  has  several  articles  on  female 
Contributors 279
labor, international labor migration and trade unions. She is a member of the 
group Feminist Researchers on Female Labor.
Sema Erder
Sema Erder is Professor in Urban studies and she teaches at Bahçeşehir Univer-
sity, Istanbul. Her current research interests focus on irregular migration and 
its  consequences  and migration policy. She has published various books, as 
well as articles, with a special emphasis on internal migration, informal hous-
ing and informal labor markets and local politics in Istanbul. She has been in-
volved  in  research  networks  in  the  Middle  East  and  Europe, such  as  GURI, 
MeaWards, and IMILCO and is engaged in collaborative activities. Dr. Erder and 
Dr. Kaşka conducted research on “irregular migration and trafficking in wo-
men” for IOM, collaboratively. 
Selmin Kaşka
Dr. Selmin Kaşka has been working as an assistant professor in Department of 
Labor Economics and Industrial Relations at Marmara University. She received 
her Master’s degree in Politics and Social Sciences from Marmara University 
and a second M. A. in Social Sciences from the University of Warwick, Compar-
ative Labor Studies Program. She obtained a Ph. D. in Politics and Social Sciences in 
2000 at Marmara University. Since then, she has been working in the field of 
gender and migration. She is the co-author, with Prof. Dr Sema Erder, of an In-
ternational Organization for Migration (IOM) research report, Irregular Migra-
tion and Trafficking in Women: The Case of Turkey, published in 2003. She was a 
research fellow at the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations (CRER) at the Uni-
versity  of  Warwick  between  April  2006  and  October  2007, where  she  con-
ducted a research project on “Gender and Migration, Globalization of Domestic 
Work: the Moldovan Case in Turkey”, supported by Marie Curie Intra-European 
Fellowships within the Sixth European Community Framework Program. 
Giulia Bettin
Giulia Bettin was born in Monselice (Padua, Italy) in 1980. She graduated from 
the University of Ferrara in 2004 with a B. A. in Economics. She holds a M. A. 
and a Ph. D. in Economics (2006 and 2009, respectively) from the Polytechnic 
280 Contributors
University of Marche, Ancona (Italy). She was appointed as Marie Curie Fellow 
at the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) in the context of 
the EU Marie Curie Research Training network TOM (Transnationality of Mi-
grants) (2008‒2009). After a Postdoc Fellowship at the University of Naples 
“Parthenope”, she is currently a Postdoc Researcher at the Polytechnic Univer-
sity of Marche. Her main research interests are international migration, remit-
tances, trade and labor economics.
Barbara Pusch
Barbara Pusch studied Sociology, Turkology, Philosophy and Ethnology at the 
University of Vienna from 1986 to 1991. In 1996, she completed her Ph. D. thesis 
on the Green movement in Turkey. The Austrian Fonds zur Förderung wis-
senschaftlicher Forschung financed her post-doctoral project on Muslim wo-
men in Turkey. From 1998 to 2000, she collaborated on various international 
research projects in Turkey and Germany. From 2000 to 2001, she taught at 
Istanbul Technical University. From 2001 to 2009, she served as Research As-
sistant to the Director at the Orient-Institut Istanbul. Additionally, she also lec-
tured part-time at the University of Vienna and collaborated on the project 
Cultural Capital During Migration. Since September 2009, she has been holding 
a research fellowship at the Orient-Institut Istanbul. Her current work focuses 
on various aspects of international migration to Turkey.
Yaşar Aydın 
Yaşar Aydın has been working as postdoctoral research fellow since August 
2009 at the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) and is as-
sistant lecturer at the University of Hamburg (M. A. International Business Ad-
ministration – MiBA). He studied from 1996 to 2001 sociology and economics 
at  the  University  of  Hamburg and took  subsequently  in  September  2002 a 
Masters Degree in sociology at the University of Lancaster (England). He com-
pleted in 2009 his Ph. D. at the University of Hamburg with a doctoral thesis on 
The Topoi of the Stranger: An Analysis and Critique of a Social Construct (UVK 
Verlag, Konstanz 2009). Yaşar Aydın has given lectures in sociology and pub-
lished diverse articles in scientific journals on migration politics, the problem 
of stranger-hood, theories of modernity and the problem of exclusion. His re-
search  interests  include  socio-political  and  economic  effects  of  migration, 
Contributors 281
politics  of  immigration,  sociology  of  social  problems  (inclusion/exclusion, 
politics of welfare-state) and nationalism. Currently, Yaşar Aydın is working on 
the research project “Mobility of the Highly-Qualified – Emigration of Highly-
Qualified Persons with Turkish Origin from Germany into Turkey” which is 
supported by the Hans Böckler Stiftung.
Mehmet Okyayuz
Mehmet Okyayuz is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science 
and Public Administration at Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Tur-
key. He studied Political Science, Philosophy and Sociology at the universities 
of Paris, Berlin, Heidelberg and Marburg. He completed his M. A. at the Univer-
sity of Heidelberg and his Ph. D. at the University of Marburg. Some of his areas 
of  research  and education are  labor  migration  along with  Political  Theory/ 
Thought, Social Policy and Ideology Research. At present, he is teaching “Im-
migration Policies in Europe” and “Public Participation of Turkish Labor Mi-
grants in Western Europe”. In addition, he is conducting research projects on 
“Return Migration from Germany to Turkey” and “Media Behavior of Turkish 
Migrants in Germany”. He is working as the Chairman and Member of the Ex-
ecutive Board of the NGO Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and 
Migrants (ASAM). He published texts (among others) concerning the issues of 




In the context of Turkey’s accession to the EU, the issue of potential migration from 
Turkey and its impact upon European labor markets became one of the concerns 
of the EU, considering Turkey’s growing population and young labor force. In 2011, 
half a century after the bi-lateral agreement between Turkey and Germany on labor 
recruitment in 1961, migration plays a key role in relations of Turkey with the EU 
and will even increase its significance – not necessarily for the next fifty years but 
certainly for the next decade. This book touches upon various aspects of the ongoing 
debate about the effects of Turkey’s accession to the EU upon the migration flows 
and sheds light on various dimensions of current panorama, addresses policy impli-
cations as well as future challenges and opportunities.
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